

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—DIRECT KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTION.

BY A. C. EWING.

It is very common to read or hear the statement that we are directly aware of the physical world, that we perceive or that we know matter directly; but it is very uncommon to see the meaning of this statement analysed. The present article is primarily an attempt to effect this analysis, which should surely be a necessary preliminary to any theory of knowledge or perception. For, till we have carried out the analysis, we can never be sure that we are not trying to prove direct knowledge or perception in one sense by an argument which really proves it only in another quite different sense of the term. The particular analysis in question, once carried out, seems to lead to or at least suggest important conclusions concerning alike memory, perception and knowledge in general; but there is no need to anticipate these conclusions yet,—let them disclose themselves in the sequel.

In the first place there is one minimum sense in which direct awareness of matter must be admitted if we know anything about matter at all. Most of those who assert direct awareness of matter mean more than this, but they mean this at least, namely, that if I know anything about a physical object at all, it is the physical object which I am really knowing and not my "ideas" of it or at any rate not only my "ideas" of it. This is, indeed, hardly more than the tautology that if I know an object I know *it*, and do not know something else instead, in this case my ideas. Yet, tautology though it is, it is necessary

to insist on it because some thinkers have confused the statement that in order to know things we must have "ideas" in our mind with the statement that to know a thing is to know our "ideas" about it. We can, indeed, know our ideas about matter, but that piece of knowledge does not belong to the study of the material world, it belongs to psychology. The cognition of matter is direct in the sense that it does not consist simply in knowing our "ideas" about matter, in only knowing a copy in our minds and not the external reality. If that is all we know, we do not know matter at all. The same applies if we substitute for "knowledge," "belief" or "opinion"; a point which is still more important since it is extremely difficult even for a realist to claim absolute certainty for any of our judgments about the physical world. Even if I believe and do not know that "this table is wooden," what I believe is something about the table not about my ideas of the table.¹ The same applies to knowledge of and beliefs about past events or minds other than our own.

Now this does not, of course, prove direct perception of matter in the ordinary sense of that expression, any more than the fact that we have knowledge of other minds and not only of our ideas about them proves telepathy. Even if the knowledge of or the belief in matter could only be reached by inference, it would still be matter which we were knowing or believing in, not only our ideas about matter; even if we could only perceive ideas or sensa, not physical objects, our belief that physical objects existed would still be a belief not about our ideas but about the physical objects. Again, this is not affected by the fact that in order to arrive at knowledge (or belief) we mostly, or perhaps always, need mental imagery of some kind, for these images are only a means to enable us to know something other than themselves. It may be right to hold that we use images in order to know, yet wrong to hold that what we are knowing is therefore only or primarily the images.

Further—and this will seem somewhat paradoxical—if we confine ourselves strictly to the sense of "direct knowledge" just defined, we see that this is a kind of "directness" which knowledge shares not only with the most uncertain opinions but even with error. For even in error we are concerned not with our ideas but with external reality: error consists in thinking that

¹ Prof. Cook Wilson (in *Statement and Inference*) seems to me inconsistent in, on the one hand, stressing this directness of knowledge and on the other treating opinion and belief as if they had no such direct relation to reality but were just something that went on in our minds.

reality is different from what it is, not in merely having ideas which fail to copy reality. If there is no reference to external reality there is no error about such reality; error is not a mere dwelling on our ideas but an unsuccessful cognising of objects.

But by the statement that we are directly aware of matter we may also mean that we do not come to accept the existence of matter as the result of an inference. We do not, it is contended, patiently abstain from believing in matter till we have inferred it from our sense-data. On the contrary we assume its existence at the beginning of life, and most people go through life without ever having inferred it. This must be distinguished from the first sense of direct awareness which I have given, for even if we inferred matter our knowledge or belief would still be direct in the sense that it was concerned with, related to matter, and not our ideas, while it would not be direct in the second sense of "non-inferential"; and it must also be distinguished from the direct theory of *perception*, for even if we did not *perceive* matter directly, we might still, rightly or wrongly, accept its existence as self-evident without inference. That our belief in matter is non-inferential seems true, but this so far is only a psychological fact. It does not prove the truth of the assumption that matter exists; self-evident truths are not inferred but neither are irrational prejudices. No doubt if we concede that we have non-inferential *knowledge* of matter we have been trapped into conceding that matter exists; for the term knowledge is not applicable unless the judgments dignified by that name are true. But this is merely verbal; we cannot use the fact that our cognition of matter is non-inferential to prove that it really is knowledge, unless we hold not only that it is non-inferential but that it is self-evidently true. (I am in this article using "cognise" and "cognition" to cover both knowing and believing without committing myself to any particular view as to the relation between the two latter; it is just a convenient abbreviation intended to avoid repetition of the clumsy phrase "knowledge of" or "belief in".)

So, thirdly, when the statement that we are directly aware of the physical world is made, it is usually assumed that this awareness gives us both certainty and truth, that it is genuine intuitive knowledge. The presence of direct awareness in this sense would undoubtedly be sufficient to justify us in accepting the existence of matter as an indubitably certain fact, but it would be quite compatible with holding that what we *perceive* in sense-experience is only our own ideas. It might be that we had an intuitive, certain *knowledge* of the existence of matter

even if we did not *perceive* it directly, *i.e.*, it might be that what we perceived was not the material objects themselves but something else, *e.g.*, ideas in our mind, and yet that we had real knowledge of matter not based on inference. Non-inferential knowledge is clearly not limited entirely by what we can empirically perceive, and might extend to matter.

Direct awareness of the physical world does not therefore necessarily imply the direct theory of perception, and the latter theory (whether right or wrong) seems to me to gain an unfair advantage in argument from the assumption that it does. Direct cognition would, in any of the three senses analysed, be quite possible without direct perception, and we cannot therefore argue that because the former must be accepted, the latter must. But undoubtedly one of the possible senses in which we may understand the statement that we are directly aware of the physical world is as meaning that we directly perceive it, and this sense now comes up for examination.

The question of direct perception is not a question about our cognition ; it is a question about the nature and identity of certain beings experienced by us, *i.e.*, whether the something which we obviously and admittedly perceive when we use our senses is part of the physical world or not. Some philosophers, the holders of the *representative* theory of perception, say it is merely something in the perceiver's mind ; others, the holders of the *direct* theory, say it is physical, external to us and capable of being perceived by other minds. Now there is one point which seems to be generally overlooked. The judgment that we perceive matter directly does not necessarily imply that we know the existence of matter. We have already seen that we might know matter directly without perceiving it directly, but the converse is equally true. For it is quite conceivable that what we perceive might be in fact identical with matter and yet that we might have no knowledge of this important fact. Indeed, this would seem actually to be the case, if the direct theory is true at all, and if we are speaking of knowledge and not belief ; for clearly representationists and idealists did not *know* that what they perceived was identical with matter, and it is very unlikely that such a deficiency in knowledge is peculiar to these philosophers. Most men certainly take it for granted that what they perceive is a physical object and they may very well be right ; but can they be said to know it ? If we first assume a knowledge of or belief in matter, we may then argue that matter is perceived directly ; but this knowledge or belief itself could be based on direct perception only if we included

under this term both the last-mentioned sense of direct awareness, the sense in which it refers to perception, properly speaking, and the third sense, or the last of the epistemological senses, and said that we have intuitive knowledge (or a conviction justifying belief) that what we perceive is matter; but I have never seen these two assertions separated or distinguished. Further, this knowledge or conviction justifying belief, even if it is present, could not possibly be given by perception. We cannot know by perception that the object of our immediate experience exists independently of being perceived unless we can perform the impossible feat of perceiving it without its being perceived; nor can we know by perception alone whether other observers see numerically the same things as we do since we cannot observe their experiences directly. We cannot even obtain by perception an intuitive conviction justifying belief in these or similar propositions. Empirical evidence alone can never tell us that what we perceive immediately is not our own ideas but a physical object. For the question is not whether what we perceive does or does not possess certain observable characteristics. We may perfectly well perceive matter directly without knowing or believing it to be matter, and therefore we cannot use the direct theory of perception to establish the existence of matter; on the contrary we can only maintain that theory if we have first established the existence of matter by other means.

To sum up before going further, we have seen that the question whether we are directly aware of matter really covers four different problems:—

1. Is the representationist view of cognition true, *i.e.*, are the only possible immediate objects of cognition our own ideas?
2. Do we come to believe in matter as the result of an inference, or intuitively?
3. Have we intuitive *knowledge* of the existence of matter (or in the absence of this at least an intuitive conviction adequate to justify belief)?
4. Is what we perceive a material object?

We have further seen that we might know ¹ matter directly, in all the senses of the term given, and yet not perceive it directly, and that we might perceive it directly and yet not know it directly or not even believe it to exist independently of our minds.

¹ I do not, however, see how we can be said to *know* the existence of matter, whether we perceive matter directly or not; but I am inclined to admit that we have a somewhat confused intuition which may be sufficient to justify belief in matter though not amounting to knowledge.

We shall return to perception later, but it is worth while noticing that the confusion pointed out also has very detrimental effects on the theory of memory. As in the case of physical perception we find the question asked—Are we directly aware of the past in memory? Here again philosophers seem to think that this question can just be answered—Yes or No, but in reality it resolves itself into four separate questions in the same way as the analogous question about the perception of matter. The first question is—Do we know the past directly in the sense that when we remember a past event it is that event itself and not our present ideas about it that we are cognising? In this sense the “direct” view of memory is clearly true if we have any knowledge of the past at all. If we know the past it is the past we know and not our present ideas; likewise if we have a belief about the past it is the past about which we have a belief and not our present ideas. Secondly—Is memory non-inferential? Here again the answer is clearly in the affirmative; simple memory is, if not totally unmixed with inference, at least as little inferential as any of our knowledge can be. When we remember a past event, our consciousness of it seems to be its own evidence. We do not believe that it happened because we argue that it is needed to account for our present ideas. *Inferences* as to my past actions are not memory, any more than inferences as to other people’s actions. The third question is—Does memory give us truth? This is not, indeed, a question that we can ask as outsiders, so to speak, since the truth of a memory judgment, not being inferred, must be cognised in the act of remembering itself and not by means of any external criterion; it must either be an illusion or its own evidence. But that it is in very many cases its own evidence and not an illusion we can hardly deny: while it is obviously impossible to maintain that there can be no such thing as a mistake of memory, it is equally clear that memory gives us truth, at least in very many cases. But our affirmative answer to these three questions does not necessitate an affirmative answer to the fourth—Is the fact remembered an immediate object of present perception? Yet it has been supposed that, if we are directly aware of the past in the first three senses, the past must be, so to speak, bodily present to our mind or occupy the same position as our present objects of perception. Hence some have supposed that since we obviously can know the past directly, this paradox is the truth; others have supposed that since this is obviously impossible we cannot know the past directly at all. But all this could have been avoided by a simple process of analysis.

It is perfectly true that we can cognise the past directly and are not confined to inferring it, but this does not mean that the past is still here as an existent object or that I perceive it as I do what is now given by my senses; it only means that I can consciously make true judgments about it not based on inference. If I actually *saw* the past we might be compelled to hold that it would have to be present while I looked at it, but why should it have to be present now for me to make right judgments about it? That the past should stand in some relation to the present does not imply its existence now; otherwise the mere fact that it was past, *i.e.*, related to the present by the relation of antecedence in time, would imply that it was itself present. Some relations may imply the contemporary existence of the related terms: this seems to be the case with pure spatial relations, relations like being a friend to, and indeed, I think, with the relation of perceiving. But there are many other relations which nobody could say implied the coexistence of their terms, *e.g.*, likeness, quantitative relations, causality. In memory I perceive directly my own images or sensations, but these need not and cannot be identified with the event remembered. My relation to them is quite different from the relation I bear to the past event. For we are immediately aware of them as here now; in knowing a past event I am not immediately aware of it as present but as past. If we doubt the evidence of our immediate experience so far as to say that they are not really present now and only seem so, we might just as well doubt anything. For we do now experience them; we do not experience the past now but only know the past, and perhaps also have some experience rather like that of the past through the stimulus of this knowledge (our experience may be, however, not similar but opposite to that of the past, as when we feel regret at the thought of past joys or joy at the thought of past pains). The view that past events can be immediately perceived seems so difficult that there can be no excuse for maintaining it after we have abandoned what is the only reason for its adoption, namely, the supposition that to know the past directly involves perceiving it directly.

The success of our method in dealing with the question of memory encourages us to return to perception. The problem here is—Are we to hold that what we immediately perceive is identical (numerically and not only qualitatively) with some part of the physical world? It is usual nowadays to decry any suggestion hostile to the direct theory of perception as “subjectivism,” but this is partly due to the confusions already

pointed out. To say that what we immediately perceive is other than the physical objects we think we perceive is not, as has been wrongly assumed, to say that we can only know our ideas ; it is not even to say that our belief in or knowledge of the existence of matter must be based on inference, either psychologically or logically. We may know what we cannot immediately perceive ; and in any case we could not establish the independent existence of material objects without admitting some such knowledge (or justified belief), since even an advocate of direct perception cannot maintain that we perceive matter directly when nobody is perceiving it. The representative theory of perception is still not free from objection, but, whatever its faults, there are at least some powerful reasons which support it against the theory of direct perception.

The chief of these is the fact of illusion. The direct theory means that what we perceive is identical with physical objects or at least consists of parts or properties of such objects. In that case you and I will see the same object, *e.g.*, a table, at the same time. But if we are sufficiently removed from each other, you will see a shape different from the one I see. Therefore, the table has or includes in its being two different shapes at the same moment, and in fact, by an extension of the argument, an infinite, or at least indefinite, number (though this would not necessarily be incompatible with one of the shapes being more important causally than the others). This is not by any means an indefensible view. It is the view held by Mr. Bertrand Russell and some of the "New Realists," and seems to be a logical consequence of the direct theory. We must either put into the physical world every perception everybody has, whether well or ill, whether drunk or sober, or admit that in some cases at least perception is representative ; and if we once make this concession it is difficult in the extreme to see how we can be justified in asserting the directness of other perceptions. It is inconsistent to maintain both that we perceive matter directly and that colour may not be a property of matter ;¹ it is inconsistent to maintain both that we see the mirror itself and yet that the reflexion we equally see in the mirror is not there at all ; it is inconsistent to say that we perceive matter directly and yet that its real qualities are quite different from its apparent ones, and that it is at least doubtful, as modern scientists often maintain, whether it has any of the sensible properties

¹ I am not myself intending to exclude the view that colour is a property of matter, but most realists do so.

given in perception whatever. Anyone who doubts or denies the external physical reality of even colour is denying that what we perceive immediately is part of the physical world, for what we perceive immediately is obviously coloured.

This is the dilemma that confronts the direct theory. We must either admit that perception is non-direct in some cases at least or admit the physical reality of everything that anybody ever sees.¹ Of the various ways of escape that may be attempted perhaps the easiest is to hold the representative theory in the case of "illusions," but to retain the direct theory in regard to those cases of perception where there is no reason to suspect illusion. It is sometimes taken for granted that there are no such cases, in the sphere of sight at least, because the laws of perspective always affect what we see. We are always some distance from the object perceived and are never at an equal distance from all its parts; therefore, it seems, we should see those parts of it which are nearer to us as too large relatively to the others, thus distorting its shape and affecting its relations to other objects in the field of perception. It has been pointed out to me, however, that this does not seem to be the case with objects only a few feet away. If I change my position when looking at such objects, I find it hard to detect any corresponding change in their shape and am at least doubtful whether there is any such change in what I see at all, though I have no doubt about it in the case of remote objects. It is therefore possible to hold that in the case of fairly near objects the direct theory is true, and yet that we perceive only a representation in the case of more distant objects. But this, though not impossible, seems very unlikely, for it would involve a total difference between the mechanism for perceiving relatively distant objects and the mechanism for perceiving near objects, without there being anything whatever in our conscious experience or in our sense-organs to point to such a difference of kind. It would mean not a gradual transition in respect of degree but an abrupt and

¹The view that physical objects possess all the properties perceived by us but only possess them in relation to an organism or "from a point of view" is not really a separate alternative, because if it means that they only appear to a perceiver and are not really present in the object, this resolves itself into the non-direct view of perception, and if it means that they are really present in the physical world as qualities relative to some other physical object or part of space, this is a form (very probably the most defensible form) of the alternative view that everything we perceive is in the physical world just as perceived. That even in this case we have to make a distinction between some qualities immediately perceived and what we usually call physical properties will be seen later.

complete change in the kind of object I see when I pass the limit where illusion begins; before I saw physical objects, now on that view I see mere representations. Further, even this would not remove the difficulties as to mirror reflexions, colour, etc., and that raised by the contrast between the structure of matter as described by science and as revealed to our eyes. These illusions, if they are illusions, continue, however near we approach to the object. There are ways, more or less plausible, of meeting any one of the difficulties, but together they constitute a formidable barrier. Nor has such a solution escaped the arguments which seem to indicate the dependence of what we see on psychological factors such as interpretation and association. Also, surely the only reasonable explanation of the fact that we do not see a difference in shape with objects close at hand is the limitation of our eyesight. If I had keen enough eyes, I surely should be bound to see a difference because the distance and angle of vision have changed; only the difference producible by that cause is so minute as to fall below the minimum visible and therefore cannot appear in what I perceive. It has been also suggested that the direct theory might be true of touch and the representative theory of the other senses; but it is difficult to distinguish between the senses in this way and impossible altogether to eliminate illusions of touch. Again, there is an equal or greater difficulty in maintaining that we perceive "primary" qualities directly but not "secondary" qualities, especially as we never perceive or even imagine one class of qualities without the other. In general, it seems very difficult to split up our perceptions in such a drastic way as any of these theories do; it seems arbitrary and unjustified to say that some are direct if most are shown by illusion to be representative, or to say that some are representative if on general grounds we have established a direct theory. But in any case it will be of value to examine further the antithesis between a complete direct theory and a complete non-direct theory of perception.

Let us turn now to some less defensible attempts to avoid the dilemma in question. It is sometimes said that what we see immediately is not really coloured but only appears coloured, or that when, for example, we look at a straight stick immersed in water what we see is not really bent but only looks bent. This would no doubt be the best solution if it could be reconciled with our immediate experience, but can it? Clearly what I think I am immediately aware of is not only a shape that looks bent but a shape that is bent, not sham bentness but real

bentness ; the physical object may not be bent but I am immediately aware of something that is bent. Therefore to say that there is nothing really bent but that it only looks bent is not merely to deny that we perceive physical objects as they are but to take the much more serious step of asserting that our immediate experience is itself illusory, that we have been quite wrong in most of the judgments that we have made as to the data immediately given to us by sense ; for we have held that they are bent when they are not bent, coloured when they are colourless, shaped in a certain way when they do not really possess that but quite a different shape. Further this error is not due to bad inference which we had confused with immediate experience, for according to this theory we really are immediately conscious of the objects that are straight but look bent ; it is not due to an overhasty and superficial analysis of our experience, for however carefully and long we look at the stick we see a bent shape before us ; it is not an extraordinary and occasional illusion but an illusion present in, at any rate, most of the experiences we have. Most philosophers would hold that we can never be mistaken as to qualities immediately experienced any more than as to the *cogito, ergo sum*, and although I am not myself sure whether this is the case and whether there is no possibility of mistake at all, still we surely can hardly admit such a widespread illusion and error in our immediate experience as is implied by this theory, without plunging ourselves into the abyss of an almost total scepticism. If we doubt the verdict of experience here, are we not equally bound to doubt it anywhere ? A further objection is that this view would involve the extraordinary conclusion that colour and other "secondary" qualities have no existence at all ; that I can never see colour, only seem to myself to see colour, and that there is nothing really coloured.

It is equally impossible to avoid the dilemma by saying that illusions can easily be explained by the constitution of our sense-organs and the laws of perspective. This explanation is useful if we hold that what we directly perceive is not a physical object, but if what we see is held to be the external physical thing itself (or part of it) we cannot apply the explanation at all unless we are prepared to maintain that the laws of perspective and the constitution of our sense-organs change, not something in our brains or minds, but the actual physical tables, chairs, trees, etc., and further change them in such a way as to cause them to take an indefinite number of different shapes at the same moment and give them many qualities like colour

which they never had at all before. For what we are supposed to explain by the laws of perspective, etc., is why what we see takes a certain shape, and what we see according to the direct theory is the physical object itself. That we see a certain shape, e.g., an avenue converging is clear; if what we see is the physical object, that the physical object has this shape follows from the law of identity and cannot be doubted. It would be different if it could be maintained that when we looked at the avenue we really did not see anything converging but only imagined we did; but if we doubt the verdict of experience here we have no right to believe it anywhere. It is as indubitable a fact of experience as any that under these conditions we do see two lines converging, that that shape is really present to our senses. The shape, since we see it, exists even if it be degraded to the rank of an image in our mind; the question is not whether it is but what it is, whether it is a physical object or an idea or something else intermediate between the two.

But we have admitted that judgment can be erroneous, and why should we not admit the same about perception, it may be asked. This is the solution adopted by Prof. Laird in *A Study in Realism*.¹ "There is a risk of error," he says, "in every species of apprehending, and not merely in judgment. That which confronts the mind may or may not be as it seems. An illusory percept, to be sure, claims to be as it seems, and it is verily a determinate appearance; but that is not to the point since precisely the same thing occurs in a false judgment. Anyone who judges that Cæsar died in his bed has a thinkable complex before his mind which is something, appears to be true, and is false in fact". Now here is, I think, another case where failure to distinguish the different problems involved in the apparently simple question of direct awareness leads to confusion. For the issue is really quite different in perception and judgment, although at first sight it seems the same. To make this clear let us call the object as it appears to us or is judged by us Ax and the object as it is Ay. Now in perception it is a fact that Ax exists. It is a fact that converging lines are really there before us when we look at the avenue; we have as good evidence for that as for almost any empirical judgment. What the direct theory of *perception* says is that Ax (the avenue as perceived, that is, the converging avenue) is identical with Ay (the real physical avenue) or at least a part of Ay, and this is clearly false unless the same physical object

¹ Pp. 41-42.

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can have different shapes at the same time. But no theory of cognition held by anyone asserts that Ax (Cæsar dying in bed, to take Prof. Laird's instance) ever could be identical with, or a part of, Ay (the real state of Cæsar), unless it were, indeed, the case that Cæsar really had died in his bed. In the case of true judgments there is no difficulty about the identity between Ax and Ay; in the case of erroneous judgments there are two alternative views held, but neither view implies the identity of Ax and Ay. Some philosophers hold that, if I judge Cæsar to have died in bed, my erroneous belief or judgment indeed exists as a psychological fact, as a state of my mind, but the fictitious object—Cæsar dying in bed—has no kind of existence or being. But in this case, since it does not exist at all, it *a fortiori* cannot be identical with the real state of Cæsar. Other philosophers, as *e.g.*, Meinong, hold that even objects of error have some kind of being, though a different kind from that possessed by ordinary existent objects; but even such a theory would never imply identity between what is asserted in an erroneous judgment and the real state of the object of which the assertion is made. It would maintain that both Ax and Ay have some kind of being, but not that Ax is identical with Ay. In the case of perception we have to start by admitting the existence of a certain object, namely, that which we immediately perceive and which we know by the evidence of experience to be two rows converging, and are then asked to say that this object is numerically identical with something, namely, a physical avenue which according to Prof. Laird does not converge in this way (he is not one of the "New Realists"). In judgment we have a state of mind, certain auxiliary mental images, that which is judged, and the real fact of which the judgment attempts to give an account; and he would not, I think, imagine that the real fact, the murder of Cæsar, could be identical with any of the other three elements in the situation, either with our state of mind in judging, or with the images (probably words) which accompanied the judgment, or with what is judged, namely, that Cæsar died in his bed. The position in cognition and perception is quite different. The difficulty in the case of perception is not the mere fact of error, but the demand that we should hold both that what we immediately perceive is numerically identical with a physical object or part of such an object and yet that it is quite different.

But let us now turn to the main argument for direct perception. It is to the effect that, if the direct theory were not true, we should be "shut up in our own ideas" and could have no justifica-

tion for our belief in the physical world. Now it is quite possible that the direct theory of perception may be true, but the argument for it just cited is of a very peculiar type. It is in short an argument which could not be accepted unless we had first judged direct perception to be a fact. For either propositions asserting the existence of matter can be rightly inferred or seen to be self-evident without assuming that we perceive matter directly, or they cannot. If they can, the argument that we could not come to know of the existence of matter unless direct perception be a fact falls to the ground. If, however, they cannot—if, as the thinkers in question hold, knowledge of matter could not be reached or belief in matter justified unless we suppose, as the plain man does, that we directly perceive matter, then we cannot assert the existence of matter unless we have *first* judged that we perceive it directly, and cannot therefore afterwards go on to argue that because we know matter to exist the direct theory must be true. Either the belief in matter can be justified without first establishing the fact of direct perception, in which case the premiss of the argument disappears; or it cannot, in which case we are trying to prove direct perception from the existence of matter and the existence of matter from direct perception without having shown that either is a fact. Realists often charge idealists, rightly or wrongly, with having based their conclusions on the fallacious argument:—

I want to believe in God.

I cannot justify the belief in God unless idealism is true.

Therefore idealism is true.

I certainly do not admire the logic of this argument, if it is indeed used by idealists, but is it any worse than the argument:—

I want to believe in matter.

I cannot justify the belief in matter unless the direct theory of perception be true.

Therefore the direct theory of perception is true.

This seems to me the straightforward interpretation of the argument in question, but I will be charitable and take two other possible ways in which it may be interpreted. It may be meant that we know matter directly all along and that the direct theory of perception is just a reflective statement of the fact that we do. In that case the argument would escape being a vicious circle because it would be merely an analysis disclosing a knowledge we already possessed, merely a statement of the fact that we directly knew matter. But after the distinction made earlier it is now apparent that this involves a confusion between perception and cognition. To say that we know matter

directly is not to say that we perceive it directly, nor *vice versa*. We might have knowledge and even non-inferential knowledge of matter without perceiving it directly, and we might perceive it directly without knowing that it was really matter we perceived. Of course if anybody holds not only the existence of matter but the direct theory of perception to be known intuitively, I have nothing more to say except that I do not share this intuitive knowledge; but we are not dealing with this position, we are dealing with *arguments* for the theory based on our belief in or knowledge of matter. The most that can be admitted is that it is slightly more plausible to hold that we have direct cognition (in this sense) of matter if we have also direct perception of matter; but once it is admitted that to know matter directly is not necessarily to perceive it directly and that to perceive matter is not necessarily to know that we perceive it, we find that there is no substantial objection to direct cognition of matter which would not apply equally on either theory of perception.

To pass to another interpretation of the argument, it is possible that what it means in the hands of some who employ it is simply that the belief in matter cannot be psychologically explained unless we perceive matter directly; but it surely cannot be proved that no other explanation is possible at all. Since other people do act as if they saw the same things that we see, since we are acutely conscious of finding, not of making, what we perceive, and since we have the same experience as we should expect if the things we saw were present all the time even when we were not looking, there seems no difficulty in explaining why we believe in the independent existence of a physical world common to all percipients, though these circumstances do not necessarily prove the belief to be true. Further the mere fact that what we saw was a physical object could not possibly help to explain the belief psychologically unless in addition to this fact we suppose an intuitive conviction that it is a fact, or at least that matter exists. But in that case whether the intuitive conviction was true or false would be quite irrelevant to the psychological explanation of our belief. The belief would be explained just as well if we supposed this conviction to be a mere prejudice due to our innate constitution or practical needs as if we supposed it to be a genuine intuition. It is a problem in psychology which we are now discussing, and therefore the truth or falsehood of our conviction is irrelevant provided the psychological state is the same.

The case against the representative theory of perception is

therefore, at any rate, less strong than is usually supposed nowadays. But, on the other hand, the advocates of that theory have committed the serious error of assuming without adequate justification that, if the immediate objects of perception are different from the physical objects common to all observers, they must therefore be mental. Now if by "mental" is meant that they are qualities of the mind, this statement is clearly false unless we are prepared to maintain that our mind is blue when we look at the sky and round (or elliptical) when we look at a penny. The immediate objects of sense-perception are far from being mental in the sense in which, *e.g.*, an act of thought or will is so. They have far more in common with the physical as conceived by us than they have with the mental, at least apart from their causal properties. They may be causally dependent on us, and they may fail to produce the effects that similar physical objects would, but in themselves they seem rather to fall on the physical side of the dividing-line; as is proved by the fact that any idea which we can form of the concrete qualities of matter must be derived entirely from them. But it would perhaps be best to say that they are neither physical nor mental but occupy an intermediate position between these two kinds of being. We cannot assume as a necessary *a priori* truth that everything must fall into one of two classes, the physical and the mental.

But, provided it is recognised, on the one hand, that if the direct theory of perception is true everything which we perceive must exist in the physical world just as we perceive it, and, on the other, that even if the direct theory is denied it does not necessarily follow that what we immediately perceive is mental, the gulf between the two conflicting schools is very much narrowed.¹ The question in dispute is no longer whether the immediate objects of perception are physical, in the full sense, or mental. For even if we describe them as physical, we must admit that many or most of them cannot possibly be identified with the physical objects studied by science or even with those recognised by "the man in the street". We must admit that many of them do not obey the most elementary and universal laws of physical causation, and again, that many of them cannot be

¹ A third alternative that some objects immediately perceived are physical but that the representative theory holds in the case of others, though, I think, open to serious objection, cannot be dismissed as altogether impossible; but it would, like the other views, have to admit the intermediate position between physical and mental of most of the objects in question.

observed by more than one individual (at least at the same time), though they may perhaps in some sense belong to or be parts of a physical object (as the "New Realists" maintain). If, on the other hand, we describe our immediate objects of perception as mental, we have to take away most of the meaning of this assertion by granting that they are extended (at least in the case of some of our senses, probably with all), and that they may possess any of the sensible properties which can possibly be ascribed to matter, although they are governed by laws of causation quite different from those studied by physical science. On either view we have to admit these perceived entities as something intermediate between the mental and the material. The two principal differences still left outstanding between the rival doctrines are (a) that the advocate of the direct theory will not hold these entities to be either causally or otherwise dependent on us, while his opponent will maintain that they only exist when we perceive them; (b) that the representative theory will suppose a different space for each observer in which his immediate objects of perception exist, while the direct theory will locate them in the one physical space, though in so doing its advocate may be driven to assimilate his view still more closely to the other by following the example of Bertrand Russell and making his space a system of spaces. We have thus seen that here as elsewhere extremes meet in philosophy; but it would be absurd to expect us in the length of a single article to decide for one of these final alternatives rather than the other, or further to narrow the gulf between them. It is enough to have done some of the laborious "spade-work" of analysis necessary to prepare the way for a solution.

II.—IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE : ITS NATURE AND CONTENT.

By LOUIS ARNAUD REID.

THE *Symposium* on "Immediate Experience" at the 1929 Joint Meeting of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society adds yet another to the 'epistemological' discussions of psychology, which, largely under the *ægis* of Prof. Dawes Hicks, have taken place of recent years. The few hours that are available before these annual meetings for the reading of the printed papers, and the necessarily short time given to oral discussion, make it difficult for anyone, other than the writers of the papers, to contribute very much at the time of the meeting. The following article offers some further reflexions on the problem of immediate experience and feeling.

There are two quite distinct senses in which the term 'feeling' may be used, both of them possessing pedigree and prestige—though pedigree and prestige of very different sorts. Let us begin our enquiry by denoting these two senses.

(i) What may be called the 'current' view of feeling can be exemplified by making excerpts from almost any work on psychology. Ward speaks approvingly of feeling as "a strictly subjective state varying continuously in intensity and passing from time to time from its positive phase (pleasure) to its negative or opposite phase (pain) or *vice versa*."¹ And hear Stout: "The affective attitude consists in being pleased or displeased with something, in liking or disliking it."² Or McDougall: "The passive aspect of experience, the suffering of pain or dissatisfaction, the enjoying of pleasure or satisfaction, is conveniently called 'affective' . . . we may speak of 'feeling' or 'affection.'"³ Or Miss Edgell: "Psychology uses the term Feeling to denote the experience of being affected pleasantly or unpleasantly by an object."⁴

(ii) 'Feeling' used in this sense has obviously quite a different meaning from many of the meanings which we give it in ordinary

¹ *Psychological Principles*, p. 45.

² *Outline of Psychology*, p. 266.

³ *Manual*, 4th ed., p. 107.

⁴ *Mental Life*, p. 13.

speech. In ordinary speech we use the term very frequently in a *cognitive* sense, and this is the second broad sense to which I wish to refer. In ordinary speech we say 'I feel surprised,' 'angry,' 'certain,' 'I feel hot, cold, hungry,' 'I feel a toothache,' 'I feel the smoothness of this surface,' or even, 'I feel this is more beautiful than that,' and, 'I feel there is truth in what you say'. Psychologists are at pains to make clear that when they use the term feeling they are *not* using it in any of the senses just mentioned, but in a *non-cognitive* sense. For psychological purposes, we do not feel *something*, we feel *somehow*. "Psychology cannot follow common usage here."¹ "The word 'feel' is commonly used as a transitive verb, equivalent to 'perceive'. . . . This usage is apt to create confusion. . . . As a verb 'feel' should be used only in the intransitive sense, as when we say 'I feel tired or lazy or hungry', and even then we do better to say 'I am tired,' etc."² . . . "Feeling is . . . not cognitive; it is not 'knowing something,' even about your subjective condition; it is simply 'the way you feel.'"³

The psychologist has a perfect right to use the term feeling in his own sense, and his use has the merits of being established, of being perfectly clear, and of standing for a real, ultimate, and probably unanalysable aspect of mental experience. But the other use has some merits also. It too is an established use, one which is not merely confined to popular speech, but is to be found continually in the writings of philosophers and even of psychologists. Its meaning may not be so uniform, so simple, so crystal-clear, but a little investigation does show, I think, that it can be given a perfectly definite meaning. Whether to that meaning we ought to attach the term 'feeling' is of course a matter of opinion. In one way, it does seem that we are justified—in spite of certain objections—in using feeling in this way. The word feeling stands traditionally (outside books of psychology) for a peculiarly intimate kind of experiencing of something, primarily our own states, and no other single English word has this status, or is expressive of quite the same thing. (It is true that the phrase 'Immediate Experience' can be employed to apply to the same thing, and I shall make use of it. But 'Immediate Experience' is again more of a technical term.) On the other hand it may very well be that to sanction two senses of 'feeling' is to harbour confusion. My use of the term 'feeling' in parts of this paper to denote this second

¹ B. Edgell, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

² McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

³ Woodworth, *Psychology: A Study of Mental Life*, p. 172.

meaning does not imply any conviction as to its being the best word. I think that almost certainly it is not. But if we do, in philosophy and psychology, choose to use feeling in this sense—a cognitive sense—we ought to be perfectly clear that we are using it in this sense, and that we are *not* using it in the traditional psychological sense of hedonic tone. For this reason I propose, in order to avoid ambiguity, to employ (except where the context makes the meaning clear) the terms 'cognitive feeling' or 'Immediate Experience' on the one hand, and 'affect' or 'hedonic tone' on the other, to denote the two distinct ideas.

There is one theory of immediate experience which, at first sight at any rate, looks as though it had a close connexion with the cognitive feeling which we are about to explore. This is the theory of *Erlebnis*, with which Prof. Dawes Hicks has made us so familiar in this country. I have no intention of trying to restate the theory here or of criticising it at length. But one part of the theory, and one criticism of it (as put forward by Prof. Hicks) has a bearing on our present enquiry. For Prof. Hicks (in the *Symposium* on "Immediate Experience" referred to) immediate experience is an *Erlebnis*, and this is identified with feeling. Now if feeling is immediate experience, it looks at first glance as though we were supposed to think of it as having 'content,' as being in some sense cognitive. For is it not legitimate to speak of 'experience of?' Is 'experience' not cognitive? Has it not an object or content?

But Prof. Dawes Hicks strenuously denies that the theory he is defending implies this. *Erlebnis* or being for self is *not* cognition or apprehension, in the ordinary sense of 'discriminative' apprehension. The mental acts or processes which we live through are *not objects* of the immediate experience. "The experience in question belongs to or is correlative with mental acts or processes."¹ "The character or nature of a mental act is in no sense disclosed by the immediate experience we are said to have of it. If we ask *what* it is that is being immediately experienced, we get no answer."² That which has a content or object is the subsequent analysis which as psychologists we make. But "'living through' it and understanding it are two different things."³ Acquaintance with mental process is distinct from introspection, though introspection is dependent on acquaintance.⁴ "Primary awareness,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 190.

² *Symposium*, p. 184.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 1920-21, p. 159.

in the sense of feeling or *Erlebnis*, has no object, its being consists simply in the awareness."¹

Now we may be quite ready to admit that immediate experience is as a concrete complex fact in many important respects different from ordinary concrete discriminative cognition. But surely if 'experience' or 'awareness' be at all correct terms to use (and it is significant that Prof. Hicks denies that feeling falls outside the boundaries of knowledge)² it is almost impossible to avoid the conclusion—though people do it—that they have *some* object or content, that *something* is discriminated, however vaguely or slightly. If they have *no* content at all, however vague, or difficult to name, are they not simply blank non-entities?

In so far as terms like *Erlebnis* or *Enjoyment* have implied non-cognitiveness, they should, I venture to think, be shunned like the devil. (And it appears hard to see how they can possibly be squared with the hedonic view of Ward and others, as Prof. Hicks tries to square them.) Because the customary use does seem to imply the idea of non-cognitiveness, I propose to avoid (however regretfully) the further use of the word *Erlebnis* in this paper and to stick to 'Immediate Experience' and 'Cognitive Feeling'. Immediate experience, then, or Cognitive Feeling, its content, its relation to its content, the comparison of it with other knowledge, and finally, its relation to hedonic tone—these are our main problems.

But first a single word more on terminology—on the term 'immediate,' which is not altogether happy. 'Immediate' suggests contrast with 'inferential'. But although 'Immediate Experience' is in fact non-inferential, it is not with inference that we shall contrast it, but with experience of objects whose existence is less intimately ('immediately,' 'directly') related to the existence of the experiencing. All experience is, of course, in one very real sense 'immediate': a star is, in this sense, experienced just as 'immediately' as a pang of remorse. But star and remorse as existents are very differently related to the mind. The existing star is separated from the existing mental process by great stretches of time and perhaps of space,³ whilst the remorseful experience and the experiencing of this are for practical purposes at least contemporaneous (and perhaps³ very nearly spatially coincident). It is this kind of thing which I have in mind when I speak of *immediate* experience. In

¹ *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 1920-21, p. 160.

² *Symposium*, p. 184.

³ If mental process can in *any* sense be said to be in space.

immediately experiencing something, the 'something' must be existentially in the very closest relation to the experiencing of it. This is all that I mean. "Immediate Experience," says Prof. Dawes Hicks, is "the kind of experience . . . we have of mental states or processes as they are actually occurring." *As they are actually occurring.* Immediate experience, be it noted, is not, as Prof. Hicks rightly says (with a different motive), introspection, though the content of immediate experience can be introspected. Introspection is an overt, consciously discriminative psychosis directed upon an object.¹ Let this suffice for the moment, with the proviso that we be allowed to add to the content of immediate experience, if we so think fit, the entities 'bodily states'. If these are in fact added, there will again be a spatial² as well as a temporal intimacy, for the boundaries of the body will mark the limits of immediate experience.

Now for the fact. The first question is whether, when we are mentally awake to a world of objects outside us, we can also be aware of our mental and bodily processes as they occur, not primarily by means of introspection, but by means of immediate experience.

Four entities there are as possible contents of immediate experience. (a) Cognition; (b) Conation; (c) Hedonic tone; (d) Bodily States. Let us take (a), (b) and (d) first, and (c) last.

(a) *Cognition.* That cognition occurs in the sense of the *fait accompli* of a piece of knowledge, in the sense of a cognitive event, and that we are aware of it, very few persons, if anyone, will dispute. That my awareness-of-this-table, for example, takes place or exists, it is almost impossible to question. What the true *analysis* of this complex is, whether and how, *e.g.*, the fact of *my being aware* of this table is different from the fact of *this table*, it is possible to question.³ We may believe in the difference, but it is not, even if it is possible, at all easy to analyse accurately and completely the fact of awareness.

Yet, given the fact, we can scarcely avoid facing the problem of analysis which at once presents itself. One important way of analysing the datum 'I am aware of X' is to say that there is

¹ It is of course possible to mean by Introspection the thing that I have called Immediate Experience, and this I think is sometimes meant. In the present paper, however, Immediate Experience, and Introspection as above described, are contrasted, though the latter, I should say, is a development of the former.

² If, again, mental process can in *any* sense be said to be in space.

³ See the *Symposium* "The Character of Cognitive Acts," *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 1920-21.

a cognitive act of awareness which has X as its object. Now to establish such an analysis we should obviously have to establish the existence of both parts of the complex 'I am aware of X,' namely, the act and the object. About the object we need raise no difficulty. The concept of the act does raise many questions. The existence of conscious cognitive acts might be suggested by inference, but inference would have to be confirmed by direct inspection, for a *cognitive* act of which we could not be conscious would have no *quale*. Knowledge by description to be adequate must be grounded in acquaintance. It is, however, true that in this case it is not altogether easy to discern *what* we are supposed to be acquainted with, that inspection of the contents of the mind is notoriously difficult, and that when we do see it is easy to misinterpret what we see.

Beginning with inference, we might be tempted to suppose that if my awareness of X has occurred there must have been also an *activity* on my part, of my being aware. But this does not follow: all that follows is that there must have been causes of my being aware, and these causes need not include any act of mine at all. Awareness may be something which simply happens to me, as something happens when a light is flashed in my face, and when, given the normal apparatus of seeing, I cannot help, as we say, 'seeing' light. It *might* be true (though I am not asserting that it is) that all that is (relevantly) necessary for the occurrence of awareness is an object and a set of organic conditions. Given all the conditions (including the object) 'awareness' would occur. It is uncertain work to infer that awareness presupposes a mental act of awareness. It is possible, of course, that some one may to-morrow produce valid arguments for supporting the hypothesis that there are mental acts of awareness. These would probably have to be based, as Dr. Broad has pointed out,¹ on epistemological grounds. I am not (up to to-day) acquainted with any arguments which seem to me conclusively to show that there must be cognitive acts.

The question, 'Are there cognitive acts?' is, however, unfortunately put, and the difficulty is in part, though certainly not wholly, a verbal one. For, if we accept the current distinction between conation and cognition, and have it definitely in mind when we put our question, then the answer is bound to be, verbally, in the negative. For *activity* belongs to mind not as cognitive, but as conative. If there are 'cognitive acts,' *e.g.*, analysis, reflexion, discrimination, they will not be cognitive but conative.

¹ *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 1920-21, p. 149.

But the verbal answer is of course quite inadequate. We can counter it by making a distinction between 'cognitive' conations, (conations which have cognition as their end and aim)¹ 'practical' conations (which have the production of some physical change by us as their end) and, perhaps, 'affective' conations. The last, which are of a more artificial and sophisticated kind, have as their end the production of hedonic feeling. But the real question remains. Suppose we admit that we do experience 'cognitive' conations, is such experience, experience of what can truly be called acts of *cognition* or awareness?

I find it difficult to believe that it is. When, proceeding by the method of direct inspection, I examine my own cognitions, I seem to find not acts or activities of knowing or being aware, but *either* the (discriminated) content known, *or* my strivings to discriminate it, *or both* together, together with certain organic sensations in either case. Neither the discriminated object, nor my (uncompleted) striving to discriminate, is the very act (the hypothetical act) of knowing or awareness; though strivings to discriminate are accompanied at every point by knowledge, though they may end in the *fait accompli* of completed knowledge and though they may derive their whole meaning from this as from their 'final cause'. Neither are organic *sensa* knowing. I am not of course arguing that knowing, and active discrimination, are mutually incompatible: they probably always run *pari passu*. But they are, I think, distinct. Acts for cognition get their significance from their final cause, the *fait accompli*: but though determined by cognition as by a final cause, and accompanied by cognition, they are distinct from it; there is no *act* of cognition or awareness. Cognition is awareness of a discriminated object, and is not in itself discriminating. Discriminating is truly, and not only verbally, conation; though it is 'cognitive' conation in the sense defined. The cognition which we immediately experience is *not* mental activity.

All this may be true, but it does not imply that we cannot discover awareness by inspection. It only asserts that we do not discover *acts* of awareness by inspection. But the analysis of my-awareness-of-X into *act* and object is not the only possible analysis. My awareness may not be active, it may be passive. Indeed it seems legitimate to infer (a) that since concrete 'cognitions' exist, there must be cognising, and (b) that if cognising exists and is not active, it must be passive. The account we have just given of what we find by inspection really confirms

¹ Although, as we shall argue, they are not in themselves cognitions.

this. We can discern by inspection no activity of cognition, what we discern is a complex containing (among other things) the content known. But it is the content *known*, and not a bare piece of existence, and it is possible, it seems to me, to discern the knowing aspect of the complex, not indeed as an activity, but as something which happens to us, something which, given the conditions, we cannot help happening. It is not easy to discern this 'knowing,' partly because of the 'transparency' of knowing, and partly because we cannot describe knowing but can only point to examples of it as we point to examples of 'red' or 'hot'. And if we try to describe it, we are liable to find ourselves pointing to something else. But it can, I think, be discerned. Our general conclusion is a matter the truth or falsity of which is of no small importance. It harmonises, I fancy, though I may be wrong, with the kind of thesis and its important philosophical implications, so ably defended by Prof. A. E. Taylor (in his Presidential Address on "Knowing and Believing" to the Aristotelian Society in 1928), that knowing is intuition, seeing, vision. Interpreting this for ourselves, we may say that the awareness which we discover by inspection is seeing, rather than active looking. It is the content-appearing-revealed-to-mind rather than mind's discriminatings, judgings, analysings, and inferences about it. And, once again, what actively discriminates the content cognised, is conation—cognitive conation.

Inspection can discern the 'knowing' aspect of the complex concrete cognition, and this 'knowing' is part of the content of immediate experience. Are there different *kinds* of 'knowing' to be immediately experienced? Not different kinds of cognitive act, for there are (if we are right) no cognitive acts, but different sorts of apprehension?

The full difficulty of the question whether there are different kinds of knowing is not properly brought out when we ask whether 'seeing' blue is qualitatively different from 'seeing' red. For whatever theory we hold, this difference is at least difficult to defend. It is seen when we ask whether there is any qualitative difference between such processes as perceiving, remembering, thinking. For the differences here appear so patent that it sounds paradoxical to question them.

But it is not really paradoxical. For, when we say 'perceiving,' 'remembering,' 'thinking,' we have in mind the concrete complexes, and not the *knowing* aspects of these. That the complexes are different in kind it would be insane to deny. It is not insane, however, but quite reasonable, to contend that

qua knowing these are all the same, that the differences are due not to differences of quality in cognising, but to other factors in the complexes. The other relevant factors are, conations, bodily sensa, and the facts and relations of the content apprehended. The desires and interests, the mental strivings involved in and awakened by, my awareness of a mountain, are surely markedly different when I perceive, and remember, and think (*e.g.*, think as the geologist might think) of the mountain. So, again, are the organic sensa different in the different cases. Organically, *looking* at the mountain is one thing, 'seeing it in the mind's eye' as it was when I saw it six months ago, is another. And the organic sensa accompanying thinking are again different, though no doubt they are vague and it needs considerable skill and attention to discern them.

Whilst speaking of the organic factor, it is worth while to refer to a short portion of an extra paper read by Mr. H. H. Price at the Nottingham *Symposium* on "Immediate Experience," particularly as the paper is unpublished. Mr. Price pointed out that apparent differences of quality of acts of sense-perception, *e.g.*, the difference between seeing and smelling, are probably due to a confusion between the act of seeing and the act of *gazing* or *looking* (fixing one's gaze) on the one hand, and between the act of smelling and the act of *sniffing* which usually accompanies it. He went on "And accordingly when those acts are almost instantaneous, as they occasionally are, so that there is not time enough to sniff or to gaze, one is not at all inclined to think that there is a qualitative difference between them. Compare for instance a momentary 'whiff' of chloroform with the momentary glimpse of a landscape disclosed by a lightning flash. There is still an intentional difference here,—there are two acts differently directed: but I do not think there is any discoverable qualitative difference."

Again, as we said, the content apprehended and its relations are different. The psychology books tell us much about the differences between the seen mountain and the imagined mountain, differences of intensity, clarity, complexity, etc. Similarly, to think of a 'thing' and to perceive it, is to apprehend, strictly speaking, a different content. The geologist has before his mind a different complex¹—an intellectual construction—

¹ If this is true, then a certain objection (cited also by Mr. Price, who referred to Prof. Moore's earlier Aristotelian Paper on "The Subject Matter of Psychology") to denying that perceiving is qualitatively different from thinking does not hold good. The objection is that we can both perceive and think of one and the same thing, and that therefore the

which is not that before the mind of the climber or the artist. Again, the relational characteristics are different. The perceived mountain is 'over there' and (approximately) 'now'. The remembered mountain is the mountain a thousand miles off, of a month ago. And so on. In these and in many other details, the three complex 'cognitions' differ from one another, and give rise to the belief that *qua* cognition they are different. But for the latter supposition there seems to be little, if any, ground. Awareness is always just awareness, knowledge (whether of a perceived, or a remembered, or an intellectually constructed object) is just "vision".

To sum up this portion of the argument: We began by asking whether we could be immediately aware of cognising. Our answer was that we can be aware of cognising, but that cognising is not active but passive, and that active discriminating (which is admittedly necessary in order that cognition should have a discriminated content) is a conative process, though it is accompanied by cognition, and its 'final cause' and explanation is cognition. Lastly, though concrete cognitions vary in kind, the differences are due to other factors in the complex, and not to differences in cognising or awareness, which in fact is always the same.

(b) and (d).¹ Two of the three other questions, namely, Is there immediate experience (b) of conations, (d) of bodily states or sensa? have already been answered in effect, and in the affirmative.

(b) There do not exist the same difficulties about asserting that conations can be immediately experienced, for conations are not 'transparent' as awareness is. We can discern conations in themselves (though always as part of a larger complex) because, when they are discernible at all, they are discernible as strivings, as interest, as subjective process which is bent on achieving some further step, of whatever kind. When awareness of X exists, it simply exists, and is perfect awareness of X. Being perfect, it can hardly be called a process at all. (Of course *going on* being aware involves processes of body and mind, and, again, the concrete *development* of knowledge involves processes, together with a change in the content known, from X to Y to Z. That

difference between the two acts cannot be a relational one merely. But *can* we both perceive and think of one and the same thing? I should argue (perhaps wrongly) that the existent referred to may be the same, but that the content apprehended is different. This of course requires justification which it is impossible to give here.

¹ See p. 158 above.

however, is another matter.) But conation in its very essence is *not* perfect and complete. It is mental *process* and is (sometimes) discernible as such. To employ an obvious and limited simile, conation (at least cognitive conation) is like the positive work of window-cleaning: awareness is like seeing straight through clean windows at the world beyond. We experience very definitely the effort. We experience on the other hand, not so much the seeing, as the world beyond, though as we have urged, it is possible to discern the seeing. There is, then, no difficulty about saying that we immediately experience conations, as examples show. The so-called cognitive acts, acts *e.g.*, of belief, or doubt, or attention, or interest, as well as more typically volitional acts, such as choosing, making up one's mind, are conations which are directly experienceable and which have discernible differences which are to some extent describable. Other states or conditions of mind such as emotions, or moods, are no doubt also directly experienceable, but with these we need not concern ourselves here.

(d) *Bodily sensa*. About the existence of bodily sensa as objects of experience there is no doubt. But there is some doubt whether we ought to speak of *immediate* experience of these. For if, as I am going to assume, bodily sensa are non-mental, their existence is for that reason less closely related to the experiencing of them. Sensa are objects always, and never subject, whereas my awareness (*e.g.*) of the table, though it may be object or content of immediate experience, is subjective in relation to the table.

Yet though bodily sensa always fall on the non-mental side, they do, as existing entities, have a closer relation to mind than do tables and chairs. They belong to our bodies, and body we know is in *some* sense related to mind in a peculiarly intimate way. Bodily sensa (*e.g.*, organic sensa) accompany and even condition my awareness of the table as the table does not accompany or condition my awareness of the distant garden as I look out over the table into the garden. They stand, as everyone knows, as intermediate between mind and the world external to the body.

What, then, are we to say of them? Can we say that they are objects of *immediate* experience? It seems to me that here we must make a rough distinction between two kinds of bodily sensa. The distinction which I wish to make is between those sensa in terms of which the world external to the body is chiefly known, and those in terms of which the body itself is chiefly known. The best examples of the first class are the 'formal',

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sensa of sight and touch and hearing. Examples of the second class are organic and kinæsthetic sensa. It seems to be true to say that sensa of this second class are normally experienced more immediately than are objects of the first class. They are (cognitively) 'felt'. The 'formal' sensa are normally experienced consciously as distinct objects. They are 'distanced'; we focus attention upon them, we analyse and discriminate their qualities. They are cognised, under these circumstances, in the plain ordinary sense, and there is not much more point in saying that they are experienced 'immediately' than in saying that the square root of minus two is experienced immediately. Sensa such as organic and kinæsthetic sensa, on the other hand, though they *can* be made distinct objects of discriminative cognition (as also can mental states) are not normally so. They rather *accompany* our experience of other objects. They are significant of the states of our body, and though always falling on the objective side, they are far more intimately related to our mental experiencing than are, normally, the 'formal' sensa. There is real meaning in saying that we (cognitively) *feel* a headache or toothache and in saying that we do not (normally) *feel* a colour or a sound. Certain conditions of my organism are peculiarly mixed up with my mental experiences so that it is often difficult to say, without special effort, whether the nausea of overwork is psychical or physical, or whether 'mental concentration' is, or is not, chiefly a bodily affair. Because of the intimacy of the relation of these sensa to mental process, because they are continually present though not discriminated, I suggest that we may include them, but *not* 'formal' sensa, as normally experienced, within the range of objects of immediate experience. Let me add that the word 'normally' is important, and let me repeat that the distinction is not to be taken too rigidly. An unpleasantly brilliant flash of light, unpleasant cutaneous sensa, a sudden boom of sound, these may, through their organic reverberations, be 'felt' in much the same way as the others.

(c) *Hedonic tone.* There seems to be no possible obstacle to saying that we experience immediately hedonic tone. The hedonic tone is of course the tone of the cognitive-conative psychosis—objective to immediate experience—together with the tone of accompanying bodily sensa. Into questions of the particularly intimate connexion between hedonic tone and conation, of the function of tone (both of mental psychosis and of bodily sensa), of the alleged 'priority' of conation over hedonic tone (or *vice versa*), of the existence of so-called 'neutral' tone, I shall not here enter. Our main problem concerns feeling in

the sense of immediate experience, not one of its objects, hedonic tone. I may, however, simply now record, without substantiating it, an opinion on the last-mentioned point, that introspection¹ fails to reveal hedonic tone in *every* psychosis. If introspection is right here, and if by feeling is *meant* hedonic tone, it will follow that there are psychoses without feeling, for to postulate 'neutral' feeling-tone is, on our hypothesis, to postulate a sheer contradiction in terms. To say that feeling-less psychoses occur, is, however, not to deny feeling-tone as a fundamental irreducible *aspect* of consciousness. It is only to deny its invariable presence.

So far I have asked mainly, what are the *contents* of immediate experience? Let us now briefly discuss immediate experience itself, its relation to its contents, and any other question or questions which may arise.

Three apparent characters of immediate experience which are outstanding and which give rise to the semi-popular use of the term 'feeling' would appear to be (1) its intimacy; (2) its relative passivity; (3) the relative massiveness, formlessness, structurelessness of what is actually apprehended in feeling.

As regards (1) little more need be said. We have already pointed out that by 'immediate' is meant 'intimate' in the sense that the content, as an existent, is in the closest relation to the *experiencing* of the content, as an existent. This is patent in the case of mental contents, where the psychosis which is content is experienced 'as it is actually occurring'. The experience of the content, though logically and psychologically distinct, occurs contemporaneously (or approximately so) with the content and is psychically continuous or of one 'stuff' with it. Where the content consists of bodily sensa the intimacy of the relation between content and cognitive experiencing is less unassailable, as we have said. Yet the more organic sensa seem sufficiently 'near' mental experience to be included as possible contents of immediate experience, as we have also said.

(2) In immediate experience the experiencing is relatively passive. It is passive in the sense that the content is 'endured,' is accepted, in the sense that in it we do not actively attend or discriminate or criticise as we do when we introspect. The presence of active attention or discrimination or criticism would imply an experience other than an immediate one in the sense

¹ Introspection is the only real test. To say that feeling-tone is always there, but that we do not always notice it (*e.g.*, Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, new ed., pp. 110-111) is unconvincing as a positive argument.

described. An immediate experience or 'feeling' of anger is essentially an *acceptance* of it, without any attempt to alter or question or criticise it. It is a 'feeling' of *plain* anger.

(3) The content of immediate experience is relatively *formless*. This formlessness sometimes amounts almost to complete indescribability. Subsequent analysis may with effort discern and name elements in the complex felt, but in immediate experience they are *massively* endured. There is quality, and definite quality,—what could be more definite than a prick or a regret?—but there is little clear and definite structure. This relative vagueness would seem to be an essential feature of the content of immediate experience, and to be accounted for by the intimacy and passivity of which we have spoken. The object is not definitely and clearly contemplated as an object; it is not set off at convenient focal distance to be 'looked' at, to be actively discriminated. When a mental process becomes the focus of active cognitive discrimination, it becomes relatively sharp and clear. But in immediate experience there is never (in the very nature of things) this active cognitive discrimination, and so the content of immediate experience can never have the same clarity and sharpness.

The content of feeling (and henceforth by 'feeling' I shall mean 'immediate experience') is relatively formless because there is no primary¹ need for it to be anything else. It would indeed be surprising if primitive¹ concrete feeling, instead of rendering us aware of vague masses of content, offered us detailed and accurate knowledge of the nature of our conations and our bodily states. What we need to *know* (in the other senses of 'know') in order to live successfully, is a certain amount of detail about the world we live in. What we need to *feel* is, very roughly speaking, only what is sufficient to enable us to correct and supplement and adjust ourselves to the world where necessary. More tends to embarrass us. The content of ordinary knowledge is determined² by the detail of a limited area of objective fact. The content of feeling is primarily¹ determined by the *need* of the mind-and-body to master as far as necessary, and to be at home in, its

¹ In using the terms 'primary' and 'primitive' I am referring as far as possible to feeling-of-content as it is in more primitive forms of consciousness and when more or less uncomplicated by the assimilated effects of introspective and other analytical cognitive processes. Such effects are at the human level always to some degree present. And this makes difficult any enquiry as to the content of feeling as such. See later, p. 169.

² In part. Because of course our limitations and our interests affect the detail of what is known.

objective world, need which may be called for short 'psycho-biological' need.

But psycho-biological need is not a fixed quantity. For primitive minds-and-bodies the relevant environment may be relatively simple, the need being only for simple and more or less automatic responses. For more developed minds-and-bodies the world is a far more complex place demanding a never-ending increase in powers of discrimination and adjustment, the development of which powers makes for the development continually of a more complex mind-and-body still. At a certain high level of this development the mind comes to discriminate and name not only physical objects, and other objects such as moral rules and principles, but the contents of itself. It begins to introspect, not necessarily after the fashion of the academically trained psychologist, but perhaps more after the fashion of the 'psychological' novelist: psychological classification may or may not follow. All such introspection is of course of the discriminative-contemplative type and is not itself feeling. But the point which I wish to make is that, along with development of mind towards greater and greater complexity, and also along with the development in particular of powers of introspection (in a very liberal sense) there tends to go a greater complexity of the content of feeling and a greater power of *feeling* (and not merely discriminatively knowing) the complex. In feeling, such complex content never comes sharply to the focus of attention, but, short of this, introspection (or retrospection) can discern the existence of such complexity, and as genuine content of feeling. This is indeed in consonance with all we know of apperception, assimilation, development. Feeling's content is always vague, but the vagueness is relative. Compare the 'feelings' of her characters in their rural environment with the feeling (apprehended by us sympathetically) of their genius-creator, Mary Webb.

Let us take illustrations of two different levels of complexity, choosing, as we cannot enter into the animal mind, familiar human ones.

Sometimes the content of feeling is simply a mass of quality hedonically toned. The content of a headache or of a feeling of *ennui* when we are engaged, say, on mental work, is experienced 'massively' and the proper avoiding reaction—say of fetching the Aspirin or of resting or of going for a 'breather'—does not require as its condition more than the minimum of discrimination of the content of feeling. Similarly the content of a feeling of dislike or anger may be massively endured, leading to the simple

action of avoidance or aggression. On the other hand, in order that a finer adjustment shall be made, a higher degree of discrimination (always non-focal so long as it is feeling) is necessary. Feeling of dislike or fear of a person, *e.g.*, may be vaguely set up against feelings of the sentiments of duty, of self-respect, of acquisition. (What for example will happen to A if he shows his dislike of his superior B by avoiding him or behaving curtly?) This complexity of content is still felt vaguely, like an ache, as an obscure, deep-down conflict of certain opposing conative masses. But the content *is* more complex. Perhaps the best case of all of the complexity of feeling's content would be the contents of the artist's feelings as, in the process of creation, he selects or rejects.

Both the importance and the difficulties of being clear about all this are great. We have distinguished definitely between actively analytic discriminative contemplation, and immediate experience or feeling. Feeling cannot as such be contemplative. And yet we are saying that through general development, and development in particular of (contemplative discriminative) knowledge, feeling's content may become more complex, and be felt as more complex. Are we not confusing feeling with contemplative introspection and taking over the deliveries not of a feeling nor even of a genuine introspection (which ought to reveal truly) but of deductive knowledge *that* the mental processes at such and such a stage are more complex and *therefore ought* to be felt as more complex? I do not think that we are, though we are admitting the real effects (by means of apperception or assimilation) upon the content actually felt, of previous contemplative introspection. And we are able to *discern* the content of feeling only by means of introspection or retrospection. For feeling itself is dumb. It endures.

The 'art' of discerning the content of feeling is not easy. Bare primitive feeling is all but blind, the most developed feeling is, *in se*, dumb, and introspection is not feeling. Neither the shell fish (nor the new-born infant), nor the mystic, nor the introspective psychologist as such, can be quite perfect witnesses, for different reasons. But the difficulties are not in their intrinsic nature insuperable. Introspection—it may be that it is always retrospection—is possible. The most qualified first-hand narrator is perhaps, as I have suggested, the artist—novelist—who at once is able to *feel* complex content, to remember it, and to render it up by means of explicit language as an individual thing, conserving its felt quality and not merely pigeon-holing it as a general class. The pigeon-holing may come

later. And pigeon-holing in time affects content of feeling, by assimilation or apperception, as I have said.

Brief consideration of three further questions may throw light on the ideas which have been suggested. First, there is a general question. Is feeling or immediate experience a part of every psychosis? Then follow two special questions having a bearing on the problem of levels of capacity for feeling: (a) Is it possible to experience immediately hedonic tone without experience of further content of which it is the tone? (b) Is it possible to experience immediately, untuned content? (This has already been touched upon, and only a word more will be necessary.)

First, are there in fact psychoses in which feeling or immediate experience is not present? About this it is not at all easy to make up one's mind, for as soon as we begin to ask ourselves questions about particular cases, it is very easy to *think* that we were feeling on such and such an occasion, whereas in fact our whole attention may have been sharply focussed on objects to the exclusion of feeling. In fact I seem to remember many experiences of acting and thinking, or of everyday routine of which I can honestly say that I was so occupied with *things* that I consciously felt nothing: and if I consciously felt nothing, how can it be said that I was feeling? But is the question so plain? If it is true, as it is, that we are not always fully consciously aware of ourselves, must we not be very 'marginally,' aware? Retrospection seems to discover dim feelings of mental and bodily contents which accompanied the interests in non-mental objects, and of which we were not focally conscious. If retrospection is wrong, if we suppose that feeling of awareness, conations, and bodily sensa were entirely absent, would our *experience* of the object have been possible at all? This is a difficult question, as I have said, but it seems to me (I conclude with some hesitation) that it would not have been possible. We may be hardly at all aware of contents of feeling, but they must have been present or the situation would lapse into sheer objectivity and would not be an *experience* of an object at all.

The other two questions may be dealt with as follows. Of the first: (a) Whether it is possible to experience hedonic tone without experience of further content of which it is the tone, we may say that if this can be said to occur at all, the statement that it does will only be relatively true. For nothing is more certain than that hedonic tone is always the quality of a psychosis, that it does not float about by itself. And if feeling-tone appears to occur by itself it will do so either at primitive stages of feeling, or when pleasure or pain are very intense. About the latter we

may say that pleasure or pain do appear at times to swamp the other contents of mind, though, once again, the other contents must be marginally present. As regards the primitive stages of feeling, we may conjecture that psycho-biological need probably arranges that there shall be definitely revealed to the mind of the lowly organism nothing but those aspects of the objective world which the organism must know to live, together with the pleasures and pains of its own activities. It is doubtful whether *primitive* feeling directly reveals much, if anything, more to the higher organisms, even human bodies-and-minds. Even in human beings, *so far as* the guidance of life is affected by primitive feeling, no marked experience of content other than of hedonic tone (always of course in fact of our other processes) is really necessary for action. For action guided by feeling is of a hit-and-miss, repulsion-and-attraction, type. On the other hand, as we have said, reflexion and analysis of the world and of our own minds, affects, through assimilation, our capacity for feeling complex contents: we come to know *in* feeling itself what we did not know in feeling before. To put it paradoxically, the discriminated content of indiscriminative knowledge increases. Conscious feeling of primitive pleasure- or pain-mass is replaced by complex content possessing tone, the whole being experienced, however, always outside the area of focal consciousness.

(b) I have already recorded an opinion (p. 166) that untuned psychoses exist. Assuming this to be true, all that need now further be said is that we should expect to find consciousness of content without tone, not at the primitive stages of cognitive feeling where hedonic tone is all-important, but at the stages of mind where introspection is possible. Introspection does seem in fact to reveal certain contents of cognitive feeling which may, but need not, possess hedonic tone, *e.g.*, the vague organic mass of *sensa* we call *cœnaesthesia*, or the contents of consciousness when our minds are not alert. At lower levels it is doubtful if these mental and bodily contents could be cognitively felt at all without their being definitely toned. At the human level we appear able not merely to contemplate them introspectively, but (no doubt again owing to the effect of introspection) to feel cognitively the qualities they possess.

I have, in this paper, frequently had to speak as if mental states existed in their own right, out of relation to a world which is cognised. This has been necessary for the purposes of discussion, but it is of course an artificial view, and we must go back to where we began and recollect that feeling or immediate experience is experience of a mind-and-body which has as its main

function the apprehension of, and action in relation to, a larger objective world. When we remember this, we cannot fail to recognise that cognition, in that it is revelation of the objective world, and at the same time a function of one seamless unity, the mind, cannot fail to affect the character of conation and hedonic feeling. Conation-affection would have no meaning at all apart from cognition of the objective. Cognition is transcendent, it is revelatory of independent objects, and it is these revealed objects with all their meanings which awaken in every case the special kind of complex conative responses which they do awaken. Take for example the instinctive conations. The mental dispositions which are awakened into activity in, say, the instincts of flight, of repulsion, of acquisitiveness, are conative activities which acquire their whole meaning in relation to a life lived in an external world which is revealed by cognition, and they could not indeed exist unless the world were cognised. In their existence, such conations are mental facts, and may be theoretically examined as such; and cognitive feeling feels them in its own way. But in their real nature, in their significance, they transcend the subject as cognition transcends the subject. It follows that immediate experience or feeling which has conation as part of its content, becomes, whilst primarily experience of mental fact, transcendent in its significance too, so that it is easy to imagine that we literally 'feel' the world which transcends us. What actually happens is that the object is cognised and is the focus of attention, that conation as we have said derives meaning and purpose and quality from the object, and cognitive feeling is feeling of cognition-conation directed in relation to the cognised object. It may be convenient to call this whole the cognitive-conative¹-objective situation. Feeling or immediate experience is of the cognitive-conative-objective situation. Such language must necessarily be imperfect; for though the distinctions of cognitive feeling, cognition, conation, object, are necessary and important, in fact mental life is indivisible and one. It is a more or less vivid mental awareness of an object, a mental purposefulness, and the cognitive feeling of these, all in one. It is in this sense that cognitive feeling shares at the same time the outward-facing quality of all normal consciousness.

The realisation of such facts—taken together with the theory of cognitive feeling we have been examining—gives some meaning to common phrases like, 'I feel this is the right course of action,'

¹ I leave out hedonic tone here. If we are right, it may or may not be present.

'I feel that this is good,' ('right,' 'wrong' or 'bad') or even 'I feel that this is true' (or 'false'). What we feel immediately is some vague, pleasant cognitive-conative satisfaction or vague unpleasant dissatisfaction in relation to vaguely cognised objects. This may be accompanied by quite definite organic experience. The organic experience may even predominate. We say, with some point, 'I feel it in my bones that . . .'. But these experiences are awakened in relation to a special cognised object.

Take the case of a practical decision or choice of a course of action, considering the mental factors only (though admittedly facts like an unhealthy liver have their importance). The course we finally 'feel' to be right will be that which, as imagined, satisfies a certain group of relevant interests, which fulfils our desires in the matter without violation of other desires or with the least possible violation of other desires. Suppose *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* to be interests all of which must be satisfied as fully as possible. Course *x* satisfies *a* and *c*, but thwarts *b* and leaves *d* unfulfilled. Course *y* satisfies *b*, *d*, and *a*, but *c* is thwarted; *z* however allows for the fulfilment of *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d*, so course *z* is chosen. Now it may be that all the possible courses are clearly set out before the mind, together with all the interests involved, and that the decision is made by the process of conscious reasoning. Very often, however, either through great complication of circumstances or through lack of intellectual ability, or perhaps through sheer lack of time, the factors are not clearly displayed. In such cases the cognitive feelings of pleasant satisfaction or painful defeat, of the harmony or disharmony, of the conations involved, will act as impulsions or checks in the dim and confused process of deciding. We are buffeted hither and thither, but in the end the right course may very well be discovered through the agency of cognitive feeling, though on the other hand it is also possible that the prominence of, say, impulses *b* and *c* pushes *a* and *d* into the background, and a one-sided and prejudiced decision is the result.

Roughly the same kind of illustration (grotesquely and perhaps misleadingly simple) can be employed in the case of discovery of truth,¹ the dominating interest to be satisfied in this case being the interest in seeing things clearly as they are, as complex wholes with their parts in place and order. We may arrive at this end, as we may arrive at a practical decision, in a highly conscious way, the various relevant hypotheses which are the methods of approach to clear understanding being set down and tested individually. Or the conclusion may be reached

¹The case of the constructiveness of the artist, guided by feeling—perhaps the best case of all—I shall not discuss.

by the dark and stormy, but often more rapid, ways of 'feeling,' the verification (or the failure to verify) coming later.

Cognitive feeling unquestionably does discern preference- and rejection-tendencies in actions and in proposition making, though certainly its conclusions need to be tested. Probably no decision of any kind could ever be made without it. The value of proceeding by the guidance of this feeling, particularly perhaps in very complex affairs where accurate analysis is for one reason or another difficult or impossible, is just its character, as concrete, of 'massiveness'. The pure intellectual thinker may see so clearly so many details, so many possibilities, that he easily develops pedantry and lack of sense of proportion in going after them all, and so is hampered both in practical and theoretical pursuits. The 'feeler' allows his conative dispositions and interests to guide his attention. Of course his mind may be unbalanced, his interests may be too narrow and too few. Decisions guided by feeling are as often as not decisions guided by prejudice. They have no *intrinsic* superiority, anyhow in matters of knowledge and practice.¹ But to say this is only to condemn narrow-mindedness in general, to which feeling is subject no more and no less than thinking. It can, within limits, be corrected.

¹ Art may possibly be a different matter. But then so are its aims.

III.

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III.—TIME AND THE SELF IN McTAGGART'S SYSTEM.

BY HILDA D. OAKELEY.

It is proposed in this article to examine the problem which confronts us throughout the second volume of *The Nature of Existence*. Is it possible consistently to combine a doctrine of the reality of selves with rejection of the reality of time? It might be supposed that the history of philosophy had shown that these two positions can be consistently held together. There is the great example of Leibniz with whose treatment of time that of McTaggart has important affinities. I should, however, argue that Leibniz's pluralism of selves, in spite of the fact that his whole philosophy seems to be involved in the form he gives to this doctrine, cannot strictly be regarded as ultimate. The theory of the Monads as the infinite points of view of God underlies his epistemology, and the conception of the Monads as fulgurations of the Divine Monad, his metaphysic. Into the difficulties which would attend upon the consistent completion of Leibniz's system in this direction it is not necessary here to enter. Apart from the fact that his pluralism of selves is not ultimate in the sense in which this is true of McTaggart's pluralism, the most important distinction between their systems, in respect to the doctrine of selves, and one which leads to other far-reaching differences is that, whilst for McTaggart the selves in reality though not in temporal experience perceive each other directly, for Leibniz there is an absolute incommunicability between selves.

It is not necessary to my purpose to examine the logical foundations of the doctrine of substance laid down in the first volume of the *Nature of Existence*, from which it results (vol. ii.) that amongst the apparent existents of experience only what is spiritual can really be substance. The argument had proved in McTaggart's view that nothing can be substance unless it has "parts within parts without end determined by determining correspondence".¹ It is found that only spiritual existents can

¹ Vol. I., Bk. IV., Chap. XXIV.]

fulfil this condition, spirituality being "the quality of having content all of which is content of one or more selves".¹ And only perceptions can form an infinite series of the type required. This article is written from the point of view of agreement with the doctrine of the reality of selves, but not with that of the unreality of time. The reality of the self can, in my view, be based on other grounds than that of McTaggart's argument, and indeed this argument appears doubtful if only because it leads to the untenable conclusion that spirit can contain no parts except perceptions and groups of perceptions. It follows that judgments and assumptions have to be explained as kinds of perception, and volitions and emotions must be shown to be in truth cogitations. The problem to be primarily discussed, however, is the relation of certain aspects of the doctrine of the self, to the form taken by the interpretation of time.

1.

A question may be initially raised in regard to McTaggart's method in the combination of the *a priori* and the empirical arguments. The *a priori* argument gives mainly negative results concerning the nature of the existent. Thus, it can be shown "that certain characteristics . . . *cannot* be true of the existent . . . but it will not be possible to show that any of those characteristics which we consider here for the first time *must* be true of the existent".² The position then, that everything that exists (or even that any existent) is spiritual remains only probable. It is difficult to say whether it has even a very high probability according to the argument, although this may be taken to be implied by the tenor of the whole treatise. For though it is possible to show by rigid demonstration that spirit is the only apparent form of substance, which conforms to the necessary conditions, it is impossible to be certain that all possible forms of substance have been suggested to us by our perception.³ And the limitations of the information that perception can give us, are again and again indicated by McTaggart.⁴ It seems then evident that McTaggart's admissions might lead to a greater scepticism as to our capacity for any positive theory of the nature of things than he contemplates. But the difficulty to which I would especially direct attention concerns the method of selection

¹ Vol. II., Bk. V., Chap. XXXVI., "Spirit".

² Vol. II., Bk. V., Chap. XXXII., p. 5.

³ Bk. V., Chap. XXXVIII., "Idealism".

⁴ See especially Bk. VI., Chap. XLIV., "Error," 516-517.

and rejection of data of experience which fulfil the conditions required by the *a priori* argument. There appears to be a kind of fallacy which occurs in the treatment of experience for this purpose by McTaggart—found also in other philosophies—for which the name of the *transformed empirical* may be suggested. A fact accepted from experience undergoes a certain alteration chiefly by omission of part of its nature for experience, before it can be included in the system which satisfies the logical conditions. It is then given a place, in which it appears almost to have attained the rank of a deduction from the *a priori*. Is not this due to the fact that there moves before the mind of the philosopher an *a priori* construction of the nature of things which does not only conform to the negative conditions required by his logic, but includes other positive principles determining his selection from experience? The suspicion of this fallacy is raised at various stages of the treatment of the nature of the self—as, for instance, when volition and emotion are admitted but only as forms of cogitation—and of the treatment of the fundamental misperception of time, *e.g.*, there must really be a series but not a temporal series. The problem whether the empirical fact in its transformation is merely a ghost of its former self or is the truth of which the other was, as it were, phantom and phenomenon, is of course a different problem in each case. One example in particular may be given here. It is argued that we know from self-knowledge the closeness of the union that exists where there is direct perception of a self. It is also postulated that in reality the self perceives other selves directly, and therefore the union between different selves has this peculiar intimacy. And this is the ground of love in reality. Now that love is the highest value is a fact of empirical knowledge. But in present experience we never do perceive other selves directly, whilst self-knowledge, of which, according to McTaggart, we do have experience, gives us no clue to the nature of love, since love must be for another, and self-love is therefore only a metaphor. It seems probable that the conception of self perceiving self directly, as also that of the closeness of the union, are deduced from the nature of love, when this fact of experience is abstracted from all conditions which cannot be reduced to the form of knowledge.

The position that a self can perceive himself directly, but cannot in present experience (which for McTaggart forms the "misperception" series) directly perceive other selves is one which primarily demands examination. The view that the self can be object to itself has of course been widely held, and is of fundamental importance, especially in McTaggart's system. Without

it the whole system would have a different character, and, as will be suggested, the theory of the time-series and its status in reality would be profoundly affected. In the view which appears to me to be true, the self can be subject only and never directly its own object. This is a question in the first place of immediate experience, in the second of the conception which is implied of the nature of spirit. It is possible on this view to account for the fact that we do appear to make the self its own object, and thus to indicate "τὸ αἷτιον τοῦ ψεύδους". The subject experienced as self is not, as I should argue, identical with the object which I seem to perceive as myself, and think of as playing its part in life. I do not know the subject as I appear to know that object-self, since knowledge must have an object. Here Prof. Alexander's distinction between the experiences he terms respectively enjoyment and contemplation, is illuminating, though I by no means claim that he would agree with the present standpoint. For the notion of contemplation in his view cannot be applied to the subject's relation to himself. What then is the object-self which I can suppose myself to contemplate? It appears to consist partly of a projection from the subject, partly of content derived analogically from elements or qualities I perceive in other selves. On this view I do contemplate these others in the sense in which I contemplate other objects, though with a difference, in so far as I transfer to them something of that which I project as subject into my object-self. Amongst other grounds for questioning McTaggart's view that in present experience the only self of which the individual has direct perception is his own, may be mentioned the fact, which has a good deal of support and to me seems indubitable, that apparent self-knowledge does not in mental growth precede the apparent knowledge of other selves, but develops *pari passu* with this.¹ That there is a genuine experience, indicated by the term "self-knowledge", is not in question. The issue concerns the nature of this knowledge. In spite of the weight which must be attached to the opinions of those who affirm it to be knowledge by acquaintance, and in particular to McTaggart's conviction reaffirmed many years since it was first stated,² the object-self seems to be more truly described as known by construction. The self I appear to know as object is not, like the will of Schopenhauer, known through self-

¹ Cf. McTaggart's own observation, "The more vivid definite and extensive is our recognition of the other the more vivid and definite becomes our self-consciousness". *Some Dogmas of Religion*, Chap. VI., "God as Omnipotent".

² Article on "Personality," *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, 1917.

consciousness to be a thing in itself. If it were, familiar experiences such as the following would be inexplicable. An individual, prior to an expected event, believes himself to know infallibly how he will act on meeting it. And he finds that he has been deceived, for he acts quite otherwise when the occasion arises. Now for McTaggart the self as substance must be thing in itself. And although for him the series of events in time is a misperception series, this does not seem to make the type of error referred to less inexplicable, if the self, being real, is its own object. For if the error involved in perception of objects under the conditions of a temporal series, is to involve error in regard to the form in which the real characteristics of the self appear in time, then to speak of direct knowledge of the self in present experience would be meaningless. The position that the object-self can only be known by construction does not imply that this knowledge may not in general be a good guide to understanding, and anticipation of the motives which will predominate in any particular situation, usually better in accuracy than our understanding of the motives of others, since each has more constant experience of himself than of any other selves. Hence, the justification of the Socratic practical precept γινῶθι σεαυτόν. I should then agree with Bradley that the self is construction, if this means a self which is object of knowledge, but with McTaggart that the self is real, if this can be taken to mean that it is, as subject, the principle which gives reality to our experience. The argument which convinced McTaggart that the self is known by acquaintance was that originally given, but later abandoned, by Mr. Bertrand Russell, and which McTaggart held to be valid.¹ Briefly, this is based on the position that in any assertion such as "I am aware of equality," I must know each constituent of the proposition, either by acquaintance or by description, and as I do not know "I" by description, I must know it by acquaintance. For I must know that the *I* which makes the assertion is the same as the *I* which has the awareness. The latter might be described as the person who has the awareness but not the former, as the same person. In the view taken in this article, the *I* which is a constituent of the proposition, being a construction, is known by description. But there is a unique quality in this type of knowledge by description, due to the fact that the object constructed is in part a projection of the subject. Hence this relation of subject and object is very close.

¹ Article in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, and *The Nature of Existence*, Vol. II., Bk. V., Chap. XXXVI.

The doctrine that the self is known directly, by acquaintance, is the first step in McTaggart's argument for the existence of something of the nature of spirit. The quality of spirituality, being "the quality of having content, all of which is the content of one or more selves".¹ The second step is to show that there is not in the case of spirit, as there is in the case of matter and of sensa, reason to suppose that the apparent perception of it must be error or misperception. For spiritual substance fulfils the condition which McTaggart had laid down in the first volume as necessary to existence, *viz.*, the having parts within parts to infinity. It is this negative condition which most definitely determines and limits the conception of the nature of spirit. For the content of spirit is the content of selves, and we have to ask what it is in the nature of selves as we know them in experience which passes the test of admission to reality. It appears that it is only perception which can form an infinite series of the type required. It is in virtue of the nature of perception that spirituality satisfies the conditions essential to substance. Yet what I should term the unreality for metaphysics of a universe of perceivers, in which "B perceives himself and C, and the perceptions which he and C have of themselves and of one another, and the perceptions which they have of these perceptions, and so on to infinity,"² is only avoided by the admission of emotions and with them values, though emotions have no status except as kinds of cogitation. I think that the unreality which seems to attach to this doctrine of substance is due to the fact that whilst the principle which is its centre cannot be given the full meaning which it has for experience, it does not, in sacrificing this, gain a profounder meaning in virtue of its place in the system of reality. The self which for experience is a principle of intelligence and will, becomes a principle of intelligence alone; for volition, as a form of cogitation, has to be reduced to acquiescence in what is. Like the deified thought of Aristotle, thinking upon itself, the personified perception of McTaggart seems in becoming eternal to lose the spiritual nature,³ in virtue of which it could be accepted as the reality of realities. In the problem of metaphysical method with which we are here presented, *viz.*, whether the transformation of the empirical self suffices to give it the ontological nature required, the following maxim seems applicable. That principle which has been selected from ex-

¹ Vol. II., Bk. V., Chap. XXXVI., p. 62.

² *The Nature of Existence*, Bk. V., XXXVII., "Cogitation," p. 89.

³ I think it must be agreed that the term "spirit" as used by McTaggart cannot be identified with "mind".

perience must either carry with it its original meaning and value, or, if transformed, acquire through that change a meaning more in harmony with the doctrine of reality implied. There must be compensation for the loss of apparent value. Now when the principle of selfhood (or personality) is transformed into a principle of cogitation alone, the new meaning to which it points, and therefore the doctrine of reality implied, is that of the universal nature of thought, the ideal of which is sameness in all thinkers, the knowledge of which is only differentiated in so far as it is known from different points of view. The only significance remaining in the eternal distinctness of selves would then be due to the existence of that emotion which McTaggart describes in passages which are philosophical poems. But it seems doubtful whether the presence and perfection of human affection is fully intelligible when reduced to a form of cogitation in a timeless system. It may here, however, be observed, that the doctrine that the self is known by acquaintance, which is for McTaggart sufficient evidence for the *prima facie* existence of spirit, is not an indispensable proof on his view of the facts of experience. For the values which he admits as attributable to experience in reality, and pre-eminently those of love and self-reverence, are facts which, at least from his standpoint, are inconceivable without the existence of spiritual beings as substances.

2.

With a view to considering the relation of the doctrine of the unreality of time to the doctrine of the reality of selves in McTaggart's system, I would suggest a broad distinction of the philosophical grounds on which the reality of time has been rejected, according as they are formulated from the standpoint of the subject as experiencing, or of the world as object of knowledge. The logical doctrines of the unreality of time seem to derive mainly from the view of the world as an objective order made intelligible in a system of propositions whose relations to each other may be conceived as changeless. The appearance of change in time threatens to be an obstacle in the process of rationalising our experience, and the denial of it seems to forward the intellectual need. On the other hand the types of doctrine which are motivated by the subjective need for getting beyond the ceaseless flux of experience have their basis in the conception of the nature of mind which, as contemplating truth, cannot be, in reality, subject to such a flow of changing impressions. Now on this line of thought the conception of mind as

unchanging and eternal seems necessarily to pass into a conception of mind unconfined by the limits of individual selfhood. The individual subject, endeavouring to pass beyond the process of change in which it seems to find itself and all its experiences involved, cannot overcome the illusion *qua* one amongst many subjects of experience; for continuous change seems to be involved in the interrelations of these subjects. It is a greater illusion which must be overcome, the illusion of separate selves; and the ultimate unreality of the self is thus the postulate required in order to validate, from this standpoint, the unreality of time. This result is perfectly illustrated in the philosophy of Spinoza. For the twin illusions (presuming them to be such) stand and fall together. In so far as the "mode" emphasises as it were its separate manifestation of substance *qua* limited at this point, and there is experience at the first stage of knowledge, time is needed as an "aid to the imagination". But with the advance to the third stage we pass out of the temporal into the eternal, and the mind becomes united with the whole. In the second stage the objective standpoint predominates. With the progress of scientific knowledge the systematisation of things is carried out with greater "tidiness" in proportion to our ability to omit the reference to time and to the self which insists on bringing its own measures. What seems unique in McTaggart's conception of the unreality of time, is that whilst his reason for this position is a logical doctrine of the contradiction which arises in our propositions about anything which is subject to change, his pluralism of real selves is determined by a spiritual doctrine of experience. I am here stating what appears to me to be the ultimate source of his position. It is not as an object amongst objects that the self cannot be under the condition of time. It is as the subject for which the highest values must be eternal. Yet, as I wish to maintain, McTaggart's conception of the experience of the self is in essence incompatible with the unreality of time.

His logical argument for treating the perception of the temporal as error, is based on the assumption that time is inseparable from change. I would suggest—in general agreement with M. Bergson, though from a somewhat different point of view—that it is impossible to separate the thought of existence from the condition of time as duration, and further, here of course differing from Bergson, that this would hold good even though the existent were devoid of change. Apart from this it might be objected to McTaggart's argument that although change involves contradiction if time be unreal, the contradiction is removed by

the reality of time, and that thus the argument could be used in the opposite sense. Change involves what McTaggart calls the "A" series (past, present, future), and in this series every event has the incompatible determinations past, present, future.¹ This difficulty, as he shows, is only removed a step further back by the explanation that what is meant is, present at a moment of present time, past at some moment of future time, future at some moment of past time. But if time be real, since *now* is a different aspect of the universe from *then*, some determination may be possessed by an event *now*, consistently with its being denied of the same event *then*. Thus the contradiction only arises if time be unreal. A more general criticism of McTaggart's treatment of the problem of time by logical method might be founded on the position that the temporal series is necessary to logic. Unless either logical relations are conceived to be of the same type as mathematical, or logic be identified with metaphysics, neither of which positions appears to be held by McTaggart, it may be argued that they postulate a temporal experience. For there can be no progress from one position to another where all are eternally present together. I do not think that this involves a merely "epistemic" standpoint in logic, to use Mr. Johnson's expression. There would be no meaning in a statement that A is included in B unless behind the statement there lay the experience, actual or possible, of the occurrence of one after the other. How otherwise is the difference between the first and the second to be given its value, how otherwise is identity between the two to be avoided? The notion of inclusion is the one selected by McTaggart as the type of the real series, of which the temporal is phenomenal. When in our experience A precedes B in time, in the real order A is included in B. But how are we to conceive the relation of the included to the including unless we can think of the terms or events as *now* separated from each other and *then* coming together? Without the temporal form they become identical in inclusion and the series is no longer a series. What other form—schema, we may call it (though it is more indispensable in this sense to the logical movement than the Kantian schema to the category)—is adequate to supply the required difference? That a spatial distinction is at least not adequate to the significance of the inclusion series in McTaggart's conception of it, appears from his view that not all the elements of the pre-final are contained in the final stage of inclusion, not at least all the values of the pre-final. Is not the temporal

¹ Vol. II., Bk. V., Chap. XXXIII., "Time".

transition necessary even to implication as a logical relation? Suppose it is asserted that A implies B. Unless my thought can rest upon A as in some sense really apart from B, as not already possessing B and still requiring a further step in order that the B which follows it by implication shall be revealed—unless the significance of A standing alone asserts itself as independent of our abstracting work, yet as something which cannot continue apart, but must summon B to follow it, is the complete significance of the implication given? It seems that no substitute for the temporal can supply this vital feature of the logical process. M. Emile Meyerson observes that it is not merely the language of every day but also that of philosophy which tends to establish a close connexion between the temporal and the logical relation in the notion of cause, and refers to the use of “le conséquent,” and “la conséquence” and of the term “antérieure logique”.¹ Again he points to “cette similitude des termes servant à caractériser la relation logique des phénomènes et leurs relations dans le temps”.² This similitude, he considers, has not received as much attention from logicians as it seems to deserve. He quotes M. Goblot’s explanation (*Traité de Logique*) that it is our discursive thought which finds itself obliged to admit the consequence *after* it has admitted the principle. “L’ordre intemporel de dépendance logique, prescrit à la pensée l’ordre temporel de ses assertions discursives,” and observes that this explanation by reference to an external circumstance does not seem sufficient. “Once we are convinced that nature is entirely intelligible, is it not indifferent from what point we start in the discussion?” He considers a cognate question in connexion with the doctrine of the potential and development, pointing out that at times it is difficult to see which of the two conceptions we have in view—the temporal-historic or the rational-logical.³ In the passages from which these references are taken M. Meyerson’s general aim is to demonstrate that it is impossible for either philosophy or science (reason in his view being one in both) to avoid altogether the admission of the irrational factor in experience. In so far as the temporal series involves the irrational, I should accept this view.

For McTaggart, since time is unreal, the greatest, and at times it seems the all-sufficient source of error, is the fundamental misperception through which we perceive all things in a temporal series. This error he regards as universal and inescapable, the

¹ *L’Explication dans les Sciences*, Chap. III., “La Déduction”.

² *Ibid.*, Chap. IV., “La Rationalité du Réel”.

³ *Ibid.*, Bk. II., Chap. X., “L’État de Puissance”.

mystic's experience of the timeless is illusory.¹ There arises for him then in the most acute form the problem of the occurrence of misperception, since he also holds that the correctness of perception is self-evident. A subtle argument is directed to the solution of this enigma. The self-evident correctness is limited to a period in time measured from a point in time. Thus what I perceive as present must be within the specious present, but it may exist at the moment O and I perceive it at the moment P, both being within the specious present. I may thus be in error, although I perceive as present what is within the specious present.² This limitation has then to be translated into the terms of the real series, since time is unreal. Assuming (it is not certainly known) that error of perception may come in by means of the specious present character of our perception of a present experience containing distinct moments (any one of which we may take as our moment of experience whereas the experience may occur at another moment), McTaggart conceives this error as meaning an error in the inclusive or C series. Thus error in perception is not inconsistent with the self-evident correctness of perception. It appears that the prior and root error of perceiving a temporal series is to be rendered conceivable by this possible error which cannot be discovered by perception to occur. But the whole analysis depends on the preliminary assumption that there is a time series within which present and specious present have significance. For our belief that there is error in the C series depends on the supposition of error in the temporal series. The problem being how, since time is unreal, do we perceive events in time, perception being infallible, it is replied that under the conditions of time our perception is in a sense correct, and in a sense incorrect, on account of the specious present. Perception then may not be infallible. Although we are certain that every perception is correct at the time when it is made, "the time at which it is made is a misperception, the reality misperceived being the point in the C series at which it occurs".³ But in order to prove this, or the possibility of this, have we not to assume that perception is infallible in regard to the fundamental perception of a time series, the very question at issue? The error has no meaning except on the assumption that there is a time series. It may further be asked in relation to this method of conceiving the problem of time, by what criterion are we

¹ *The Nature of Existence*, Vol. II., Bk. VI., Chap. XLV., "Error and the C series".

² *Ibid.* See also Bk. VI., Chap. L., "Compliance with the Conditions".

³ *Ibid.*, Bk. VI., Chap. L., "Compliance with the Conditions".

enabled to determine the extent of the misperception? For the misperception is so profound as to introduce into our experience time with all its attendant illusions, illusions to which is due a transformation of reality such as to leave unaffected hardly a single important experience.¹ In McTaggart's view we have no reason for supposing that it extends to the point of perceiving as a series what is not in reality a series, but—for example—some type of whole of parts, which might be translated into a series by our misperception. "What appears as the temporal series is really a series though it only appears to be temporal."² We need not, it seems, entertain doubts concerning the appearance unless it contains a contradiction. There is then in reality a series though the temporal form is illusory. We may analyse what comes to us as a single and all embracing experience, and distinguish in it a part which is wholly illusory and a part which is veritable. The difficulty which McTaggart seems to experience in determining what type of real series it is of which the time-series is a misperception, may suggest doubts whether the notion of series is the true logical equivalent of the process of time. To some thinkers, the nature of time has appeared to be better indicated by the idea of a continuous passage which is discrete in its moments only in relation to our mode of conceiving it, stages in the passage being distinguished primarily on account of their importance whether in view of practice or in view of the systematic and intelligible conception of the world. This interpretation cannot be more than referred to since my purpose is not to discuss the alternatives to McTaggart's treatment of time, but the problem of the compatibility of the latter with his doctrine of the self. The employment of the notion of the inclusion series as being that type of which the order of time is phenomenal, enables him to present his highly original theory of the relation of appearance to reality in the most exact form possible, and so to satisfy himself in what respects its form, and in what respects its content, can be taken as reflexions of the truth. As regards the form, for instance, the transitive and asymmetrical characters of the relations in the order of time must have their source in the same characters of relations in the real (C) series. Perhaps the most remarkable peculiarity in McTaggart's doctrine of the relation of the apparent and the real series is the view of error in reality. The perceptions in the C series are not merely incomplete, they contain real error. "If they were not really misperceptions

¹ See Bk. VI., Chap. XLIV., sections 516-517.

² *Ibid.*, Bk. VI., Chap. XLV.

it would be impossible that the error for which we are trying to find a place, could be found in them." Thus the misperceptions of our experience do not only arise there, they have a real source. What then is this cause of error which is beyond time? The doubt again arises whether this cause, or to be precise the order in which error really arises, the inclusive series, can be made intact so to speak or wholly pure from time. This doubt is strengthened when we come to the discussion of the relation of the pre-final to the final stages of experience and the idea of the "futurity of the whole".¹ That the terms of the inclusive series should appear to form an A series (past, present, future) and consequently a B series (earlier and later) is, as McTaggart observes, an ultimate fact. "We cannot explain why it should be so. But there is no reason why it should not be so."² But the reason why the inclusive series was selected was that it appeared to him to be amongst possible types that one of which the time-series could be reasonably regarded as the appearance. Now amongst the respects in which he recognises that the correspondence seems difficult to establish is one which belongs to the content. The content of the terms of the time-series, as we observe it, does not at all suggest that the terms do in reality stand in the relation of including and included. For the content does not appear to show any uniform change in either direction. "Everywhere we find persistence of content, recurrence of content, and oscillation of content." But all these features can be accounted for on the theory. "The oscillations, etc." which he examines, all belong to the cognitional experience in the strict sense in which (as I presume he would allow) we cannot speak of emotions and desires as cognitional: for instance, decrease or increase in clearness of perception. Let us grant that these can be explained on the theory, as in his demonstration.³ But the explanation does not seem adequate if it does not include explanation of persistence, recurrence, oscillation in the quality of the content as value, in view of the place of value in his system. Since the problem of the relation of experience in time to the real order, concerns the whole of our experience, and McTaggart holds that the value qualities of our experience may in certain respects be attributed to reality, why "when enumerating the conditions which must be fulfilled by any theory of the C series, if that theory is to enable us to find in that series the explanation of error" ⁴ does

¹ See Section 3.

² Bk. VI., Chap. LIII., "Apparent Perceptions".

³ Bk. VI., Chap. L., "Compliance with the Conditions".

⁴ Bk. VI., Chap. XLVI.

he not consider it of the first importance to examine the oscillations and other irregularities of these qualities, whether as distinct from cognition, or as kinds of cognition? I would suggest that the ground or the chief ground of this omission is the failure to recognise that the whole meaning of the order of value in time depends on the nature or aspect of the temporal order as experience of the subject. The oscillations, persistences and recurrences of content he examines, all affect the nature of the object in its purely cognitional character.¹ Some reference, however, is made to oscillations of value in the concluding chapter.² Here the question as affecting nations or societies, *e.g.*, the question of moral progress in the general sense, is dismissed, since "nothing is intrinsically good or bad, as we have seen, except either selves, or parts of selves". And McTaggart's doctrine of pre-existence and post-existence involves that it is impossible for us to know whether that which is the reality of which the nation is appearance (the selves of the society) is the same in any sense from age to age. Progress or deterioration can only affect the individual. And here, though we might perceive it to last for a whole life, the insignificance of our field of observation compared with the greatness of the universe "reduces to insignificance, not only the importance of a single self, but the importance of all those groups which we are accustomed to regard with sympathy". For these reasons McTaggart rejects the whole testimony of experience on such questions as those of progress and retrogression, and prefers to decide the problem on "general considerations". His own view is optimistic, that is, of course, in what the theologians would call an eschatological rather than a humanitarian sense. But here we seem to meet what I have termed the fallacy of the transformed empirical, in a peculiarly insidious form. The theologian can rest his belief in the infinite importance of the individual on his theological doctrine. He usually assumes also the reality of time. But the philosopher without either theology or a positive principle to give him an *a priori* metaphysic would be expected to find in experience the basis for his view that the nature of the universe does secure the ultimate good of each self. The "general considerations" include considerable reference to empirical material, *e.g.*, in regard to the existence of selves and the nature of their experience in knowledge and emotion. Reflexion on experience also suggests that it "is so small in comparison with the whole that it is impossible to obtain any information about the whole by induction from what is observed".

¹ Bk. VI., Chap. L.

² Bk. VII., Chap. LXVIII., "Conclusion".

A priori reasoning demonstrates the unreality of time. Yet a meaning is to be retained for the positions that the self, in reality timeless, is to pass through an immense time and finally reach a very good state. What ground can there be for these conclusions excepting an *a priori* metaphysic of the self, from which the experiences of the self known in time may be deduced as *phenomena bene fundata*?

3.

By means of a very remarkable conception McTaggart seems to form a bridge between the temporal and the eternal, that is, by allowing a certain validity to a principle which can only have a place in experience occurring in a time-series, in so far as that principle has a permanent value. This conception is the conception of the "futurity of the whole". It is the form of the real or inclusion series which supplies to him the standpoint from which he arrives at the conception. This series "will contain at least one term which the misperception series does not include—for the inclusion series will have—as one of its terms—the term which is inclusive of all others and which is included by no other".¹ The whole must be a correct perception—it cannot therefore be a term in the misperception series. Now since a self misperceives any term in an inclusion series as being in time, he will perceive H (the term which is inclusive of all others) as a whole as being in time. But he will never perceive it as present. He could only perceive the whole as present if he were at the same stage as the whole. And only the self as a whole could be at the same stage, and as a whole he could not perceive anything in time.²

The whole is then "though not really future—future in the only way in which anything can be so—as appearing as future"—"*Sub specie temporis*, the whole is now future".³ As McTaggart points out, this view is opposed to the view that the universe, taken as a whole, is at every moment of the time series manifested as present. The ground of the difference is that "what appears as the temporal series is really a series, though it only appears to be temporal. . . . Hence some eternal realities appear as being earlier in time, some as being later." But "the final term of the series which is also the whole, appears *sub specie temporis* only as future, and never as past or present". Whereas in the view McTaggart opposes "it is this term which is most emphatically asserted to exist as present". Now it happens that the results

¹ Bk. VI., Chap. XLIX., "The Three Series".

² Bk. VI., Chap. XLIX.

³ *Ibid.*, Bk. VII., Chap. LXI.

for ethics are much more satisfactory on McTaggart's than on the contrasted view. According to the rejected view we have to suppose that all the good which is in the universe as a whole is manifested in our present life. Either then there is less good than we demand, or some of our ideals are false. We may agree with McTaggart that the doctrine that the whole is completely manifested in the present has disastrous results for ethics. But are these really avoided in the doctrine of the futurity of the whole? Since the final term is all-inclusive, all the good that exists in the universe must be contained in it, and (though he does not seem to admit this) all the evil, since he does not regard it as that kind of whole in which the combination of the parts carries with it the possession of a new character or quality. There is not for McTaggart as there is for Bernard Bosanquet a transmutation by which either evil ceases to be evil in the whole, or we pass beyond both good and evil. McTaggart does not affirm that the whole is entirely good, but only that there is more good in it than evil. This position is certainly more in harmony with our moral experience than the neo-Hegelian position. Yet it may be questioned whether the degree and amount of error which he allows to affect our present moral judgments are not such as to create the kind of uncertainty about present estimates in this sphere which he supposes his doctrine to avoid. As an example may be taken the following observation. Having referred to his own view that an ungratified volition always means an erroneous perception, he asks whether his results will destroy the value of the emotional and moral life, and in relation to the latter concludes that "it is not certain that there is really any disapproval of crimes or any approval of, or acquiescence in, acts of virtue—but the fact that there are apparent approvals, disapprovals, and acquiescences, is sufficient for morality".¹ So far as the status of ethics is concerned, this result does not appear to give it more standing than Bosanquet's conception of morality as belonging to the stage of claims and counter-claims, a stage transcended in the Absolute, where separate individuality ceases to demand recognition. For McTaggart's ontology, however, separate individuality is fundamental.

But the greatest difficulty in connexion with the doctrine of the futurity of the whole is, I think, a logical one. The combination in a single conception of the meaning which can only belong to a fact of the temporal misperception series, and the meaning of that which is timeless, seems impossible. From the

¹ Bk. VI., Chap. LVII., "Emotion and Volition".

standpoint of the temporal experience, the whole is always future. From its own standpoint, since it is eternal, we can only apply temporal characterisations to it by metaphor, and presentness would be a better metaphor for the appearance of the whole at the last stage of the C series than pastness or futurity. What does this signify for the experience of the self? In so far as temporal conditions have meaning the whole is never reached, it is always future. In so far as the final stage is attained, the present with the past and future is really abolished. It appears to result that either we are having in time an experience of the highest value to look forward to, but never to attain, or we are with everything else in the universe eternally members of the whole. It is now as present as anything can be, and the neo-Hegelian paradox that all is already either good or neither good nor evil, is not escaped. Either we shall never attain the eternal or there is the eternal now. To McTaggart's position that "we shall in a finite time reach an endless state which is infinitely more good than bad,"¹ there seems to me to attach a difficulty which is the converse of that of the doctrine which Aristotle supposes himself to find in Plato's *Timæus*, that in an eternal world there is a beginning of time. Here in the course of a temporal experience we should enter upon eternity. I do not think that the difficulty is overcome by the distinction between the whole and the eternal. For the whole must *sub specie temporis* include the whole of the temporal series, it is the eternal which manifests itself in time.

The logical conception of the Inclusion series which is to form the transitional category between the temporal and the eternal, does not then seem capable of performing this function unless the temporal order really lies half concealed behind the relation of inclusion. When the final stage is reached we know that all the pre-final stages were or are permeated by misperception. As timeless, we perceive them in their true character, the final experience being as we are told similar to the experience of presentness. It seems impossible to hold that we are not eternally perceiving these stages without misperception, unless a status is allowed to the order of time in virtue of which it forces its distinctions of now and then, present and future into reality. Thus either we get the futurity of the whole which carries with it the pastness of the parts, and these distinctions must be carried over into reality, or our real experience is complete and perfect, and we dismiss the order of time as something that neither is, nor was.

If McTaggart, in spite of the logical power and exhaustive

¹ Bk. VII., Chap. LXVIII., "Conclusion".

analysis of his method, has rendered himself liable to this criticism, I think the ultimate reason lies in the perhaps unconscious transition underlying the treatment of time, and affecting the treatment of the self, to which reference has been made; namely between the subjective and the objective methods of analysing the meaning of the temporal process. The doctrine of the timeless spiritual world has its birth in the objective view of the nature of things, from Plato's treatment (in his earlier period only) of the soul as an idea, to McTaggart's philosophy of the self as substance having qualities and relations. McTaggart does not obviously make use of the subjective method, but his philosophy seems to have need of it. The theory of the self would, however, have to be associated with acceptance of the reality of time, if the selves are to be independent beings. If time is unreal the selves in their true nature as subjects lose their distinctness which can only be maintained by creative activity, and the passage into the doctrine of universal mind takes place. This is obscured for McTaggart because his theory of the unreality of time is determined by logical argument in relation to the content of a world of substances, objectively regarded, although he believes that all substance must be spiritual. Amongst the results of this standpoint are the comparative lack of value attributed to memory, as to history, and the practical life. This is, of course, inevitable also on account of the rejection of the reality of change, and the view of volition as a kind of cognition, signifying in reality the feeling of acquiescence. But to discuss these points would be to go far beyond the limits of this article.

The difficulty which lies nearer to the heart of McTaggart's position is that of the assignment of grounds for the dissimilarity of selves. The greatest value depends upon the relations of selves; this relation is conceived as infinitely more perfect in the timeless than in the temporal experience. It would appear that unless these selves possess each a unique individuality, the value of the pluralistic universe would hardly exceed that of the monistic. This is, of course, no argument against its reality; but for McTaggart, obviously, only in a pluralistic universe can the highest value be attained. It may also be noted that McTaggart at times lays stress upon quantity rather than quality of value. A life of exceedingly small value would, if it went on long enough, become at some point better than a brief life of the highest value. The view that "quality is something which is inherently and immeasurably more important than quantity," he considers "neither self-evident, nor capable of demonstration".¹ It is

¹ Bk. VII., Chap. LXVII.

very difficult to make this position consistent with his treatment of value in the final stage. For it would appear to lead to the result that no value is intrinsically better than another. A sufficient quantity of an inferior value would be superior to a small quantity of one greatly superior in itself. The quality of the selves experiencing value is then, from this standpoint, less important than their number, and in fact McTaggart conceives them as "qualitatively very much alike. Each of them perceives selves and the parts of selves, and has no other content but such perceptions" which are also states of emotion and acquiescence. As regards the way in which selves may be differentiated, it may be quantitative, or there may be "tone-differences" in the quality of their perceptions. It is very clear that McTaggart does not himself regard this similarity of selves as in any way diminishing the value of their experience. As his conclusion tells us¹, we are gradually approximating a final stage in which the good infinitely exceeds, not only any evil co-existent with it, but all the evil in the series by which it is attained. And he makes other impressive statements showing deep conviction of the certainty and greatness of the eternal value. Yet on this point the Absolutist philosopher seems to recognise more truly what is involved in the rejection of time. He abandons the value of personality, and transforms the values of human relations into the principle that determines all which is finite and limited towards union in the whole. McTaggart conceiving reality from the subjective side as spiritual cannot sacrifice the uniqueness of selves since spirit is personal. The values of human relationship are therefore not totally transformed but either we must see them as weakened in certain respects essential to selfhood, or it must be allowed that his doctrine of the unlimited value of the final stage passes into a kind of mysticism. For there appears to be in his system no intelligible ground for the sense of intimate union between selves which is the basis of the highest value except in the nature of knowledge in which their experience essentially consists. Their whole content consists of perceptions, and the objects of these perceptions are selves having a content of perceptions, and the perceptions of these selves. In the attempt to conceive their nature clearly, we are inevitably led on to the thought of a perpetually increasing advance to unity which is never completed but indefinitely approached.

¹ Bk. VII., Chap. LXVIII.

IV.—DISCUSSION

SINE QUA NON CONDITIONS.

CURRENT works on logic limit their treatment of hypotheticals to the form whose typical expression is *if A, then B*. In this form the condition is offered as sufficient, should it occur, to establish or produce the consequent. Given *if A, then B* and *A*, we can safely infer *B*. Or if *not B* is the additional premise, the denial of *A* is warranted. But a condition which is sufficient, may not be a *sine qua non*. Hence the characteristic fallacies are to deny the antecedent and infer the denial of the consequent, or to affirm the consequent and then infer the antecedent. These are fallacies precisely because the condition which is sufficient may not be a *sine qua non*. John's falling sick, to use a hackneyed illustration, may be sufficient to make him write a letter. Hence given that he is sick, we can infer a letter will be written, and given that no letter has been written, that he has not been sick. But knowing only that, we cannot be sure that unless he is sick he will not write, nor that he is sick if he has written. The sufficiency of sickness to make him write does not exclude the possibility that other factors may bring about that same result even while he remains well. Not unless sickness is the *sine qua non* of his writing, are these latter inferences warranted. Science, it is true, presents most of its implications in the form involving sufficient conditions; but this should not blind us to the fact that *sine qua non* conditions are familiar and frequent features of our experience. And the language of daily life, whatever the poverty of text-book logic, is well equipped to give accurate expression to the *sine qua non* type of condition. It is only when we ask, what precisely are the inferences validly derivable from such conditions? what are the fallacies to be avoided? that both logic and common sense sometimes fall into confusion. To work out the logic of such conditions is the object of what follows.

Unless, not unless, none but, only, except—all these, each, however, with an emphasis peculiar to itself, are conjunctions used to introduce implications involving *sine qua non* conditions. We are all familiar with their use in conversation, as when in response to the question, "Are you going to the game?" the reply is made, "Not unless you have the tickets". Other illustrations could readily be supplied were they needed—there are two in the first paragraph of this article. But just what is asserted when such expressions are used? Take

the hoary quotation which generations of logic students have been required to reduce to strict logical form, "None but the brave deserve the fair". Putting aside for the moment the question as to exactly what "strict logical form is," we can say that, in the form given, what is asserted is that being brave is the *sine qua non* of deserving the fair. This type of condition has the rare advantage of an accurate title. It means precisely, *without this, not that*; the range of the 'this' and 'that' being in each case determined by the specific content of the judgment in which the *sine qua non* condition appears. In the illustration just given, what is primarily asserted is that bravery is a thing without which there is no deserving the fair. The peculiarity of such a condition is that no specific assurance is given that its fulfilment is sufficient to establish what is thus conditioned. You must be brave to deserve the fair, but bravery may not be enough. Perhaps, to complement bravery, goodness may be needed, or generosity, or riches; again, perhaps bravery alone is after all sufficient. But taken strictly, what the proposition asserts is simply that bravery is a *sine qua non*.

Later we shall return to the question as to whether in normal usage *sine qua non* propositions convey also a fair presumption as to what is required to give sufficiency, but our first concern is with the inferences validly derivable from *sine qua non* propositions taken strictly. So taken, the *sine qua non* condition asserts necessity without sufficiency, just as the sufficient condition asserts sufficiency without necessity: in terms of this distinction the one type is the reverse of the other. And the formal rules stating the correct use of the one show a symmetrical reversal of those governing the other. A table will make this clear.

TABLE I.

Sine Qua Non Conditions.
Given: Not unless X, Y.

Sufficient Conditions.
Given: If X, then Y.

I. Valid Moods:

1. Deny the antecedent and infer the denial of the consequent: But not X, therefore not Y.
2. Affirm the consequent and infer the affirmation of the antecedent: But Y, therefore X.

II. Fallacies:

1. Affirm the antecedent and infer the affirmation of the consequent: But X, therefore Y.
2. Deny the consequent and infer the denial of the antecedent: But not Y, therefore not X.

I. Valid Moods:

1. Affirm the antecedent and infer the affirmation of the consequent: But X, therefore Y.
2. Deny the consequent and infer the denial of the antecedent: But not Y, therefore not X.

II. Fallacies:

1. Deny the antecedent and infer the denial of the consequent: But not X, therefore not Y.
2. Affirm the consequent and infer the affirmation of the antecedent: But Y, therefore X.

It will be seen that what is a valid inference given one type of condition is a fallacy given the other, what is a fallacy given the first, is valid given the second. Thus to return to our illustration of John and his letter writing. Given: If John is sick, he will write a letter, the familiar inferences follow from the additional premises either that he is sick, or that he has not written. But given: Not unless John is sick, will he write a letter, then to infer he has written from the fact that he is sick, or to infer he is not sick from the fact that he has not written, are fallacies. Whereas to infer he has not written from the fact that he is not sick is valid; as is also the inference that he is sick from the fact that he has written.

This symmetrical reversal holds also when *none but*, *except*, and *only* are the introductory conjunctions. But when in place of *Not unless X, Y*, we have *Unless X, Y*, there is a slight variation in the way in which the reversal appears. Given for comparison *If X, then Y* and *Unless X, Y*, the reversal occurs in the relations between affirmations and denials.

TABLE II.

Given: Unless X, then Y.

Given: If X, then Y.

I. Valid Moods:

I. Valid Moods:

1. *Deny* the antecedent and infer the affirmation of the consequent: But not X, therefore Y.

1. *Affirm* the antecedent and infer the affirmation of the consequent: But X, therefore Y.

2. *Deny* the consequent and infer the *affirmation* of the antecedent: But not Y, therefore X.

2. *Deny* the consequent and infer the *denial* of the antecedent: But, not Y, therefore not X.

II. Fallacies.

II. Fallacies:

1. *Affirm* the antecedent and infer the *denial* of the consequent: But X, therefore not Y.

1. *Deny* the antecedent and infer the *denial* of the consequent: But not X, therefore not Y.

2. *Affirm* the consequent and infer the *denial* of the antecedent: But Y, therefore not X.

2. *Affirm* the consequent and infer the *affirmation* of the antecedent: But Y, therefore X.

A comparison of the first columns of Tables I. and II. will disclose a similar shift of affirmations and denials when one passes from propositions of the *not unless* type to those introduced by *unless*. In the valid moods where the *not unless* form has "deny antecedent . . . deny consequent," the *unless* form has "deny antecedent . . . affirm consequent"; and for "affirm consequent . . . affirm antecedent" in the one, we have "deny consequent . . . affirm antecedent" in the other. A similar situation is found in the fallacies. To summarise the difference between the two forms we may say that in the *not unless* form, X is asserted to be the *sine qua non* of the occurrence of Y, while in the *unless* form, X is asserted to be the *sine qua non* of the non-occurrence of Y.

At the same time it is easy to show formally that any proposition of the *not unless* form, can be restated, with exact formal equivalence, in the *unless* form, and *vice versa*. By simply shifting the position of the *not*, we obtain from "not unless X, Y" the equivalent form, "unless X, not Y". Similarly, by introducing compensating negatives we can pass from "unless X, Y" to "not unless X, not Y". The logical or formal equivalence of these pairs is exhibited in the fact that, when used as premises, the two members of each pair yield identical valid conclusions and identical fallacies.

TABLE III.

Given : Not unless X, Y.	Its equivalent : Unless X, not Y.
Apply the rules, Table I., first column.	Apply the rules, Table II., first column.
Valid Moods :	Valid Moods :
1. But not X, therefore not Y.	1. But not X, therefore not Y. (Affirmation of the consequent.)
2. But Y, therefore X.	2. But Y, therefore X. (The denial of "not Y" yielding Y.)
And so also for the fallacies.	
Given : Unless X, Y.	Its equivalent : Not unless X, not Y.
Apply the rules, Table II., first column :	Apply the rules, Table I., first column :
Valid Moods :	Valid Moods :
1. But not X, therefore Y.	1. But not X, therefore Y.
2. But not Y, therefore X.	2. But not Y, therefore X.

And again, so also for the fallacies.

But when we pass from these symbolised expressions to living discourse, we can say, in the words of Herakleitos, that actual judgments are both willing and not willing to undergo these transformations. For example, the same speaker might readily say to a group of men, offering it as a general principle, "None but the brave deserve the fair"; but later to some one man whose spirits needed bucking up, he might more readily say, "Remember, unless you are brave, you won't deserve your lady". There is a shift of emphasis in the two expressions, but it is also clear that the same main fact is asserted in both cases, namely, that bravery is a *sine qua non* of deserving the fair. Again, if we start with the question, "Are you going to the game?" the reply naturally takes the form, "Not unless you have tickets". But if the second person had spoken in answer to only a mute question, he might well have said, "Unless you have tickets I am not going". And again the essential fact involved in both cases is the same. What determines the choice between the two forms is where the emphasis is to come, and, even more important, the tone and character of the circumstances immediately preceding the assertion. In some circumstances, the *unless*

form is the more appropriate, in others the *not unless* form. And if logicians would attend carefully to daily speech, they would often be amazed at the nice and quick apprehension on the part of the most ordinary people for what is the more appropriate form.

But while in the above cases the transition from one form to the other is both easy and clear, and while in all cases the transition is formally possible, there are cases when such a transition cannot be made without loss of clarity. "Unless you have tickets, I will stay at home" is, I think, a fairly clear statement. I find "Not unless you have tickets will I not stay home" simply opaque. Yet the two are formally equivalent. Personally, I think that even for logic the fact that the latter is opaque is more important than its formal equivalence.

On the formal side there is but one point remaining for exposition, the method of denying *sine qua non* propositions. Since such propositions deal with necessity, a possibility is sufficient to upset them. If we are told that X is a *sine qua non* of Y, formal denial is provided by simple asserting that Y is possible without X. "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God" is denied by merely asserting the possibility of seeing the kingdom even if not born again. As to whether the denial could be substantiated short of the actual vision without the second birth, is, naturally, another matter.

We have treated inferences involving *sine qua non* conditions as belonging to a type to be clearly distinguished from the type based upon sufficient conditions. But is this warranted and is it worth doing? Propositions of the sort called here *sine qua non* propositions, appear regularly in logic books with the requirement that the student reduce them to logical form so that they can be treated by the ordinary rules provided for sufficient conditions. After all, is not that enough? And after the fashion of Mr. Johnson we might continue the argument by roundly asserting that not unless it can be shown that such reduction eliminates part of the essential meaning of *sine qua non* propositions, is it necessary to treat such propositions as a distinct type. The *nota bene* would naturally be: This last argument is of the *sine qua non* type. Regardless of its form, what this argument really raises is the question of the relation of form and meaning. We can admit the formal side of the argument at once by showing how any *sine qua non* proposition can be reduced to a proposition of the sufficient type. Given, None but the brave deserve the fair, we have by reduction, If one is not brave, he does not deserve the fair. Or in general, given, *Not unless X, Y*, by reduction we obtain, *If not X, then not Y*. Such an argument, however, is little to the point, for it can be worked both ways. Sufficient conditions can also be reduced to *sine qua non* conditions. Given, If John is sick, he will write a letter, we obtain the *sine qua non* form, Not unless John is well, will he not write a letter. From the form, *If X, then Y*, we obtain *Not unless not X, not Y*. This

in turn can be translated into the form, *Not Y implies not X*, which itself is a form some logicians often offer as an equivalent rendering of our original, *If X, then Y*. But even that form, *Not Y implies not X* does not escape translation, for it can be restated in the *sine qua non* form, *Not unless Y, X*. Thus we have not merely completed the circle but started on a second circuit.

Out of all this we can certainly draw the conclusion that every sufficient condition involves a *sine qua non* condition as well; that every *sine qua non* condition conceals a sufficient condition. But we cannot draw the conclusion that one form of assertion has logical priority or supremacy over the other. Rather we should see that, in order to understand the meaning of the form, we should attend to the facts which are normally expressed in one form rather than in another. The form is but the vehicle, to be ridden in or avoided as the facts permit and our intention determines. To repeat a phrase used above, that some forms conceal one thing, reveal another, is more important than that somehow or other any cargo can be loaded into any wagon.

That is the chief reason for giving *sine qua non* conditions their due of independent exposition, as it is also the reason for according the same treatment to sufficient conditions. Not unless John is not sick, will he not write a letter, is a blurred way of stating what is clearly stated in the form, *If John is sick he will write a letter*. For what is it about John we wish to know? Let it be that we are concerned lest he should be in need and we not know. To such a question the needed reply is the assurance that if he should fall sick, he would let us know. It is the *sufficiency* of the condition which gives the assurance. But change our interest, let it be that we are concerned because no letters have come, then assurance is best given by the *sine qua non* form, *He doesn't write unless he is sick*. For a last illustration consider the familiar notice outside a factory, *None but skilled workmen need apply*. That is a clear and emphatic statement of the main fact, that being a skilled workman is a *sine qua non* of obtaining employment at that factory at that time. Any reduction of that notice to the sufficient form would lessen the prominence of that essential fact.

Reduction should be avoided except in those cases, less common than some logicians seem to think, when clarity itself requires it. There is no merit in reduction for purely formal considerations. It is sheer ignorance of living discourse to think that some few logical forms have an exclusive claim to clearness and precision. These objections to reduction hold not only against passing from a *sine qua non* condition to an alleged equivalent in sufficient form, but also against alleged equivalents in the same form. Mrs. Ladd-Franklin recently offered a series of riddles to logicians.¹ The first

¹ See the *Journal of Philosophy*, 6th December, 1928; vol. xxv., no. 25, p. 700. To date no answers have been published in the *Journal*.

one was to determine whether or not two propositions are logically equivalent. The two propositions are: Not unless it rains do I take an umbrella—Not unless I do not take an umbrella does it not rain. If we test these propositions for logical equivalence by working out what implications can be derived from them, we find that on the basis of the first we can say: (following the rules given in Table I.) But no rain, therefore no umbrella—or—But he is carrying an umbrella, therefore it is raining. On the basis of the second we can say: But he is carrying an umbrella, therefore it is raining—or—But no rain, therefore no umbrella. This looks like exact equivalence. Even if we proceed to work out the fallacies natural to such premises, we find that from the two propositions identical fallacies arise. Could equivalence be more perfect? Not formally.

Are not then these two propositions equivalent? I think the correct answer is, symbolically yes, but actually no. For consider what these two propositions say; replace them in a living context. Some men are discussing rain, umbrellas, rubbers, and so on. One man says, "Well, it may be all right to be prepared for some things, but not unless it rains do I carry an umbrella." He means clearly that the weather forecast, even black clouds overhead, are not enough to make him carry an umbrella: the rain itself is a *sine qua non* of his carrying the beastly thing. In his assertion logical form and causal connexion have identical direction. Now let another man speak: "I agree with you completely, so completely in fact, that not unless I do not take an umbrella does it not rain." But if he said that, surely, if he were understood, some one would say, "Who the deuce do you think you are, Jupiter Pluvius? Do you think your not taking an umbrella is a *sine qua non* of its not raining?" In fact, of course, such is not the case. Yet what of the formal exhibition of equivalence between the two propositions? The formal equivalence ignores the issue between logical implication and causal order; or more accurately, by attending to the form rather than the meaning, whatever causal order may be contained in the meaning is dropped out, leaving only the order of implication. But the causal order is significant; it is folly to ignore it. Hence, taken at their full value, the two propositions under discussion are not only not equivalent, but the first is sense, the second nonsense.

The position as to formal treatment of propositions implicit in the above, is not to be taken as blanket condemnation of formal processes. Far from it. Their validity is not impugned, nor their value denied. But no formal procedure can be trusted when divorced from a critical intelligence—or even better, from common sense.

It is only common sense, not logical acumen, which appends a paragraph on the presumptions as to sufficiency, if any, which attend *sine qua non* conditions. The basis for my comments is the way ordinary people actually use this form. By far the most common occasion is when factors are known and recognised which would be

sufficient were it not for the lack of some one further factor. This further factor is then for such a situation a *sine qua non*. Here is an illustration recorded as it actually occurred in a conversation. "Are you going to Los Angeles for the holidays?" "Not unless I get some money." Subsequent questioning disclosed that the first speaker understood the conversation to mean that money was a *sine qua non* and that further, if the money were forthcoming, the trip would be made. And his understanding was correct. Yet the second part of his inference was formally not warranted. Mrs. Ladd-Franklin's riddle affords an even more striking illustration. "Not unless it rains do I take an umbrella." Does this mean that when it rains the umbrella is taken? Not if we stick to our form. Strictly taken, the proposition could be true, it might always rain, and the man never carry an umbrella. If all this turned out to be the case, we might say the speaker was disingenuous—but that is not a logical sin—we could not say he had lied. We could not even comfort ourselves with his getting most thoroughly wet. He might wear a raincoat. But we can draw the moral: a purely formal logic, far from being a guide for the simple, is really a trap for the unwary.

H. D. ROËLOFS.

V.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Idea of Value. BY JOHN LAIRD, M.A., Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1929. Pp. xx, 384. 18s.

PROF. LAIRD is already well known to students of philosophy by his important writings on the Self, on Realism, and on Moral Theory. But this new book will add greatly to his reputation, and may be expected to appeal to an even wider circle of readers. So far as I can judge, it is quite the most comprehensive book on the whole subject of Value that has yet appeared in English, and at least one of the most complete in any language. Its merits, however, can hardly be satisfactorily brought out in a critical notice. They lie largely in the detailed examination of particular problems, in the systematic coherence and comprehensiveness of the whole, and in the extraordinary wealth of illustrative material by which it is enriched and adorned. Almost every word in it has to be carefully weighed; and it would be impossible to explain their full significance or to discuss their importance in a review of tolerable length. I can do little more than advise the readers of MIND to study it for themselves—not, however, as a first book on the subject. But it is, of course, my duty to give a general account of the contents of the book, to call attention to those parts that appear to be specially significant, and to indicate any respects in which it may be held to be incomplete or unsatisfactory.

The discussion of the subject seems to fall naturally into several distinct parts: (1) the consideration of the precise significance of the leading terms; (2) their use in the study of Economics; (3) their use in the study of Ethics; (4) their use in the study of *Æsthetics*; (5) their more purely metaphysical implications and applications. On all of these topics he has much to say that is fresh and instructive; and on many of them his treatment may be said to be exhaustive. It is chiefly on the metaphysical side that I feel impelled to ask for more, or at least for a rather more definite indication of the view that is finally reached.

The terms that are of chief importance are, of course, Value and Good; though some others, such as Worth, Dignity, and Reality, call for a certain amount of attention. In dealing with the general significance of the term Value, Mr. Laird rightly notes that its extensive use in philosophical writings is a special feature of recent

years; but he notes also that this tendency is a reversion to earlier speculative thought—in which, however, the term 'Good' was more commonly employed. In his own treatment, he uses *bonum* as the leading term to indicate the main types of Value, distinguishing the various grades as *bonum utile*, *bonum jucundum* and *bonum honestum*. Perhaps *bonum intelligibile* might have been added with advantage, though in reality it is not neglected.

With regard to the Greek use of the word ἀγαθός, he notes that it had reference primarily to high birth. In all countries the original tendency has been to think that the man who does well is the man who is 'well to do'. He might have noted a similar transition in the use of the Latin *bonus* and *honestus* and also of our own word 'noble' and even of 'the grand old name of gentleman'. With regard to the latter, it may be worth while to recall what Bosanquet stated in his Essay on 'Ladies and Gentlemen,' where these terms are interpreted as implying a certain skill or tact in finding the right thing to do in a particular situation. The Greek καλοκάγαθία, to which Mr. Laird refers, seems to be intended to convey the somewhat similar idea of the combination of good will with practical efficiency. In contrast with this, we might recall the modern phrase 'so good that he is good for nothing' or Kant's antithesis between the Good Will and the defects due to a 'stepmotherly nature'. The ambiguities that are thus seen to lurk in the use of the term Good are at least a partial justification for the modern preference for the more general term Value, which, though by no means free from ambiguity, lends itself at least more easily to the recognition of different types of worth or efficiency, and especially to the recognition of positive and negative types. The saying that 'there is some soul of goodness in things evil' sounds paradoxical; whereas there is no paradox in saying that what has negative value in one respect may have positive value in another. Again, we can speak of 'logical values,' of the relative values of different categories, etc. It is this flexibility of the term, I think, that has enabled it to play so large a part in modern thought. This is partly recognised by Mr. Laird; but he seems to recognise it (especially on p. xix) with some hesitation and even some reluctance. He appears to prefer 'Good' whenever it can conveniently be used. Value, as Ruskin noted, refers primarily to efficiency—what *avails*. Hence it is specially suitable for those axiological types that are instrumental, and Good for those that are intrinsic.

Passing from these general considerations, we may now notice the special types of value that are dealt with by Mr. Laird. He begins with *bonum utile*, i.e., in the main, with economic or purely instrumental values. The detailed discussion of these falls within the province of economic and sociological studies, rather than of those that are strictly philosophical. I suppose it is true, however, that in all aspects of life we tend to become aware of means before we become clearly aware of the ends that they subserve. The

statement that is quoted from Hobbes (p. 9) expresses probably the view of value that is apt to present itself most readily to the 'man in the street': 'The Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things his Price: that is to say so much as would be given for the use of his Power; and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependent upon the need and judgement of another'. A view of this kind has, of course, ceased to have much weight even in economic discussions. But Mr. Laird deals faithfully with it, referring not only to the writings of professional economists but also to the important contribution of P. H. Wicksteed, which is perhaps not so well known as it ought to be. There is a somewhat scornful reference to Ruskin (pp. 32-33 and 35). No doubt, Ruskin's view of value was not altogether clear; but surely his service in diverting attention (more definitely than Carlyle had done) from wealth to welfare, and in emphasising the wider bearings of the conception of Value, deserved a more sympathetic notice. Mr. Laird says that Ruskin only showed that economic science is not a complete 'social philosophy'. Surely he contended also that, whenever it is regarded as having a direct and decisive bearing on practical life, it ought to be treated as only one aspect of social philosophy. I suppose this is now generally recognised; but social philosophy (or 'politics,' as Aristotle called it) is a large and difficult subject. Perhaps its bearings on economics were more effectively brought out by the historical school of German economists (such as Wagner and Schmoller) than they were by Ruskin.

Having disposed of *bonum utile*, Mr. Laird proceeds to the consideration of those modes of valuation in which ends are more directly involved. But, before entering upon the detailed treatment of these, he inserts a chapter dealing with the view that is taken of the general subject of value in the philosophy of Spinoza. He does not explain very definitely why this should be done; and it may be disconcerting to many readers to be plunged so suddenly into a rather elaborate and highly critical examination of Spinoza's views at an early stage in the treatment of the subject. It is, of course, true that values are dealt with in a comprehensive way by Spinoza; but his treatment is much affected, as Mr. Laird explains, by his definitely deterministic point of view, and also, as Mr. Alexander has urged, by his insufficient recognition of the fundamental importance of the temporal process. Mr. Alexander himself (who appears to regard himself as very largely a disciple of Spinoza) has tended, as Mr. Laird has noted (p. 316), to think of value as a 'prepossession'; on which Mr. Laird makes the very pertinent comment that it may rather 'be a prepossession that values are prepossessions.' Spinoza himself can hardly be said to treat it as a prepossession; but it is surely true to say that it does not appear to have as prominent a place for him as it has in the work of his successor Leibniz, or in that of Plato and his followers. Spinoza's views are, however, very searchingly examined by Mr. Laird both

in this chapter and at a later stage (pp. 255 and 257); and he may be right in thinking that the discussion of them serves to emphasise at the outset the large bearings of the subject. There is at least one point that Spinoza's treatment helps to bring out, *viz.*, that a determinist view of reality need not detract from the significance of the idea of Good either in human life or in the general life of the universe. It serves also to emphasise the distinction between the valuations of particular individuals and what is good from the point of view of the Cosmos. This becomes more apparent as we proceed.

Having thus cleared away some of the difficulties that are presented by Spinoza's philosophy and indicated the sense in which he may, nevertheless, be taken as a guide, Mr. Laird proceeds to deal positively with the various types of intrinsic valuation, beginning with what is described as 'Natural Election'. This seems to be, not so much a mode of deliberate valuation as the elementary experience out of which the more purely subjective modes of valuation may be held to grow. It is the rudimentary tendency in human and animal life to be attracted or repelled by what seems to be favourable or unfavourable to their existence or growth. It appears to be the counterpart, and to some extent the basis, of what is known in biology as 'natural selection'. In both these processes the grounds of selection are not consciously present (just as in the disliking of 'Doctor Fell'). But the simplest forms of conscious choice may be held to grow directly out of them; just as a gardener may consciously select what, to some extent, Nature might have unconsciously selected for him. This mode of unreflective choice may be said to supply the basis for those forms of valuation that are described by Mr. Laird under the general heading of *bonum jucundum*, and perhaps even, to some extent, those that come under the heading of *bonum honestum*—*i.e.*, the agreeable and the excellent. But, before proceeding to consider these, he finds it necessary to discuss the general nature of Desire, as distinguished from that unreflective mode of appetite to which reference has been made.

In dealing with Desire, he notes that there are two distinct ways in which it may be conceived. It may be thought of as an unreflective 'hormé' (to use Prof. Nunn's term) or as involving the definite thought of an *end* for which appropriate means may be adopted. In the former sense, it is hardly to be distinguished from Natural Election, except as being more complicated and continuous. In the latter sense, it involves a more definite consciousness of the end to which the process is directed. This end may be thought of as pleasure and, in any case, the attainment of it would generally yield pleasure.

In dealing with Desire, as well as in some subsequent parts of his work, he refers a good deal to the work of the Austrian school of psychologists, especially Meinong and Ehrenfels, who are largely responsible for the increasing amount of attention that has been given to the general subject of value in recent times. He can hardly

be said to overrate their work. Perhaps he is right in suggesting (p. 172) that Meinong's doctrines 'were often perhaps rather complex than profoundly subtle'; but both he and Ehrenfels certainly called attention to many difficulties that had been too lightly passed over. The views of T. H. Green, James Ward and others are also carefully considered. Special reference is also made, at more than one point, to McTaggart's view of the supreme value of Love. It is not, of course, altogether peculiar to McTaggart; but the particular way in which he emphasised it has certainly a special interest. In connexion with this, however, I think it would have been well to call attention to the distinction between Love as *appreciation* and as *benevolence*. There seems to be a considerable difference between them, though they are not always clearly distinguished. It was mainly, I think, in the sense of appreciation that Love was regarded by McTaggart as the supreme value; whereas in Christianity and, I think, also in Buddhism, it is chiefly used in the sense of benevolence. The one form of Love passes, no doubt, very readily into the other. Shakespeare may be said to have given some illustrations of this, especially, for instance, near the end of *As you Like It*; but it seems, at least, quite possible to have a preponderance of one or other. It seems true to say, for instance, that there is a preponderance of appreciation in the poetry of Keats and of benevolence in that of Shelley. It is in the sense of appreciation that it is specially dealt with by Mr. Laird in the present chapter; and in the succeeding chapter he is led to discuss the general foundations of *Æsthetics*, referring to Hegel, Croce, E. F. Carrington, L. Abercrombie and others. I think he might, with advantage, have added some reference to the writings of Mr. A. C. Bradley on that subject.

In the general treatment of Pleasure (*bonum jucundum*) which runs through this part of Mr. Laird's work, I am not sure that he is sufficiently alive to the ambiguity that lurks in the use of that term, and, even more, in its correlative Pain. It would surely be well if 'agreeableness' and 'disagreeableness' were more commonly used as the most general terms for the hedonic antithesis, instead of pleasure and pain, which are both somewhat ambiguous. It is, no doubt, true, as Mr. Laird urges (p. 146), that 'pleasure' is freely used, in ordinary discourse, even for the most exalted forms of joy or bliss. So is 'happiness'. But it is surely well, in writings of a scientific character, to take note of possible ambiguities in its use. The feeling, as pure feeling, is the same whatever the nature of the objective content by which it is conditioned may be; but, except perhaps in some forms of madness, it hardly occurs in isolation; and the felicitic content in what is commonly meant by simple pleasure is so different from what it is in joy, gladness, happiness or bliss, that it is confusing to call these diverse experiences by one simple name. There is a still greater ambiguity in the use of 'pain,' which, as James Ward urged, denotes primarily a special mode of organic sensation; and is used

in that sense rather more often than in that of negative hedonic tone. The phrase 'my pain is great because it is so small' serves to bring out the distinction. A slight organic pain may sometimes be more disagreeable than one that is, in itself, more intense. The neglect of this distinction seems to bring Mr. Laird sometimes nearer to pure Hedonism than he evidently intends. Apart from this, however, his discussion of the whole subject is very good.

I may note in passing, that there is a misprint on p. 157. In the rhymed quotation from Bentham, 'faithful' should, of course, be 'fruitful'. It is the only serious misprint that I have found in the book, though there are perhaps one or two slightly defective sentences.

The treatment of *bonum jucundum* is followed by an interesting sketch of the analysis of Approval in the writings of the British moralists—Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, Adam Smith, Price and Reid. This is so largely a matter of detailed exposition that no summary could be profitably given. It is certainly well done and does not seem to call for any special comment.

The following chapter is on 'The Objectivity of Values'. It is here that Mr. Laird's relation to Spinoza is most definitely brought out. According to Spinoza, the whole has to be regarded as absolutely good. It must be accepted as being perfectly real and complete in itself. The highest good for individuals may be said to consist, in Margaret Fuller's phrase, in 'accepting the universe'. But there is also a more purely individual good, which consists in happiness, however that is to be interpreted. So far as I can follow Mr. Laird's complicated and somewhat hesitating statements, he seems to contend that Excellence has to be recognised as the supreme value; but that we have to acknowledge also the validity of Natural Election, including that extension of it which is best characterised as Appreciation. We have also to recognise that man is by nature social; and that social selection has a legitimate place in the determination of values. In this connexion he recognises a certain validity in the theory of the Ethos of a People, which Bradley adopted from Hegel. He brings out various qualifications that have to be made in the view, qualifications that were to a certain extent recognised by Bradley himself, though perhaps not sufficiently emphasised. He may thus be said to recognise three levels in Values, individual preference or election, social selection, and objective excellence. They all have a certain validity, though it is only to the last that complete objectivity can be ascribed. I suppose it is true that a view of this kind is more nearly in harmony with the philosophy of Spinoza than with any other; though it contains features that Spinoza might not have recognised as his.

This leads us on to the definite consideration of *Bonum Honestum*—i.e., Excellence, as distinguished from Natural Election and Appreciation. In dealing with this, he returns to Spinoza, but discusses also, at some length, the views of Descartes, Malebranche

and Geulincx. Leibniz, curiously enough, is more slightly referred to. Perhaps Mr. Laird may have agreed with Hegel in thinking that the philosophy of Leibniz is too much of a 'fairy tale' to be taken seriously. But we live in an age of revivals; and Leibniz has been taken pretty seriously by Mr. Russell and others; and certainly he gave considerable prominence to the conception of value. I think his general position should have been referred to more fully at this point. But perhaps the most notable section in this chapter is that in which Mr. Laird gives a somewhat full analysis of the doctrine of Kant. So far as I can judge, his treatment of this is thoroughly sound and discriminating. He points out various ways in which Kant's views have been misconceived, but indicates also some serious deficiencies in his views.

The next chapter is entitled 'Towards a Conclusion'. It does not bring us to a conclusion; but it deals in a clear and instructive way with the various forms of valuation, and ends with the somewhat disheartening suggestion that perhaps 'value' should be definitely regarded as an ambiguous term. It seems clear that, in some sense, it is ambiguous, inasmuch as it is applied to things that are useful, to things that are chosen for their own sakes, and to things that are good in themselves without regard to choice. Still, if we regard value as referring simply to what is choice-worthy from some point of view, it would seem that all these modes might quite properly be included under it.

There is one complaint, however, that I feel impelled to make at this point. Throughout his treatment of the subject, Mr. Laird confines himself to the views of modern writers, and gives a rather special prominence to the work of Spinoza. It seems to me that any treatment of the idea of Good that takes no account of the view of Plato, must be regarded as somewhat gravely deficient. Even Mr. Alexander who, like Mr. Laird, takes Spinoza as his chief guide, is almost as much influenced by Plato's method of treatment; and it seems to me that, in its more purely cosmic applications at least, it cannot properly be ignored. It may be thought that it is too speculative a conception to be explicitly dealt with in a general discussion of Value; but the view taken by Spinoza may also be said to be highly speculative. Mr. Laird does refer to the Platonic doctrine in his Introduction; and it is somewhat disappointing to find that he does not follow up the reference in the body of his work. It happens that there have been several recent publications in which the Platonic theory has been emphasised. Mr. Laird himself mentions, in his Introduction, Prof. A. E. Taylor's important work on *Plato: the Man and his Work*, in which the significance of the Platonic conception is well expounded, though the somewhat heretical view that Mr. Taylor takes of the *Timæus* may be thought to prevent him from bringing out the full bearing of Plato's doctrine. The Platonic view is also emphasised by Prof. Urban in his book on *The Intelligible World* (published almost simultaneously with Mr. Laird's),

in which Plato's theory is referred to as the foundation of the 'Great Tradition' on which modern Idealism is based. The writings in which the Platonic view is most definitely set forth would seem to be the *Philebus* and the *Timæus*. The former has been well edited by Dr. R. G. Bury and the latter by the late Archer-Hind. A good general account of Plato's view is given in the book by Prof. R. C. Lodge on *Plato's Theory of Ethics: the Moral Criterion and the Highest Good*. The essential point is that Plato treats the Idea of Good as an interpretative principle for the Universe as a Whole. This appears to be the only way in which the significance of the highest Excellence can be adequately brought out. No doubt, some glimpses of this may be said to be found in the work of the Cartesian school, with which Mr. Laird has dealt somewhat fully and sympathetically. It is best brought out in the philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz—somewhat negatively and critically in the former, more positively in the latter. But Mr. Laird, as has been already noted, hardly seems to do justice to the work of Leibniz. Perhaps it may have seemed to him unwise to mix up the general consideration of Value with a too detailed account of particular theories with regard to its place in the interpretation of the Cosmos; but it seems doubtful whether the full significance of what he calls the 'timological' view of Value can be brought out without this. It may be thought that it is too speculative a conception to be explicitly dealt with in a general discussion of Value; but I cannot help thinking that the brief indication that is given in the Introduction might with advantage have been somewhat amplified at this point, and that much of what is stated in the early chapter on Spinoza might have been more appropriately introduced at this stage. The treatment of Value in the later writings of Bosanquet might also have been more fully referred to in this connexion. But at least the recognition of Excellence or Perfection as the supreme form of Value carries us a considerable way towards its use in the more speculative forms of modern philosophy; and for this we may be duly grateful. Plato himself did not by any means neglect some of the lower modes of valuation; though it is his application of the conception of Good to the interpretation of the Cosmos that seems to call for special notice. Even Mr. Alexander, as already noted, though to a large extent a follower of Spinoza, has been greatly influenced by the Platonic treatment, and, though he depreciates Value in name, he does not, I think, altogether disregard it in essence.

In his concluding chapter, Mr. Laird returns to the question of the possibility of quantitative estimates of Value—a question that was previously touched upon in the consideration of the more purely economic aspects of Value. He discusses the views of a considerable number of writers—among others, the views that have recently been put forward by Mr. Perry. Those who have laid most stress on the possibility of quantitative estimates have

generally written from the hedonistic point of view. Mr. Laird definitely rejects this method as final; and the fact that he has a considerable degree of sympathy with it, makes his criticisms all the more telling. He contends, however, that quantitative estimates are possible and important. Within limits, this would probably be generally conceded; but, as far as I can see, it is impossible to make quantitative estimates of the different modes of value that would have much precision or much practical utility. In a rough way, no doubt, it would be possible enough. It is desirable that all the genuine values should be realised; and the degrees of difficulty in realising them may be, to some extent, estimated. The powers of particular individuals for the realisation of them may also be, to some extent, determined; and it seems to be clearly right that each one should seek to realise all the most important values that lie within his reach, and not altogether neglect those that are less important.

It is undoubtedly true that we often have to choose between different forms of Good. Life itself is, in general, a necessary condition for the realisation of any form of value; and yet it is very possible, as we are often reminded, *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*. Moral goodness is recognised as a supreme value; yet he who said 'be not righteous overmuch' has been generally reputed wise.¹ Love—especially, I should think, in the sense of benevolence—may be the highest principle of all; but it is not always easy, in particular cases, to know what it enjoins. Those who have had a large experience of life may be able to give good advice in special circumstances. The appeal seems to be, in the end, to what Aristotle called the *φρόνιμος*—the man of good will and practical experience—or to what Hegel referred to as 'the ethos of a people'. The latter conception, as we noted, is appreciatively, though critically, dealt with by Mr. Laird; but Aristotle, as well as Plato, appears to be, to a large extent, taboo.² I certainly think that the almost complete neglect of what Plato and Aristotle had to say about values is the most serious defect in Mr. Laird's book. Surely it is not an exaggeration to say that they had a better understanding of the higher values than any of the moderns have had, except those who (like Hegel, Bradley and Bosanquet) have derived many of their views directly from them.

There is an interesting reference in the closing chapter to Mr. G. E. Moore's treatment of 'organic unities'—a conception that has a very wide application. Mr. Laird suggests that it is best not to speak of the value of the particular parts within an organic unity, but rather of the value which they *would* have if they were

¹ Compare also Mr. Laird's reference to Bradley's view about 'a moral duty not to be moral' on p. 45. Of course, 'righteous' and 'moral' may be used in wider or narrower senses. It is not possible to be *too good*.

² There is, however, an incidental reference to the *φρόνιμος* on p. 368. But the conception surely deserves a much fuller consideration.

not included within that unity. I think this is a sound suggestion; and, of course, it has very wide applications. It seems true to say that the values of *all* objects are dependent on their place within some system, though the system may not always be one that could be properly described as *organic*. To take a somewhat trivial instance, Chaucer's pen was probably very similar to the pen of most other men of his time; but it derived a special value from his use of it; and I suppose it might be said to have had more value when it was used for the writing of the *Canterbury Tales* than when it 'moved over bills of lading'. The hand that used it had also a greater value than it would have had if it had been severed from his body; and this would be still more emphatically true of his heart.

I am well aware that this review is far from doing justice to a very notable and extremely comprehensive book. It certainly possesses a large measure of the qualities with which it deals. It is, in a high degree, *excellent*; it can hardly fail to be *appreciated*; and to all advanced students of philosophy it must be an object of *natural election*. If they are led to wish for more, so much the better.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

The Ascent of Humanity. By GERALD HEARD. London: Jonathan Cape, 1929. Pp. xiv + 332. 15s.

THE purpose of this book is to display the evolution of the body-mind of man as involving a passage from a relatively unindividualised condition to full individualisation and then on to a condition analogous to, but different from, the first. It contains, therefore, an interpretation of the whole of history, seen like a landscape from an aeroplane as having a pattern which escapes us when we are too close to it.

The first problem that confronts us, before we start on our journey, is that of progress. Every discussion on this subject is held up by the remark: "It depends what one means by the word 'Progress'". That is to say, there are nowadays two problems and not one. On the one hand you have the problem of *progress*, and on the other the problem of the *idea* of progress. This pre-occupation with different ideas of progress is characteristic of a psychologically-visioned age. If anyone is asked whether mankind is progressing, by which must be meant not the sophisticated 'mere alteration of state,' but alteration in a certain direction which involves more 'good,' he will answer according to his lights. In an age when the subjective view of ethics was not current the light will seem to lie outside, and the basis of comparison may be agreed upon; but we are landed with serious difficulties when it dawns on us that the light in accordance with which we make our judgments is shining out of our own eyes and that we see things 'couleur de siècle'. It is then that progress gives place

to the idea of progress. The question may be attacked in three ways : (1) We may ask outright : ' Is there more good in the world now than before and is there a likelihood of there being still more ? ' (2) We may ask : ' What sorts of things can have the quality ' good,' and are there more of such things now ?,' or (3) ' What means may be calculated to produce an increase of good things, and are we reaching a state of affairs when such means are more and more ready to hand ? ' I do not pretend that these are independent questions ; they are obviously very closely related and in practice are all asked at once, or else answers are assumed to some of them.

If happiness is said to be good, and if the economic stability of each individual can be shown to be productive of happiness all round, then the question is whether we are moving in the direction of such economic stability. Difference of opinion with respect to the *idea* of progress means that people will differ about the second and third questions, both as to their meaning and as to the answers which are appropriate. They will differ as to what is meant by saying that a thing is good, as to what things really *are* good (if any) and as to the means whereby such things are produced. If it is held that happiness is good, and that happiness is a state in which our desires are satisfied, it might be argued that we should be equally satisfied whether we wanted what we got or got what we wanted.

An important question is now raised : why do people differ ? The answer given by Mr. Heard is that their views on progress will be a reflection into a desirable future of a state of disequilibrium in the present ; mankind evolves and (p. 6) " Progress is disclosed as a movement in the human mind, a standard which as it changes, gives an accurate path of the evolution of man's consciousness ". Now this would seem to be leading up to the subjectivist conclusion that progress is not real, but a phantom bait which alters with the state of our digestions. This, however, does not appear to be the case. He notes that there is a tendency to despair because economic and political advance do not seem to be the means for producing satisfaction—perhaps, indeed, there are no such means. Mr. Heard interprets this condition as being due to the fact that thinkers " Obsessed with economics and suspicious of psychology . . . take the individual to be final and insoluble ". This might mean that the present age has not projected any idea of progress, either because disequilibrium is so acute, or because knowledge and insight are lacking, granted that equilibrium itself has not set in. But Mr. Heard wishes to go farther than this ; it is not merely that we have not created a phantom, we have not seen the truth. We are promised (p. 6) that the individual " will now be driven by the fact of his own unresolved individuality (no more an End in Itself than the State) to create a community in which he may resolve himself, compassing a real progress from the original co-consciousness (out of which his individuality originally condensed) through the painful transition that is individuality, to the superconsciousness of a purely psycho-

logically satisfying state". It would seem that the troubles are due to the painful transition and to the lack of recognition of its transitoriness, and that when individuality is 'resolved' we reach a satisfying state and, according to Mr. Heard, this is *real* progress. It is hard to see exactly what is meant by a 'purely psychologically satisfying state'. Is it a state of desirelessness? or a state where we want what we get? or a state in which we think we get what we want? When you have classed progress among the subjective phenomena it is not altogether safe to use the word 'real' in connexion with it. Why should this state which is described as a *real* goal be more than a projection symptomatic of Mr. Heard's own condition? All he might be able to show is that the idea of progress is an indication of tension between what we have and what we need, that as our needs alter our ideas of progress will alter, and that mankind develops in such a way that the tension becomes less and less until the idea of progress vanishes in the complete satisfaction of the organism. If you look at one end of the series and prefer it to the middle you are merely projecting desires symptomatic of your age on to the concept you are contemplating.

On page 5 Mr. Heard says that the idea of progress when it arose was necessitated by "the new sense of individuality . . . now for the first time become conscious". The tension in fact is partly a function of the conflict between the individualist urge and the cohesiveness of the group, and in a masterly way Mr. Heard proceeds to trace the growth of individualism out of the primitive unindividualised mass. He displays great learning, and has an astonishing selective technique at his command. In the first chapter he collects together a certain amount of the evidence for co-consciousness. He points out that existing scarcely individualised tribes have themselves a long history of their own and can only be taken to be like primitive man if we suppose that they have been pushed off from the centre of human diffusion into circumstances where their development was arrested either because nature was too kind or too cruel, and that we must be careful when we draw inferences from their conditions to the conditions appertaining among our remote ancestors.

Two main arguments are put forward to support the hypothesis of co-consciousness. One is the usual heuristic argument that much that was puzzling in the behaviour of backward peoples is clear if we accept some such hypothesis, the other is that in nature 'all growth tends to be spiral,' evidence for which is unfortunately assumed to be known, and which seems to mean that certain qualities of organisms, e.g. size, alter in a certain direction up to a point and then alter in a reverse direction. It is assumed that such a law dominates human evolution with respect to individualism; and Mr. Heard is perhaps carried away by a too vividly spatial form of ideation when he suggests that we are now on the return curve of the spiral and as it were look down on primitive peoples from a position more immediately above them than was the case with our fathers, which means

that we can know more about them. In fact our co-conscious theory is a symptom of our development towards a new co-consciousness. "To-day," writes Mr. Heard (p. 33), "for the first time, civilised, self-conscious, critical man is able to recognise a pre-individual condition, and the fact that he can so recognise it is evidence of an evolution in himself which has carried him whither he can perceive that individuality is not final, that other states lie behind him in the past and may await him in the future," whereas (p. 25) "a generation ago . . . the observers saw little but the distorted reflection of themselves." The epistemological pit gapes before us. Why should *our* vision be any the less distorted? A very important point is made, of course, but not so much in support of the theory as to show how dangerous it is to accept it as more than useful. As Mr. Heard elsewhere (p. 31) says: "Realising the distorting rationality (that they assume themselves to be norms of consciousness) of researchers, we ought to decide . . . in favour of oddness, against the limited distorting fancy of 'making sense'".

However, accepting the hypothesis of primitive co-consciousness, Mr. Heard spreads the map of history before us and brings order and intelligibility into the vast confusion. It would be hard to exaggerate his skill in bringing such an immense amount of material into so small and so admirably organised a canvass. He writes brilliantly, his grasp is sure, and he shirks none of the difficulties, of which perhaps the greatest lies in the fact that evolution does not occur continuously but in jerks. There are set-backs, apparent regressions, and periods during which nothing seems to be happening at all.

First comes the ambiguous proto-individual—the priest king—embarrassed and almost detested because of his peculiarity. He is often reduced to offering himself as a sacrifice to satisfy his ambivalent attitude to society. With growing strength he, or rather his spiritual descendants, take to conquest. Kingdoms are formed with offices, religious and lay, to be filled by developing individuals, while occasionally the fore-runners fail to find satisfaction on earth and take refuge in a personal religion of survival. Empires crumble because they cannot support the strain of a fissured state, and conditions become unfavourable for further development; but once it has made its appearance individualism has altered the pattern of the universe for later comers. More and more individuals will be precipitated, more and more places will have to be found for them, the familiar themes of priest-king and hero will be repeated but in different media, and a time will come when there are so many individualised organisms that society will have to invent a monastic system to protect itself by shutting them up. Society is taken to be an organic unity with a stability of its own, to preserve which it will automatically take measures against any element which is likely to upset its equilibrium.

But as the stream of individuals increases, as the principle of separation affects more and more organisms, the advance guard are

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endowed with a new interest; suddenly (p. 199) "at the beginning of the seventeenth century we are faced with a new force as positive as intelligence and at the same time instinctive in its blindness and strength," and Humanitarianism makes its appearance. The 'upper individuals' "are already re-expanding toward a consciousness larger than individuality". The leaders develop an interest in other people's welfare, pity them, and go out of their way to help them, and their very interest in others than themselves leads them to help hatch out 'lower individuals' of our own age—the age of revolutions. The masses are becoming more and more individualised, the more advanced are acquiring more and more interest in matters not primarily concerned with their own personal welfare. There is ample evidence of the former in the excessive sensitivity of the working classes about their own individuality, and their preoccupation with its integrity, though of course they are superficially influenced by the humanitarianism with which they are surrounded.

The question is whether the new interests can be properly described as 'consciousness larger than individuality'. It is not a mere quibble, because it is just this change in consciousness which is under discussion; it is not merely that the expression is used in a popular sense. And, furthermore, inference is drawn from the change which was first apparent in the seventeenth century to the probable state of mankind in the future.

Co-consciousness is the name given to a hypothetical condition of consciousness in which the nail of a man is *seen* as a vulnerable part of the man himself, in which the unit of counting is, say, a hand's worth, in which collective decisions are taken without the steps usual in civilised meetings, and in which the individual is not aware of himself as apart from his group but is so identified with it that he feels misfortunes and adventures which happened to another as having happened in some way to himself. What that is like we cannot say. The point is that the world is supposed to look different, and we infer the look of the world from the behaviour of the organism we are studying—obviously a dangerous procedure. But the fact that we cannot remain unmoved in the presence of other people's misery does not mean that we are conscious of them in a different way from the way in which we were conscious of them when we were indifferent to them. Now we are prompted to help them, then we were not, but our present view of them is in no way analogous to the mysterious unimaginable condition which is named 'co-conscious'. In our hypothesis concerning primitive man we are making two suggestions—one is that he had a different mode of consciousness, and the other that the pull of the group was stronger. When individuality emerges the pull of society becomes weaker (possibly owing to relatively stable conditions) and the change which is called a change in consciousness is really a gradual return of the pull of society, which can leave the *mode* of consciousness unaltered.

In the last two chapters Mr. Heard brings together evidence for

those changes of interest which he thinks point to a change of consciousness. Of course it would be admitted that I shall interpret that of which I am aware in a way dependent on my interests, but the interpretation may very well be experienced in the same way as alternative interpretations, unless that of which I am conscious be identified with consciousness, which certainly does not seem to be the position which Mr. Heard either can or wishes to take up.

The first change mentioned is a change in the keenness of our senses. This leads to the power to perceive more details of the universe, while as a matter of fact there is also a movement in the direction of whole-wise organic concepts. The having of such concepts is the same kind of experience as the having of other concepts.

Secondly Mr. Heard says that we lose our desire for power over nature and are more impersonally interested. "Our true action is to watch and try to understand the drift, the flood, of the Universe," and on the same page (270), "Understanding reveals itself not as the means but as the end of life". Is this really the case? Even if it were, the fact that we manipulate finer grades of matter cannot conceivably make our activities less material. He believes that we can infer from the increasingly small trace we leave behind us, when we compare our relics with the pyramids and Palmyra, that "We are dematerialising". Surely this must be meant as a pictorial representation and is not to be taken seriously, and yet it is followed by an appeal to the uselessness of astronomy, the impersonal nature of the astronomer's objective, the detachment of his attitude, and finally on page 277 we read that this is evidence of "the building up of the new social consciousness, the new group personality". It is difficult to see how we can possibly draw such a conclusion, and indeed one would have expected the astronomer to be devoting himself to social service rather than to the satisfaction of his own curiosity. The only difference between the 'individualist' and the astronomer is one of interest and not of consciousness; and we find the argument even harder to follow when, after dealing with the hypothesis that we are diminishing in size, he says on page 279 that "the diminishment of bulk *means* that mind can now and must now be carried on as a group affair wherein the units can rely wholly for their survival on a common co-ordinated immediate interest of the whole" (my italics).

A further indication of change is that the modern concepts of physics are symptomatic of so altered a way of regarding the universe that the older physicists are incapable of grasping them. Mr. Heard then goes on to state of the modern unifying concept of the world, as if this were peculiar, that "derived from sense data . . . it passes under our eyes to-day beyond physical vision". But any hypothesis of the ultimate nature of the universe must be in the same position, even if we believe in tables and chairs which persist when we are not there to perceive them,—puckers in space-time are no odder.

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There is yet another attempt to infer altered consciousness. Our view of the world is non-anthropomorphic, once it was anthropomorphic; we have therefore changed. But can we admit that "as we attain unindividualised vision we ourselves alter. Our minds become, though still retaining their keen consciousness, integrated parts of a larger consciousness" (p. 285)?

Lastly with cosmology morality has changed. We think and feel more socially. This is true and undoubtedly indicates an alteration, but in what? Not in our experience, say, of pity, but in the objects which call it forth. Our actions are, whether we like it or not, unreasonably, and therefore 'naturally,' determined by the welfare of others and not exclusively by the welfare of ourselves.

The position seems to be this. There is undoubted change in the springs of action, and change which seems to come from within rather than impressed from without—attitudes, interests, concepts alter. If we are right in supposing that the hypothetical co-consciousness of primitive man refers to a mode of being conscious, and not only to what he was conscious of, then there is evidence that our consciousness differs from his, but no evidence that we are attaining to a consciousness varying from our own in a way analogous to the way in which ours varies from his. We may go on experiencing very much as we do now, but interested less in ourselves. This can hardly be called 'losing our individuality' because it might be a distinct 'I' who was interested in other people. Of course Mr. Heard might very well say that my arguments are due to my preoccupation with my own individuality and my dislike of the idea of losing it, but this form of argument can be used in the opposite direction.

In the last chapter Mr. Heard has some interesting and original remarks to make about psychic research. He finds its origin in witch-cults, which he interprets as the emergence of proto-individual women, late developers. His suggestion is that there is an impersonal field of experience which can be tapped by people suitably sensitive. He calls attention to the fact that the sensitive have been found of later years among the 'higher individual class'. The general conscious field is very like that assumed by Jung to account for the persistence and spread of common legends and symbols, and Mr. Heard has here a convenient explanation of telepathy and haunting. Interpretation of elements picked up from this common field varies with the state of evolution of the interpreter; first it is anthropomorphic, then animistic and then increasingly impersonal. Surely this cannot be taken as evidence of our depersonalisation; if the personalised expression is due to some pre-occupation with personality because of emergence from a totally different state of consciousness, when that pre-occupation is over, because of stability or other interests, it does not mean that we have altered our state of consciousness.

Mr. Heard's visual scheme of ideation and pictorial vivid style are often, as I have suggested before, responsible for metaphorical

expressions which sometimes make his arguments difficult to follow in detail. This is most evident in the first and last two chapters. It should be pointed out, however, that whatever may be said in criticism of Mr. Heard's views on consciousness and progress, in a great constructive achievement like this one cannot expect accuracy of expression on such technical points, and that the main thesis of the work, the development of individuality, remains untouched by arguments directed against the more philosophical parts of it. In any case he has made a very important contribution to social psychology, perhaps the most important that has yet been made in this language; and it is to be hoped that he will provide us with further studies of subjects which he has been forced only to touch upon in the book before us.

W. J. H. SPROTT.

Logic for Use. An Introduction to the Voluntarist Theory of Knowledge. By F. C. S. SCHILLER, M.A., D.Sc. London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1929. Pp. viii, 469. Price 16s. net.

MR. SCHILLER professes in this book to content himself with a straightforward exposition, and to avoid controversy "at least as far as he is able". But old time habits are too strong, and at least half the time he is attacking Formal Logic. Personally, I have never come across any Formal Logic which quite fits the description Mr. Schiller gives; it reminds me a little of the calf in the story. There was a cow whose calf died, and whom it was thought good to deceive. So the calf skin was stuffed with straw, and presented to her. She licked it fondly, taking great comfort therein, until by continual licking she wore away a part of the skin, laying bare the straw; which she thereafter consumed with great happiness. Mr. Schiller's situation is a little more complicated, for in his case the calf was not his own, and it is he who has stuffed it; but he obviously enjoys the straw, and every now and again he licks a portion of the real skin to keep up the deception. But this dead calf of straw, labelled Formal Logic, serves a useful purpose in his book; it enables him by contrast to show what a lively and vigorous offspring is the calf he is endeavouring to get us to take over from him and rear.

Mr. Schiller's own logic, which he describes as voluntaristic, is not, when you take all its sides, so hopelessly taboo in academic circles as he tries to make us believe. It is, if the horrid truth must be told, quite sober and respectable. He tells us indeed that truth-for-us depends on our willing, on our interests; that there is no such thing as formal validity; that we need not put premisses together or draw their conclusions if we do not want to; that we can formally contradict ourselves, walk past inconvenient issues; that we can do all these things and yet often arrive at truth-for-us

better than if we did not do them. But he tells us also that the interest that truth satisfies is our cognitive interest, and that it may thwart other interests (124); that it is success in a cognitive undertaking which tests truth (103); that truth in general is good and desirable, and men in general desire it (123); that when he says that truth is what at any time works best, he means, what works best in the cognitive interest of getting truth, and that in any particular inquiry we cannot say what will work best, until we try (170-172)—in other words, that there are no rigid and mechanical rules to be laid down beforehand to guide us in our investigations; that in general the test of what is better has reference to the insight, amplitude, energy and direction of trains of thought (249). He insists again that trains of thought can be well or badly directed, and that it is important that there should be a discipline which enables us to evaluate them systematically: Logic is this discipline (23); and although formal logic is entirely useless as a theory of truth, yet it is useful in guiding our anticipations of what conclusions are worth following up (264). For we do reason, and do try to deduce conclusions (285); and though the syllogism has no validity, yet it has value in our conclusion-drawing. Indeed, if in a syllogistic argument we admit that the truth of the conclusion depends on the premisses both being true, and on the terms not changing their significance within the argument in such a way as to invalidate the conclusion, then we can save the syllogism, and incorporate it into the Valuable Logic as a proper form in which to conduct a thought-experiment (290-291). Even coherence, which is entirely useless as a means of arriving at "valid" truth, is a valuable guide in helping us to arrive at our kind of truth, the kind of truth accessible to us, which is liable to receive modification on further investigation and fuller insight (319). Apart from his calf of straw Mr. Schiller is very reasonable.

But I do not see why he should not go further than he does. He distinguishes, as many mathematicians do, between pure mathematics, which deals with ideal systems deduced from deliberately chosen premisses, and the use of such systems in relation to the course of events. In the former he admits that complete accuracy of deduction is possible (351). He insists of course that judgments in pure mathematics are relative to the assumptions on which they are based, and cannot be described as "true" apart from these assumptions. But this does not lead Mr. Schiller to deny their usefulness in man's attempt to discover provisional truth about events. He is indeed quite alive to their value, when proper precautions are taken. Now there are in existence various deductive systems which can be called "logical," being much more general in their postulated bases than ordinary systems of pure mathematics. "Symbolic logic" can be described as the study whose business it is to investigate such deductive systems. It is still in its infancy, but has already progressed far beyond the range of the old traditional formal logic, which was too restricted in its scope, and not altogether satisfactory

in respect of the assumptions on which it rested. I do not see why Mr. Schiller should not have had an eye to the possibilities of symbolic logic, if properly developed, in aiding man's study of the course of events. What he admits about the syllogism, he ought to admit far more fervently about symbolic logic in general, which though only relatively in its infancy, yet stands to the syllogism somewhat as the calculus stands to simple arithmetic. As his logic looks to the future, I should have expected him to give at least some encouragement to the opening up of this particular avenue.

Partly, his reason is that he thinks it abstracts too much from meaning. But if he had followed his own advice and tried to discover what symbolic logicians meant when they used symbols, he would have discovered that there is quite enough genuine meaning retained in symbolic logic to make it much more than a mere word game (56, 206). But there is more than this. There are in Mr. Schiller's *Logic for Use* many elements which, in spite of his intention, are obscurantist, reactionary, conservative—in short, tend to block progress. For example, more accuracy than is needed for the purpose in hand is not only a waste of time, but also wrong and an obstacle in the way of progress (109). Again, "in discovery, our main interest is in the eliciting of novelty, in the extension of the bounds of knowledge. Our attitude is one of inquiry, not of *ex post facto* reflexion or criticism. We desire and purpose to discover new truth, and all our emphasis and attention fall on the novelty" (331). Similarly, (330) he discourages "the search for premisses" which shall "validate" inductive processes. This "means retrogression instead of progress". "The right way to make use of a truth claim is to move on with it and to verify it progressively" (331). Now, whatever Mr. Schiller's intention, such suggestions, acted upon, would have prevented the development of the theoretical systems of mathematics which gave such fruitful material to Einstein; would have put obstacles in the way of the careful accurate determination of the constituents of the atmosphere which led Ramsay to the discovery of the inert gases; would have stopped all sorts of physical, chemical and physiological researches; and such suggestions seem to prevent him from seeing a possible future value for symbolic logic. He underestimates in a similar way the value of the mathematical work on probability for the study of the practical estimation of chances in insurance, bookmaking, the stock exchange, etc. (333-337). It is as if he were to disparage the study of kinematics in relation to the practical art of bridge building.

I do not think that this was his intention; but it seems to be the practical outcome of his impatience with mere theory, mere analysis, mere accuracy. He wants to get on with real discovery and to shake up the sluggards. It is a question whether in these matters you can always distinguish the apparent sluggard from the real strategist.

In his account of scientific investigation Mr. Schiller has always

done good service by his insistence on the way in which principles, even apparently the most self-evident and fundamental, are tentative and need to be tested by their success in enabling the searcher to get into closer touch with events; and by his corresponding emphasis on the way in which apparent facts receive modification with the growth of science. Again, that man is not to be separated from nature, and regarded as a mere observer of a course of events which he can do nothing to alter; that his endeavour is to discover those features and linkages of things which are relevant to his purposes, and that any account of investigation and of truth must be based on the consideration of relevance; that revaluation and not static finality is the central feature of any truth discovered by man: these are points on which it is desirable that emphasis should continually be placed, and on which Mr. Schiller has always dwelt. What one misses in his account is any attempt to formulate, in as systematic a way as the nature of the subject allows, any provisional canons of investigation as it is actually pursued in the sciences. Such canons would not, of course, be able to be regarded as final, reflecting as they would only current scientific insight and practice; but they would be valuable not only to the philosopher, but to scientists themselves; and it is in such a book as *Logic for Use* that we have, I think, a right to look for them. Perhaps Mr. Schiller, in the more promising atmosphere of Southern California, may succeed in fostering the spirit of such an enterprise among his new pupils. We change, and the times change, and with them canons of interpretation; but we can learn from the experience and the practice of the past; and for an age to endeavour to formulate its canons of interpretation is to furnish possible help not only for itself, but for its successors. For my own part, I look to a development of *Logic* on its formal side as likely to be of as great importance for the future interpretation of nature as has been the development of pure mathematics; but one man cannot be expected to pursue all lines, and from Mr. Schiller I should be satisfied with the development more closely related to practice. But I think we are entitled to expect this from him, in a more or less systematic form.

L. J. RUSSELL.

Biological Principles, A Critical Study. By J. H. WOODGER, Reader in Biology in the University of London. Kegan Paul (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method, ed. C. K. Ogden). London, 1929. Pp. xii + 498. Price 21s.

"SINCE the end of the nineteenth century" writes Mr. Dampier-Whetham in his new *History of Science*, "great advances have been made in our knowledge of life and its manifestations, but the chief ideas by which those advances have been guided were formulated

before 1900. Twentieth-century mathematics and physics, breaking away from the Newtonian scheme, have marked a veritable revolution in thought and are now profoundly influencing philosophy. Twentieth-century biology is still following the main lines laid down before the century began." Every biologist must agree that this statement is perfectly correct, for with the exception of a certain influence of the quantum theory in the physiology of the special senses the biology of to-day is truly an extrapolation of nineteenth-century modes of thought. No new concepts have been generally adopted and found useful, in the sense that the new mechanics are new or the general theory of relativity. It may be, of course, that this is inevitable and that much more progress on the lines already laid down must take place before biology becomes ripe for the application of any revolution in its theories. And in this way the state of affairs described by Mr. Dampier-Whetham may not be as unfortunate as it seems, for in Mr. Woodger's words "it will be time enough to talk about the Newton of biology when it has found its Galileo". But any relief which may come to the biologist by way of historical consolation must speedily be dissipated when he turns again to consider the subject matter of his studies, the so tantalisingly mysterious processes of living things, the transparent egg, for instance, of a marine invertebrate, a spherical bag of semi-liquid material containing little or no localisation of organ-forming substances, developing in a few hours into the complicated and highly organised larva complete with organs of various shapes and functions. Contemplating these phenomena he is bound to feel that our present methods, logical as well as technical, are inadequate for their scientific analysis, and to conclude that some of us, at any rate, might profitably desist from the use of those methods and spend our time in casting about for something better. This is the task which Mr. Woodger has set himself, and perhaps it was inevitable that in the present book he should have got little further than the destructive criticism of the methods now in use. He is perhaps a little unfair to his fellow-biologists in his common assumption that they do not realise the deficiencies of them; but this complaint may suffice to indicate the unsatisfactory, polemical, aspects of certain parts of Mr. Woodger's book.

No doubt the most serious difficulty which biologists have to face is the problem of organisation. The living organism is certainly a harmony of reacting parts and at the furthest pole removed from a simple heap of molecules, as it were, flung together; it is composed of parts which may behave very differently when in isolation from what they do as parts in the functioning organism. It is this which was probably one of the kernels of truth at the heart of the various forms of old-fashioned vitalism, and it will certainly be a great advance if our generation succeeds in disengaging it from the wrappings of its traditional form, so sterilising for active research, and bringing it out into the open where it can merge with physics and chemistry, not perhaps in their present form, but in a form extended to cover

all organisms from the lowest to the highest, from the simplest to the most complex. Mr. Woodger accordingly spends one of his longest chapters (vi.) in discussing organisation, and introduces a scheme of a hierarchy of levels beginning with the arrangement of molecules within the cell-parts, going on to the arrangement of cytological structures within the cells, and so to the arrangement of cells within organs and tissues, and finally to the integration of the individual's body or the ecological relation of the individual's body to the species or the local group. It was inevitable that he should have some unpleasant things to say here about biochemists who in their desire to unravel the dynamic changes in the living body have necessarily to destroy its structure and in the past have sometimes forgotten this important fact. Nevertheless it is remembered much more than Mr. Woodger supposes, and by a curious coincidence at just the time that his book was being printed the Professors of Biochemistry at both Cambridge and Oxford were lecturing on the very subject of organisation in the living cell. The problem of organisation enters into physiology at every level, in fact; thus the dissociation-curve of a fatty acid, as Peters has shown, is greatly affected by whether it is absorbed on to a surface or not, and Warburg's classical experiments showed that cell-respiration was intimately associated with cell-structure. In a colloidal molecular aggregate, indeed, with its oriented surface, we see the simplest unit in the living hierarchy, and Mr. Woodger would undoubtedly agree that the colloidal nature of living substance is of the first significance. But it is perhaps rather characteristic of his book that immediately following his section which deals with the hierarchies of levels in the animal body, there is not a section devoted to practical applications of this (new ?) mode of thought, but on the contrary one "summarising the reasons for believing that an *exclusive* attention to what are called mechanical explanations in biology is not desirable, bearing in mind that vitalism is not the only alternative, but that purely biological" (causal) "explanations are also possible". Research workers, therefore, get little help from Mr. Woodger here, and this holds true throughout the book, where he deals for instance with the organism and environment, structure and function, teleology and mechanism. But to this he would reply, quite justifiably, that it was not his aim to indicate in any detailed way how biological theory might change, but simply to induce in the minds of investigators a more open way of thought, leaving the applications to them. In the only case where he does go into detail, *i.e.* the discussion of the preformation-epigenesis question, he comes to the negative conclusion that genetics and embryology, far from joining forces as they are very inclined to do at present, would be better advised to remain separate, for the reason that *characters* such as pink *x* or curly *y* may well be inherited but not *parts* such as liver or gonad. We may predict that this advice will not be followed, but Mr. Woodger must be thanked for his illuminating historical discussion of the way in which eighteenth-century

preformationism still lives on in the gene, and for his searching survey of the difficulty of regarding genes as chemical molecules according to the orthodox genetic view.

One of the most valuable parts of the book is the part which deals with structure and function, for it is always a good thing when some hoary antithesis can be shown to be meaningless and so release the attention which has been devoted to it for more worthy employment. Mr. Woodger shows that it here results from the use of two modes of abstraction, structure being the description of a slice of the history of a biological object, the timeless static iconography of an essentially dynamic piece of life. "The anatomist usually studies the pickled heart, after it has ceased to have an exciting history which is difficult to observe and has begun to have a tame history as a uniform physical object." No such antithesis as structure versus function exists in nature and there is no reason why it should exist at all, for it arises from the incompatibility of two forms of abstraction, one regarding the heart as a rhythmical non-uniform object, the other as a non-rhythmical uniform object, one primarily concerned with time, the other primarily with space. As a worm of four-dimensional events the heart itself is something different from either picture, and not depending for its structure upon its function or *vice versa*.

Embryologists will be grateful to Mr. Woodger for his discussion of preformation and epigenesis, for even if it does not lead anywhere very definite it illuminates a good many things on the way. He emphasises the important point that development in embryonic life involves not merely an increase in visible and invisible complexity but a genuine rise in the level of organisation. This is often forgotten and yet deserves to be remembered; for the embryo of an animal seems to swim upstream, as it were, against the current of the world's tendency to increase entropy according to the second law of thermodynamics. If the progressive increase in the shuffled element in the universe is what, as Eddington says, gives a direction to time, it is remarkable to see at such close quarters a real increase in the non-shuffled element as organisms develop. No doubt this is paid for by some corresponding decrease elsewhere in the universe, but such considerations unite embryology with those other biological sciences in which a possible tendency has been detected to local reversals of the second law.

What immanent factors have we to postulate in the egg related, as cause to effect, to the subsequent mode of characterisation of the individual? We can no longer believe that the whole completed organism with all its parts exists preformed in the egg-cell, ready to expand like a Japanese paper flower in water; nor can we believe in any localisation of organ-forming substances within the egg, except in certain special instances. The responsibility has in our time been thrown back on to the nucleus, with its set of factors governing the heredity. But the heredity of what? Of everything in the finished animal, most biologists are tempted to say; so that the

fact of having a liver no less than the fact of having a brownish-red liver is attributable to the genetic constitution of the egg and sperm nuclei. The genetic constitution of various birds' eggs developing in the same incubator is what decides which shall issue forth as pheasants and which as ducks. But Mr. Woodger reminds us that things are much more complicated than this, in so far as what happens to a group of cells in development may depend largely on its mere position in the whole and need not be controlled genetically. This difference between *organisation* and *characterisation* has been remarkably shown recently by the work of Spemann and his school of experimental embryologists; for it has been found that an embryonic part transplanted to the embryo of another species may behave "ortsgemäss" in its new situation, i.e., it follows the plan of the new body in which it finds itself and becomes ectodermal or endodermal, etc., quite independently of its origin. And it may do this while yet exhibiting its specific characters, e.g., it may remain white although the animal into which it has been transplanted may be green. Evidently its mode of characterisation (whiteness) is immanent in it while its particular rôle in the developmental process is dependent upon its spatial relations to other parts and is not immanent in it. The contribution of a part to the whole is dependent on its position in the whole, but its characterisation is not dependent and owns to a genetic control. Mr. Woodger eventually concludes that the increase in organisation found in embryonic life means the production of more and more parts in a hierarchy of organising relations, and that the genetic Mendelian factors are only concerned with the mode of characterisation of those parts. A frog's leg would owe its "frog-legginess" to Mendelian factors but its "legginess" to the nature of the egg-cell as a whole, considered as a set of potential organising relations. There is a doubtful region here, and it may be hoped that Mr. Woodger will return to the subject in order to make more clear to us what exactly he thinks it is which controls the parts, if Mendelian factors are to be restricted to the characters. Will not all our theory of evolution require a reconstruction on this view? It certainly has the effect of abolishing the antithesis between preformation and epigenesis, for the former holds only for characters, which are implied by the genetic equipment of the egg-nucleus, and the latter holds for the production of the parts, which takes place automatically, as it were, as the organism becomes more organised. But only further discussion will show whether it can be upheld permanently, and Mr. Woodger himself seems to doubt whether it really explains all that it ought to, for he concludes his chapter by suggesting that the phenomena of heredity and embryology may not be at all explicable without the abandonment of the concepts of material particles which lie at the base of chemistry. "The puzzle of preformation and epigenesis," he says, "is but an aspect of the much wider question of the relation between the events of nature which pass and the persistences of nature, and between what is actual and what is possible, and how possibilities become actual".

One of the best aspects, perhaps, of Mr. Woodger's treatment of his subject is his emphasis on the probability that many of the problems of biology are absolutely insoluble along the classical lines of thought, not merely unsolved at the date of writing. Further extrapolation will not clear them up. Thus he criticises the traditional attitude of biologists that the behaviour of one of a number of similar bodies cannot depend upon its mere geometrical position but must be caused by some influence acting with a force which is some function of the distance. Mere geometrical position within an organism may be very important, for there may be modifications of space-time within organisms, modifications which could not be contemplated at all by the classical modes of thought. Mr. Woodger's book is indeed well calculated to stimulate the biologist to thought, and stands indeed, if the forecast may be permitted, at the beginning of a period. We generally recognise that the old controversies between vitalism and mechanism are profitless and stale, but there were undoubtedly elements of value on both sides. The present time, with its great changes in epistemology, logic, and physics, is very propitious for the selection of these elements and their union, so that the "philosophy of biology" which until recently was occupied with needless controversy can now settle down to the much more important task of overhauling the methods in use by biological workers and of finding some new directions in which a more profound understanding of living things may be looked for. The valuable elements from Driesch on the one hand and Loeb on the other are found, when brought together, to centre round the problems of organisation and time, and Mr. Woodger's book marks the recognition that this is the case. We shall hope that later works in this field will be more constructive; and meanwhile he deserves general gratitude for his very thoughtful book with its reminder that the accumulation of data, like patriotism, is not enough.

JOSEPH NEEDHAM.

David Hume: Leben und Philosophie. By RUDOLF METZ. Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1929. Pp. xii, 405. Geb. M. 13.

Bibliographie der Hume-Literatur. By RUDOLF METZ. Literarische Berichte aus dem Gebiete der Philosophie, Heft 15-16. Erfurt: Kurt Stenger. Pp. 39-50.

Unveröffentlichte Briefe David Hume's. Edited by RUDOLF METZ. *Englische Studien*, 1929. Band 63. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland. Pp. 337-388.

Les amitiés françaises de Hume et le mouvement des idées. By RUDOLF METZ. *Revue de Littérature Comparée*, 1929. Paris: Honoré Champion. Pp. 644-713.

STUDENTS of Hume owe a great debt of gratitude to Prof. Metz for the publications above enumerated. The bibliography gives

a complete list of the editions of Hume's various works in English, French, Italian, and Danish, and also a remarkably complete and classified account of the literature (including articles in journals), in these languages, dealing with Hume and his Philosophy, from Hume's time to our own day.

Twenty hitherto unpublished letters have been discovered by Dr. Metz in the manuscript collections of the British Museum. Other two letters, not used by Burton in his *Life of Hume*, are from the collection of letters in possession of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Among the points of special interest in the letters are Hume's reference, in a letter dated 1739, to his *Treatise* as "a system of philosophy," and his explicit statement, in a letter dated 1755, that his *History* was not an imitation of Voltaire's *Siècle de Louis XIV.* "His opinion flatters very much my vanity; but the truth is, that my history was plan'd, and in a great measure compos'd, before the appearance of that agreeable work." As early also as 1755, he declares his *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* to be his "favourite performance".

Dr. Metz's article in the *Revue de Littérature Comparée* treats of Hume's periods of residence in France, of his relations with French writers, and more particularly of the reception of his works and of the translations of them, in the intermediate years prior to his second visit to France in 1763; and concludes with a very interesting account of the many and extraordinarily varied friendships which he formed during the two and a half years of his stay in Paris. Dr. Metz has a wealth of detailed knowledge of the history and personalities of the time, and places his readers in the happy position of being able to follow the course of events, and to enter into the personal relations, with some degree of genuine understanding. I know no other source from which so much help in this regard can be obtained.

But it is with the volume devoted to Hume's life (pp.3-87), and teaching (pp. 91-396), that I must chiefly deal. It is, I should venture to maintain, the best single work wholly devoted to Hume. There are, in other treatises, discussions of this or that part of Hume's Philosophy—such as Cassirer's admirable treatment of Hume's theory of knowledge in his *Erkenntnisproblem*—which are much more complete, and in this or that respect more adequate; but taken as a whole, and as covering the life and every part of Hume's teaching, Dr. Metz's volume stands by itself. It is independent, and yet not coloured by any desire to exhibit Hume as supporting this or that type of later or present-day philosophy. The author states that his chief obligations are to Prof. C. W. Hendel's *Studies in the Philosophy of Hume* (1925). He is, however, less interested than Dr. Hendel in Hume's philosophical affiliations; and while in the main accepting the conclusions thus reached, has as his chief concern the systematic statement and exposition of Hume's central doctrines. In particular, he endeavours to show the essential

consistency and continuity of Hume's philosophical interests, as exhibited in the *Treatise* and *Enquiries* and his other writings. He gives no support to the contention, fathered by Huxley and others, that owing to love of fame Hume deserted philosophy for more popular fields. The *Enquiries*, however incomplete, give an exposition of those parts of his earlier teaching which he regarded as of prime importance; and having discharged this task in a manner sufficiently satisfactory to himself he proceeded to illustrate and apply these doctrines in all the various fields of human endeavour, moral, æsthetic, economic, political, historical, and religious.

The differences, largely consisting in omissions, between the teaching of the *Treatise* and that of the *Enquiries* are, in Dr. Metz's view, properly understandable only upon recognition of the unduly ambitious character of the programme which Hume had set himself to carry out in the *Treatise*. What he proposes is "a complete system of the sciences"—among which he counts not only mathematics and natural philosophy, but also logic, 'morals,' 'criticism,' politics and natural religion—based upon "a foundation almost entirely new". The exaggerated character of the hopes which the youthful Hume is here entertaining finds unqualified expression in the *Introduction* to the *Treatise*. Hume speaks of abandoning "the tedious, lingering method—hitherto followed". "We must," he says, "march directly to the capital or centre of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once master of, we may everywhere else hope for an easy victory". It was, Dr. Metz contends, an increasing *scepticism* in regard to the more ambitious features in this programme, not the exigencies of popular exposition, that gave rise to the altered tone, and more modest claims, of Hume's later writings. What remained from start to finish was the centrality of place assigned to the philosophical study of our human nature, as it expresses itself alike in practical life and in the sciences. Philosophical thinking has not, Hume consistently held, any autonomous independence; it exists for the sake of life, which on all sides sets barriers alike to those presumptions that lead it to ignore its limitations, and to any sceptical questionings by which it may endeavour to break away from the 'natural' beliefs—beliefs upon which the criteria that make scepticism possible are themselves based. Consequently, as Dr. Metz maintains, when Hume's youthful hopes proved abortive, philosophy became for him critical, and no longer predominantly systematic in character; and he therefore felt free to omit from his *Enquiries* whatever appeared to him to be unduly abstruse and unfruitful, as not having any direct bearing upon the problems of human life. This does point to a waning in his strictly speculative interests, but is entirely consistent with all that is most characteristic in the earlier work. He continues to prosecute, with unabated energy, his '*Zwei-Fronten-Krieg*,' against popular superstition on the one hand, and against the philosophies of the Schools on the other. His interests have

come to centre in the disciplines that by a shorter circuit connect with the study of human nature.

It is from this standpoint that Dr. Metz gives his exposition of Hume's teaching. As Dr. Metz suggests, the value of Hume's philosophical achievement is not seriously affected by the inadequacy of his psychological explanations of our 'tendencies to feign,' or by his inconsistency in allowing 'distinctions of reasons,' or by his failure to account, consistently with his assumptions, for our apprehension of space and time. It was, indeed, by a series of happy inconsistencies that Hume contrived to make his contribution to technical philosophy so immensely fruitful. This is more than usually obvious in those excellent chapters in the *Treatise*, on the 'Probability of Chances' and the 'Probability of Causes,' where Hume, after deciding that what the vulgar call chance is "nothing but a secret and concealed cause," distinguishes between the beliefs which are due merely to custom and those others which depend upon reflexion, resting, it may be, upon one single experiment "duly prepared and examined". And it is in this latter connexion, more briefly dwelt upon in the corresponding section of the *Enquiry*, and not in relation to any merely habitual determination of the mind, that, as Dr. Metz justly points out, Hume's discussion of the evidence for miracles properly belongs. This is a point which critics of Hume have generally failed to recognise.

Similarly, in treating of the self, Hume suggests the correction for his own excesses. "Self or person," as he states in the *Treatise*, "is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. . . . To explain it perfectly we must take the matter pretty deep, and account for that identity which we attribute to plants and animals; there being a great analogy betwixt it and the identity of a self or person." Dr. Metz's line of criticism is that, as Hume's constant endeavour is to determine the self as *object*, he fails to appreciate the subjective in its *specific* character, and so rules himself out from treating the subject-object relation in any adequate manner. "The subjective side remains empty and undetermined; and accordingly what cannot be found on the objective side, among the psychical contents or data, falls outside the field of knowledge, and is denounced as fictitious. Though such fictions have an important practical-biological significance, they have no value as knowledge" (p. 224). That Hume was very well aware of the insufficiency of his account of the self, is shown—as Dr. Metz also points out—by his own avowal in the *Appendix* to the *Treatise*. "Upon a more strict review of the section concerning *personal identity*, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent." This deepening of Hume's scepticism in regard to his results is a very sufficient reason why he should have entirely omitted this part of the *Treatise* in composing the *Enquiry concerning Human*

Understanding. In view of the deliberately provocative character of so much in the *Enquiry*, especially in the sections on *Miracles* and on a *particular Providence and a future State*, it is obviously absurd to suggest, as Windelband has done, that the omission is due to any fear on Hume's part that offence might be given to the more orthodox among his readers.

Dr. Metz also gives a very helpful statement of Hume's ethical and other doctrines. As to whether his discussion of Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* is equally successful, many readers will perhaps question. There is no part of Hume's teaching in regard to which there has been such general disagreement.

NORMAN KEMP SMITH.

Kant's Conception of God, a critical exposition of its metaphysical development, together with a translation of the Nova Dilucidatio.
By F. E. ENGLAND, M.A., Ph.D. With a Foreword by PROF.
G. DAWES HICKS. Pp. 256. George Allen & Unwin, 1929.
10s. 6d. net.

It is related of a certain Oxford professor that, when asked whether he liked sermons, he answered, "Yes, provided they are long enough". We might say the same about books on Kant. So many of them, at least of those published in this country, are too short. Hence they fail to do justice to the magnitude of their theme and to make the impression they deserve. You cannot, for instance, in considering Kant's Theory of Knowledge, confine your outlook, as Prof. Prichard did in his able work, to the first half of the first *Critique*. Kant's philosophy must be taken as a whole, and this simply cannot be done, as Ward, for example, tried to do it, in a small compass. Dr. England, taking as his theme the Kantian conception of God, lays himself open to a similar charge. He covers the whole, or nearly the whole, ground, but with too swift a stride. The relevant matter in the three *Critiques* cannot be adequately handled in a hundred pages. We are not suggesting that Dr. England's survey is superficial, or that his criticisms lack definiteness or penetrative insight. He knows Kant and the vast mass of Kantian literature thoroughly, as is evidenced not merely by Prof. Dawes Hicks' testimony in the *Foreword*, but by the all-too-infrequent critical discussions in the notes. His references to Kant's precursors and contemporaries (*e.g.* to the influence of Crusius on the *Nova Dilucidatio*), and his illustrations from living thinkers (*e.g.* Bergson, Broad, Russell and, especially, Whitehead) are always relevant and interesting. We are told in the *Foreword* that Dr. England has been long engaged in gathering materials for the interpretation of Kant's philosophy. What he has given us here is so good that we wish he had dispensed the fruits of his researches more liberally in the present volume.

The book is divided into three sections. After a clear and admirable survey in the first chapter of the situation as it came to Kant from his rationalist predecessors, we are carried forward in Chapters II. and III. from the *Nova Dilucidatio* of 1755 to the eve of the publication of the first *Critique*. The second section (chs. IV.-VI.), entitled "The Transcendental Logic and its Metaphysical Implications," deals with that *Critique*, particularly with the problems arising for Kant in connexion with the functions of Understanding and Reason and with their bearing on the Ideal of Pure Reason. Up to this point, it would be unfair to cavil at Dr. England's brevity. Readers may reasonably be supposed to be acquainted with the data and the main points of controversy, especially as they have Prof. Kemp Smith (with whom the author is in substantial agreement) as their pilot. In the third section, Dr. England comes to close grips with the Idea of God. It is considered in relation (a) to the contingency of the phenomenal world and the presupposition of an Unconditioned noumenal ground (ch. VII.—compare also ch. X.), (b) to the recognition, in the *Critique of Judgement*, of purposiveness in Nature (ch. VIII.), (c) to the facts of moral experience and the metaphysical construction to which they give rise (ch. IX.). The closing chapter (X.), on "The Idea of God as Ultimate Ground" gathers together Kant's later utterances on the subject, with an all-too-brief notice of the *Opus Postumum*, and gives the author's own views as to their validity and value. There is added, in the Appendix, an excellent translation of the *Nova Dilucidatio*, hitherto inaccessible in English, which will prove of service to students unversed in Latin.

It is in this third section that we feel the need for a fuller presentation of the argument. Too little attention has been paid by English philosophers to the interpretation of the *Grundlegung* and the two later *Critiques*. Yet they are of cardinal importance for an understanding of Kant. His chief concern in the destruction of the old transcendent metaphysic was to establish a new immanent metaphysic in its stead. Hence the importance of the problem of the Ideas of Reason, and particularly the Idea of God. On the vexed question of their status, the author follows Prof. Kemp Smith in holding that the trend of Kant's thought led away from the view that limits their scope to "heuristic principles, regulative of the empirical exercise of reason," and towards the view that, like the categories, they possess objective validity as conditions of possible experience. So he writes of the Idea of the Unconditioned that "it is only in and through this Idea of Reason that we can ever come to know the phenomenal character of the world of sense-experience" (p. 135); and he goes on to show how, on this basis, the Cosmological argument may be rehabilitated in a form compatible with Critical principles. "If it be granted that all our concepts, whether categories or Ideas, are justified by their indispensability for the task of organising experience, then the concept to which the cosmological argument points must be admitted as a

concept of something real. This does not for a moment mean that a first cause exists. . . . The very notion of a first cause violates any and every conception of causality. The question of the origin of the chain of empirical events appears to be for ever outside the scope of reason. What the argument does mean is that the only escape from the antinomies involved in our sense-experience lies in the notion of a whole which is itself free from the limitations attaching to the parts" (pp. 139, 140). The truth is that Kant's criticism of this argument in the *Dialectic* is one of the weakest things in his philosophy. He treats it, as he found it in contemporary Rationalism, as implying the priority of the possible to the actual, as concluding to the hypostatisation of that empty and artificial concept, the *Inbegriff aller möglichen Prädicaten*; whereas its force has lain, throughout its long history, in the basic principle that possibility presupposes actuality, and in the inference to a *res vera*, a necessary Being who is pure Act. It is strange that Kant, whose thought was a life-long travail to rid metaphysics of the incubus of the "merely possible," should have stigmatised the cosmological argument "as a trick consisting merely in trying to avoid proof of the existence of a necessary being *a priori* by mere concepts". As Dr. England says, "Kant could speak of 'mere concepts' only so long as he was viewing concepts as predicates of things in the manner of Leibniz" (p. 195), and only so long as he "tended, in his subjective mode of thinking, to regard the Ideas as concepts of abstractly possible things as distinguished from objectively real concepts" (p. 196).

That a similar reconstruction of the teleological argument is pointed to in the *Critique of Judgement* is the theme of the succeeding chapter (VIII.), on "the purposiveness displayed in nature" which strikes us, despite its brevity, as the ablest in the book. Here again the destructive criticism of the *Dialectic* left much to be desired. Like that of Hume in the *Dialogues*, it was directed in the main against a merely external teleology. In the third *Critique*, Kant is confronted with the inner teleology of living organisms. Can the principle of *Zweckmässigkeit*, characteristic of the faculty of Judgement alike in its æsthetic and in its teleological exercise (see the author's excellent note on p. 145), be regarded merely as "a regulative principle for the reflective Judgement"? Or does the doctrine of Nature as a system of mechanical laws break down in face of biological facts? Dr. England relentlessly exposes the shifts to which Kant was driven in his effort to maintain his ground, whether it be the distinction between the determinant and the reflective judgement, or the appeal to a noumenal intuitive understanding to solve a problem which arises strictly within the province of discursive thought. "Nothing but sheer dexterity avails to save Kant from the pressure which the problem of the living organism has brought to bear upon his whole *Weltanschauung*" (p. 148). He sees, as Hegel saw, the need for the recognition of new categories. "It seems impossible to maintain at once that the objects of experience

are rendered possible only through the application to sense-data of the categories, and that organisms are given in experience. . . . No *analogon* of life is required for the interpretation of the organism; the organism is alive, and as such differs *toto coelo* from anything to be found in inanimate nature" (what, by the way, would Dr. Whitehead, to whom the author more than once refers, say to this?). "And if certain facts of experience cannot be interpreted as due to mechanical laws, but require the concept of purpose or end, the teleological principle has equal claims with the categories to be regarded as a transcendental principle" (pp. 154-155). Dr. England goes further, and in the latter half of the chapter argues that the concept of inner purposiveness implies that of a designing Intelligence. We cannot here follow out his correlation of Kant's doctrines with later speculative theories of creative evolution, or his analysis of Kant's moral argument to Theism in the ninth chapter. Gathering together the results of his three-fold inquiry, he concludes that "if our interpretation of the universe of fact be left incomplete except as we form some conception of a supreme being as the ground of its unity, its *Gesetzlichkeit*, and its natural and moral *Zweckmässigkeit*, such a principle would appear to have equal claim with the categories to be considered transcendentially, *i.e.* metaphysically, necessary" (p. 209).

That Kant never arrived at this position, despite "his ever-widening view of the nature of real existence," was due, Dr. England holds, partly to his rigid bifurcation of the realm of being into knowable phenomena and unknowable noumena, partly to his manner of conceiving God on the lines of contemporary theology. Hence he never squarely faced the question of the sort of concept we must form of God "if we are to do full justice to the facts of experience". We are not so sure about this. The *Opus Postumum* shows Kant at the close of his life speculating very freely on this question, canvassing with apparent approval views of God's nature suggested now by Spinoza, now by Zoroastrianism, now by Fichte, views very alien to those of traditional German theology. Then there is the *Religion within the bounds of mere Reason*, which Dr. England omits from his survey, with (*e.g.*) its interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity in moral terms. Moreover, Kant's concept of God was surely shaped in the light of his own early religious experience. Dr. England is silent on this topic, and would doubtless plead in justification that his essay is limited to the metaphysical development of Kant's concept. But can this metaphysical development be understood apart from Kant's personal religious history? It was not merely that the destruction of the rationalist claims in the *Dialectic* forced Kant back on Practical Reason as a basis for Theism. He had early learnt the perils of religious *Schwärmerei*, and the need of checking resolutely his own partiality for mystical speculation, for which the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* furnishes such interesting evidence. He had learnt too to associate religion intimately with practical morality.

Hence his transfiguration of morality into religion; hence the numinous character in which, as Prof. Webb has pointed out, the moral law presented itself, not merely to his mind, but to his heart. Dr. England recognises (p. 178) that "Kant had made the transition from the moral law to the lawgiver very hesitatingly," and rightly censures "his way of stating the nature of the inference" in the *Critique of Practical Reason* as "extremely unsatisfactory" (p. 179). Was not this because the moral argument, if formulated more directly, would lead naturally to a doctrine of God's immanence? Whereas Kant, under the influence of his own moral experience, clung tenaciously to God's transcendence. It is only in the *Opus Postumum* that we find him swinging free of old associations, and writing of God as "no substance discoverable outside of me, but merely a moral relation within me".

Dr. England's closing chapter is an attempt to answer two questions, (a) as to the nature of the conception of ultimate reality indicated by the facts of contingency, purposiveness, and morality, (b) as to the objective validity of the Idea of an ultimate moral ground. We have already referred to his views on the second of these questions. On the first, he expatiates with much freedom, setting against Kant's *Inbegriff* and intuitive understanding and Hegel's timeless Absolute his own conception of God's temporal personality. God is the ultimate individual, identified with "the existent, temporal, dynamic, developing, self-creative universe". "God cannot be at once the sole ultimate individual and merely the supreme subject or supreme intelligence, for there would in that case be no room for a not-self. But it is possible to conceive God as the sole, ultimate individual whose self is confronted by a not-self, which, though not external to him, is as real as the content presented to my processes of apprehension when those processes are directed to the events which go to the make-up of my own total personality" (pp. 192-193). This is interesting as a statement of Dr. England's view; but, in face of the many objections it provokes, it needs much fuller argument than he can find room for at the close of a book on Kant. He is bound to show, for instance, how the not-self confronting God can be other than external to him, how, in short, the view escapes the pitfalls of dualism. And, when all allowance is made for anthropomorphic analogies, can such a God be conceived as perfect or as an object of religious worship? Is he, in other words, entitled to the name of God? Dr. England's concept of God invites comparison with Dr. Whitehead's, to which reference, at once sympathetic and critical, is made in the note on p. 167. He accepts Whitehead's theory that "God is the principle of concretion, the principle of determination or ordering activity, the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act," but rejects his postulate of indeterminate creativity. We suggest that a consideration of the distinction between God's "primordial" and his "consequent" nature, as recently developed in *Process and Reality*, would facilitate a more plausible reconstruction of the position which is cursorily indicated in these pages.

The book is well printed and has an adequate Index. The style is clear, though one sentence (at the opening of the second paragraph on p. 140) clamours to be rewritten. We have noted a few unimportant misprints: p. 31 for *promamare* read *promanare*, p. 56 for *possible* read *possibile*, p. 58 for *metaphysicae* read *metaphysice*, p. 58 note 1 for *cogitable* read *cogitabile*, p. 59 for *hace* read *haec*, p. 74 for *irrepraesentible* read *irrepraesentibile*, p. 178 note 2 for *Religio* read *Religion*.

W. G. DE BURGH.

VI.—NEW BOOKS.

Kommentar zu Spinozas Ethik. VON LEWIS ROBINSON. Erster Band.
Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1928. Pp. 377. M. 8.

It was, perhaps, a little unfortunate that the author of this considerable commentary on the *Ethics* of Spinoza should have decided to publish it piecemeal: the unity of Spinoza's mature doctrine is so close that the reader of the first two *Parts* of the *Ethics*, to which Mr. Robinson's first volume is devoted, is constantly urged to look for the discussion of later sections which can only appear in some, as yet unpromised, second or third volume.

The method of procedure adopted is the straightforward one of taking the various prefaces, definitions, axioms, postulates, *lemmata*, propositions, corollaries, *scholia*, appendices, etc., *seriatim* in their original order, with quotation of the relevant passages in the original Latin, usually followed by a translation or paraphrase in German, and then by a discussion or explanation, historical, comparative, logical, metaphysical, etc., as the section may demand. This matter constitutes the greater part of the volume, the remainder being occupied by an *Introduction* of forty pages devoted to an account of the chronological order of Spinoza's writings, and to the philosophical relations of Spinoza and Cartesianism; and by two *Excursus*, one of thirty-seven pages on Substance and Attribute in the earlier works, and a shorter one on *Ens absolute indeterminatum*. By these means Mr. Robinson has accumulated, in an easily accessible form and order, a great mass of information and learning, with not a little profitable and enlightening discussion of the various points of Spinoza-scholarship and doctrine. We must add, however, that though most of the pertinent great problems are mentioned, Mr. Robinson provides but little new light for their solution, though there is an important suggestion in his assertion that: "Wir sehen also, dass überall wo es sich um die Verteidigung der Einheit der verschiedenartigen Attribute im Schosse des Seienden, der Substanz, der Natur oder der Gottheit, handelt, Spinoza an erster Stelle das Argument der unendlich vielen Attribute aufführt" (p. 112), especially when it is taken together with his discussions of the nature and relations of the Attributes and Substance in *Exkurs II*.

Among the important subjects rediscussed in the course of the volume we may notice Mr. Robinson's serious attempt (pp. 287 *et seqq.*) to clear up the difficult questions raised in *Eth. II, viii et Cor. et Sch.* and elsewhere about the distinction of two sorts of actuality belonging to particular things: as comprehended in the Attributes of Substance, and as emerging under transeunt causality in the time-series. Following Baensch and others he distinguishes the essence of a particular thing from the idea of it: the former is contained, though not separately, in the Attribute, and thus belongs to *Natura naturans*; whereas the idea is only a mode of the Attribute of

Thought and is thus contained in the mediate infinite and eternal mode, and belongs to *Natura naturata*. Thus modes not present in the time-series are essences without durational existence: they are eternal in their concrete context in the Attribute. The theory is undoubtedly ingenious, but is probably an unsatisfactory solution of a self-constructed difficulty. Further, we may ask: In which Attribute are the essences contained? In Thought only, or in all the Attributes? If the former, what of the substantial identity of the Attributes; if the latter, is there not now a new problem for solution, viz., the difference between the enduring perishing mode and the eternal essence? Is it not the case, therefore, that the whole theory of essences contained in the Attribute or Attributes and durationally duplicated in the past, present, or future of a time-series, demands thoroughgoing criticism in the light of the eternity of the Attributes? But this would only be possible as the result of a fundamentally refashioned exposition of the Spinozistic philosophy.

Another topic which Mr. Robinson discusses afresh is the hierarchy of being in its logical passage from *Natura naturans* to *Natura naturata* (pp. 310 *et seqq.*). In one respect at least his account is more satisfactory than some which have been current, viz., in his insistence upon the inseparability of Substance and its Attributes: the latter do not follow from the former but constitute it (p. 243). At the other end of the scale the particular things are, in this account, left in union with their infinite context: they have no separate being. How far this is a correct account of Spinoza's full meaning cannot be discussed in a short review, but there are reasons for believing that in Spinoza's opinion some parts of nature have distinct existence of an ultimate kind. It will be interesting to see how Mr. Robinson expounds, in particular, the important doctrine of human eternity when he reaches *Part V.* of the *Ethics*. Another divergence from current accounts of the hierarchy concerns the immediate and mediate infinite and eternal modes of the Attribute of Thought. Mr. Robinson interprets the phrase *infinita idea Dei* as meaning the idea which has for its object God (*Natura naturans*), and then makes it an immediate infinite mode of God. From this there follows the mediate mode *idea omnium quæ ex Dei essentia necessario sequuntur*, the two together constituting the *intellectus absolute infinitus*. *Prima facie* this account may seem more consonant with the strict significance of the phrase *idea Dei*, but how it should be a mode, even infinite and eternal, seems a mystery, since the idea of *Natura naturans* ought to be identical with *Cogitatio naturans*, i.e., with the Attribute itself. The same disturbance of the substantial identity of the Attributes appears as a lack of parallelism in their modes: for the object of the idea which is the immediate infinite mode must be not God but *Motus-et-Quies*. The phrase *infinita idea Dei* must thus be taken with a tacit (but universal) *quatenus*; it then falls to the rank of a mediate infinite mode, leaving *intellectus absolute infinitus* in possession of the rank of immediate infinite mode, having *Motus-et-Quies* for its *ideatum*, and related to Thought as *Motus-et-Quies* is related to Extension: viz., as its self-created content and fundamental expression.

As we have said, it is impossible to comment precisely upon many points of Mr. Robinson's exposition in the absence of the remainder of the work; this is especially the case with the doctrine of eternity which is mentioned towards the end of this volume (pp. 359 *et seqq.*) in connexion with the significance of the phrase *sub quadam specie æternitatis*. As the whole subject can only be cleared up when the teaching of *Part V.* has been expounded and subjected to examination, we shall look forward with some

interest to that further discussion. Meanwhile we can only express the view that the theory that Spinoza recognised and intended to express a distinction of two kinds of eternity has hardly been demonstrated, though it might be well if this could be done.

There are instructive discussions of the notion of creation, of the distinction of the human and the divine intellect, of *determinatio est negatio* (distinguishing quantitative and qualitative determination). And of course there is no *Index*.

H. F. HALLETT.

Matter, Life and Value. By C. E. M. JOAD. Oxford University Press, 1929. Pp. xviii + 416. 18s. net.

On page 363 and elsewhere in this book, Mr. Joad describes the work as a "system" of philosophy; and certainly his book is in one way very comprehensive and in another way (for the most part) very metaphysical. In the main, however, the formal interest usually supposed to characterise a "system" is not apparent in Mr. Joad's pages. The reason is partly that Mr. Joad is so thorough a pluralist that he is anxious to assert the existence of several disparate sets of entities (at least three such sets, and (I think) a good many more) which are so disparate that the question of their relationship or even of their consistency can scarcely arise. The principal reason, however, is that Mr. Joad is more of a seer than an arguer. His method is to assert that this or that *must* be so (with or without the addition that Plato hath said it, or that the truth which Mr. Joad proclaims has to be expressed metaphorically or anthropomorphically) and to rebut, or attempt to rebut, a few objections only. In short, he usually disdains the tedious methods of ordinary philosophical travel, and prefers to ascend his peaks by aeroplane and to come down in a toboggan.

The beginning of the book is rather more systematic than the rest of it and the opening chapter attempts to show that "vitalism" *must* be true, because life must be radically different from, and cannot arise out of, matter. (Mr. Joad does not claim, and does not show, any striking novelty in this part of his task.) Thereafter, he proceeds to announce the fundamental alliance between his "vitalism" and a particularly intransigent brand of realism. Matter, it would appear, consists of bare sense data to which the mind contributes nothing by way of arrangement, amplification, or suggestion, and which it also (somehow or other) does not affect by selection (Mr. Russell's *External World* is here laid under contribution, and avidly accepted although rather sketchily set forth). Mind and life, it is further maintained, are one and the same. Mind consists, entirely and utterly, of simple awareness; therefore life does so too. We can, however, be aware of subsistent objects, as well as of "matter" (Mr. Joad says), and this class of subsistents includes the objects of memory, imagination and intellect as well as all the nonsense that anyone ever entertained or ever could entertain in what, by courtesy, is called thinking. Minds are not aware of themselves (Mr. Joad continues) although they may be aware of subsistent counterparts of themselves, and they advance in proportion as they come to be aware of wider and wider realms of being. It is further maintained (in a way I find very puzzling and, so far as I can see, quite unexplained by Mr. Joad in the place where he says he has explained it, viz., pp. 146, 147) that "extrinsic" characters are conferred upon mind "by the nature of the object upon which it is directed" (p. 380 n.).

To mention no other point, I have been unable to discover any passage in which Mr. Joad so much as refers to some of the more obvious objections to his philosophy, such as the difficulty that many vital functions do not seem to require or to employ awareness in any intelligible sense, or again that conscious experiences like desiring and willing are *not* simple awareness. (Mr. Joad talks a good deal about desire and emotion, but does not explain how they are related to his general theory. Does he mean that desire is the "simple" awareness of a complicated entity, partly absent and merely subsistent, partly an organic sensum, and that pleasure is the simple awareness or direct perception of some peculiar sensum or imaginatum ?)

The second part of Mr. Joad's book deals with "value". "There is also in the universe," he says "an element which is permanent, perfect, and changeless, to which I have given the name of reality" (p. 368). (After bestowing the name of "reality" in this quite special sense upon "value," it has to be confessed that Mr. Joad continues to use the term "reality" in the ordinary way as well as in his quite special way.) "It is upon this in its lowest form as the world of subsistent objects," he continues "that awareness is directed in thinking. In its higher forms, of which goodness, truth, and beauty are examples, there is at the present stage of evolution intermittent and indirect awareness of it in moral and æsthetic experience, and a more continuous and direct awareness in mystical experience."

Mr. Joad argues with great vigour against "subjective" conceptions of value, although not always, I fear, without begging the question (*e.g.*, he says on page 274 that "we all of us do think that it is better that an un contemplated Madonna should exist than an un contemplated cesspool"). This, if it were true, would be a universal, if implicit, admission of the objectivity of beauty, but if "un contemplated" means "un contemplable," as in fairness to Mr. Joad's opponents it should, the point is precisely what very few writers on æsthetics are disposed to concede.) So far as I can see, however, Mr. Joad simply assumes that the only possible sense in which "values" could conceivably be objective is the sense in which they are laid up in eternity as a world of "reality" quite distinct from matter and from life. It also appears to me that he himself requires the conception of "value" in quite a different sense. For he maintains that the apprehension of value "enhances the dignity of the mind that knows it". Obviously the procession of passing awarenesses which (according to Mr. Joad) is the mind cannot possibly belong to the realm of eternal unchanging uneventful "value". If, then, the mind becomes more dignified, does it not become better, or more valuable ?

Mr. Joad writes throughout with great vigour and spirit. It would be hard to find him dull, although some may think his exposition wild in parts and in other parts not very cunning ; and in his treatment of the themes in which he himself takes the greatest interest (*e.g.*, as I should judge, music, philosophical realism, and vistas of the universe suggested by *Back to Methuselah*), he comes very near to being an admirable writer, and is very frequently an eloquent one. It seems to me unfortunate, however, that he thinks it necessary to hold that Shakespeare and all poets must be preachers rather than artists and so to belittle the poets and exalt musicians and painters (although to be sure he retracts the greater part of this opinion after elaborating it at a length that comes as near to being tedious as it is possible for Mr. Joad to be). The fallacy here (if I may be excused for speaking bluntly) is to hold that because poets use words which have meaning, therefore their art must be impure because representative. If

Mr. Joad considered how much simpler a painter's task would be if he dealt with totally *unsignificant* forms, and had not in fact to make an æsthetic whole out of constituents some of which *are* representative, he would, I think, have helped his chief conceptions by ridding them of a dubious and irritating digression.

JOHN LAIRD.

The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy: An Essay towards a Phenomenological Interpretation of the First Book of the Treatise of Human Nature. By C. V. SALMON, M.A. (Oxon.). *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, vol. x, 1929, pp. 299-449. Offprint, M. 7.

THOSE who, like myself, are very imperfectly acquainted with the phenomenological teaching of Brentano and Husserl will find this *Essay* somewhat difficult reading. It is a statement and criticism of Hume's Philosophy from the point of view of those who would contend that the main disability from which Hume suffers is "a lack common to all philosophers until the time of Brentano, the lack namely of the conception of intention, and the intentional character of consciousness" (p. 441). This is what leads Mr. Salmon to regard the problem of identity, not that of causality, as being Hume's central problem, and to trace the defects in Hume's discussion of the problem to two main sources; first, to Hume's failure to extend his discussion from perception to the other activities of consciousness, and secondly to his 'sceptical' assertion that the objects of perceptual consciousness are 'broken and interrupted existences'. Owing to the first limitation, Hume failed, Mr. Salmon argues, to state his problem in its true generality: How is an identical object present to consciousness? "The question which Hume did ask, What is the difference between the 'appearance' and the 'existence' of the perceptions? should be converted into: How, within the subjective sphere, can the object of which I am conscious be distinguished from the experience in which I am conscious of it? Hume's 'existence' should have become the identical 'object,' the object of the intention of the consciousness, the 'idea,' falsely called 'image,' whereto the 'mind' can return innumerable times, and always to an exact identity. Hume's 'appearance' should have become the experiential or pure 'psychological' 'experience,' the 'conditions' and 'moments' of the 'mind's' consciousness of its object" (p. 446). Thus Hume ought, for instance, to have taken into account the identity of the arithmetical judgments which he has accepted as valid. "How can the proposition $2 + 2 = 4$, be separated from the 'moments' in which it is apprehended, and remain the proposition $2 + 2 = 4$, whose identity can be re-apprehended innumerable times?" (p. 447).

The setting of this problem in the foreground, and the scrutiny of Hume's teaching from the standpoint which it prescribes, has, in Mr. Salmon's hands, certainly justified itself. He is not asking in what perspective Hume himself viewed his various problems, though on this point also he has much to say that is of considerable interest. He is endeavouring to determine the value and internal dialectic of Hume's doctrines, when tested by phenomenological standards. But even so, the resulting restatement is one which can be very heartily commended to all students of Hume, whatever their own philosophical sympathies may happen to be. Much

is said which is very well worth saying, and which has not, to my knowledge, been so well said before.

Mr. Salmon is careful to keep close to the actual text of the *Treatise*, from which he gives extensive quotations; and I shall not here attempt to do more than indicate the general line of his criticisms. Hume, after treating 'identity' as an 'illusion,' admits it to be 'fact' under the name of 'unity.' This, Mr. Salmon contends, is virtually the admission that identity is an abstract idea, and that it can be classed with those many other abstract ideas, of which Hume is unable to give any consistent account, even as 'distinctions of reason'. "The problem of identity is already contained in Hume's conception of unity. Hume should not have made any assertions concerning the single and unitary nature of the objects supposed to participate in the changes required by the sequence of our experiences, until he had investigated the nature of the original separation between experience and object" (p. 411). Even in its narrowest form, Hume's problem is, as Mr. Salmon shows, falsely stated. Hume makes use of a representative theory of perception which he has himself shown to be invalid; and in the process of so doing seeks to bring in the testimony of the vulgar as supporting the assertion that the objects of our perceptual consciousness are "broken and interrupted". In this way alone is Hume enabled to formulate the problem of identity in the paradoxical form upon which he insists. His purpose was to contrast the vulgar view with the philosophical; yet both are here made to rest on the same basis. "Hume stands in the whole matter, therefore, in this curious situation, that all the arguments which he brings against the philosophical hypothesis and its origin, can be, and should be, brought also against his own account of the origin of the vulgar hypothesis, which he professes to hold. In criticising the philosopher, Hume was unwittingly criticising himself" (p. 431).

Mr. Salmon treats also in considerable detail of Hume's alternation between the introspective attitude and the attitude of the empirical psychologist who observes other persons and not himself, and of Hume's consequent attempt to treat association as a causal agency, when he has already sought to account for our belief in causality by its means, "invalidating cause where it is valid, namely in the real world, and validating it, where it is invalid, namely in the psychical world". "If anyone tries to pin him to either of these assertions, he can wriggle out of it by quoting from the other" (p. 343).

Mr. Salmon's general standpoint, and the conclusions to which it leads him in his comments upon Hume, are summarised in the following passage at the opening of the *Essay*. "Hume may be admired for preferring to leave his work full of absurdities than to forsake the principles of his Subjectivism. For these are irrefutable, and his mistakes are not difficult to rectify. The Subject is the only 'object' of philosophy. Within himself lies the philosopher's world, albeit large enough to hold the universe, and universum of knowledge. The history of philosophy has shown that the introspection of consciousness requires a strict discipline. Two prejudices hamper the philosopher, the metaphysical prejudice and the empirical. Hume was free of the former. But the empirical fallacy returned to plague him whenever he seemed quit of it. Paradoxical as it reads, Hume was led into solipsism by his belief in reality. For while he recognised that the subject was responsible for his consciousness of every objective sphere, he considered himself obliged to qualify the subjective with some of the qualities of the one objective sphere of Reality.

The reality of Humeian consciousness quickly excluded the reality of the whole world else" (p. 302).

As this *Essay* shows, Mr. Salmon is eminently qualified to act as an interpreter, for English readers, of what he entitles 'the Phenomenological School'. In the present work, as is appropriate in a contribution to the *Jahrbuch* of the School, he presupposes an understanding of the very special sense in which it uses such terms as consciousness, *a priori*, subjectivism, existence, intention, etc. Should he be prevailed upon to write an exposition of phenomenological teaching, suited to the needs of those who have no previous knowledge of its terminology and outlook, he would be rendering a notable service, and would greatly aid in forwarding better mutual understanding, at present so sadly lacking, between students of philosophy in Germany and in Britain.

NORMAN KEMP SMITH.

Mind at the Crossways. By C. LLOYD MORGAN. London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd., 1929. Pp. xi, 275. 10s. 6d. net.

I AM confident that very few who read this charming book will be able to lay it down without entertaining the liveliest gratitude towards its author. It is good talk, very good talk, from the first page to the last; and its matter, as distinct from its manner, conforms to the very high standard we expect from this writer.

Speaking generally (unless I have misunderstood Mr. Morgan), I suppose that one might sketch the book's argument, in rough outline, somewhat as follows: Scientific explanation is in terms of relations and correlations and of these only. It has no dealings with agents and with causes. And, scientifically speaking, we have to maintain that nature contains two distinct series which are *concomitant* with one another, *viz.*, the mental (and omnipresent) series and the physical series (also omnipresent in nature). There is no "emergence" and no "cross-over" from either series (or any part of it) to the other (or to any part of the other) but interest attaches to emergence and to cross-over *within* each series. On the other hand there may be explanations quite different in type from (and therefore incapable of conflicting with) scientific explanations; and among these explanations, "dramatic" explanation, or explanation in terms of "agency," is both legitimate and important. Such dramatic explanation cannot be extended with accuracy to any beings who are not at least persons. It does, however, explain the actions of persons *qui* persons. It is also applicable to the actions of God; and, in the end, God "under dramatic reference" is the explanation of the entire "constructive-ness" in nature.

I should like to offer a few brief comments (1) upon the notion of "concomitance" as here employed, and (2) upon the doctrine of agency with special reference to theism.

(1) Mr. Lloyd Morgan appears to use the term "concomitance" because it is more elastic than the older-fashioned "parallelism". On the other hand, unless the "concomitance" indicates a fairly close correspondence it does not seem to express very much, or to be worth fighting for; and Mr. Lloyd Morgan's doctrine seems to me to be rather peculiar in this regard.

Setting aside any (very vague) "concomitance" not to be found in

the mind-body systems of sentient animals and men, we observe the following stages of concomitance in Mr. Lloyd Morgan's account. "Instinctive behaviour is co-related with percipient reference; intelligent behaviour with perceptive reference; rational conduct (let us say) with reflective reference" (p. 183). More in detail it is asserted that instinctive behaviour passes into intelligent behaviour through "cross-over," as in the theory of conditioned reflexes, and that the passage from percipience to perception is essentially the passage from 'this sound,' 'this smell,' etc., to what James Ward called "complication" i.e., to the type of integration or "meaning" implied in the statement that "the ice looks cold," where a visual datum has a thermal significance.

This theory has at least one curious feature, viz., that while there is asserted to be a very definite correspondence "under" cross-over between the passage from the first stage to the second stage in both series, there is an amazing lack of correspondence between the organisation of the first mental stage (where organisation is as good as absent since the first mental stage seems to be a chaos of discrete sensa) and the very highly organised instincts. According to our author (p. 149), "What is inherited is such body-mind organisation as provides for the genetic origin of fore-experience under cross-over". Without in any way desiring to accept a theory like Mr. McDougall's, however, I would suggest that "percipience" must include protensity and extensity as well as atomic sensa (if it does in any clear way contain the latter) and that primitive percipience probably has a certain typical organisation. It does not, indeed, contain the *reflective* categories of space or time and is not organised *in that way*. But why should it not have a *percipient* spatio-temporal organisation? Surely an animal that, let us say, swims by instinct can steer as well as see or feel. (Mr. Lloyd Morgan's account of the third stage of concomitance, I think, strongly suggests the 'interaction' and not the 'concomitance' hypothesis, by which I mean "scientific" and not "dramatic" interaction. But I have no space to pursue the point.)

(2) If "agency" means either "constructing" (i.e., making) or "making a difference" I do not see why this unscientific but legitimate type of explanation should not apply to sub-personal (i.e., according to Mr. Lloyd Morgan to unreflecting), and even to physical "agents," although I am aware of what Berkeley, Rashdall, and others have declared upon this point. I am also very doubtful whether Mr. Lloyd Morgan, particularly in his account of personal freedom (e.g., p. 260) does not do precisely what he says should not be done, viz., hold that our freedom "emerges" when we become rational and, when it has emerged, modifies and alters our conduct in such a way that the "dramatic" explanation *conflicts* with the "scientific". (I gather, however, that Mr. Lloyd Morgan holds that science cannot give us reality but only gives us truth, while dramatic explanation may put us in touch with reality. If so, I suppose we might be *really* but not *truly* free.)

Mr. Lloyd Morgan's theism seems to me even more remarkable. As I apprehend his argument, he holds that God's agency explains the entire "constructiveness" of nature (including evolution, emergence, etc.), and that such explanation centres round (a) God's rational plans, (b) the emergence of novelty. If creation were *ex nihilo* and if God were temporal I can see that his creation would be, in one sense, a magnificent example of emergence, but it might still be deducible from God's plan, and therefore, in another sense, *not* "emergent". In short, so far as I can see, Mr. Lloyd Morgan's theism requires a God (a) to act in

accordance with a prearranged plan, and thus to construct and conserve everything except man's free acts; (b) to be "creative" in the sense of producing some novelty through "emergence" and indeterminance. (See again p. 260.) I find it difficult to combine these views in any coherent way, and I am not helped in this task by Mr. Lloyd Morgan's assurance that God is timeless.

JOHN LAIRD.

The Sceptical Biologist. By JOSEPH NEEDHAM. London: Chatto & Windus, 1929. Pp. 288. 7s. 6d.

The Sceptical Biologist is the name of the first of a series of ten essays which are here collected and published together. The title of the book might equally well have been taken from that of the third essay—*The Hunting of the Phoenix*—for it is largely occupied with a relentless pursuit of that unhappy bird in the form of vitalism, or Neo-vitalism as Mr. Needham calls it, including under that term such very different views as those of Prof. Driesch and Dr. J. S. Haldane. The author is a sceptical biologist in two senses. He doubts whether any biology is worthy of the name of science unless it is either bio-physics or bio-chemistry, and he also doubts whether, having got bio-physics and bio-chemistry, they tell us anything about the world which can be taken seriously for metaphysical purposes. He says "it is useless to imagine that the mechanical view and the non-mechanical view have any real counterpart in external Nature, as Lotze supposes" (p. 26). Consequently some of the essays are devoted to the pursuit of another phoenix, namely, Naturalism. Here, Mr. Needham is in agreement with the vitalists although he expresses the opinion that they are people "whose religious sense had got into the wrong place". He holds that "the mechanical view" is "a legitimate methodological distortion, capable of application to any phenomena whatever, and possessing no value at all as a metaphysical doctrine," but, at the same time, the "vitalistic view" has not even the merits of a "methodological distortion". Neither is "metaphysically true," and because this is held to be the case Mr. Needham, at the end of the first essay, comes to the conclusion that it is the pursuit of knowledge, not knowledge itself, which is valuable; being a biochemist, not biochemistry, is good.

This book, then, is a product of the reaction against the simple-minded metaphysics of nineteenth-century science. Mr. Needham draws his inspiration chiefly from such idealist philosophers as James Ward and Aliotta and seems to revel in what he calls the "subjectivation" of "mechanism" and "non-mechanism". But he says nothing at all about the modern movement towards realism nor the possibility of the enlargement of the scope of "the scientific method". He seems to think that our minds are condemned to run eternally in two rigid grooves, and the passage from one to the other seems to be somewhat analogous to the alleged passage of an electron from one atomic orbit to the other, according to some physical speculations. The author himself says that "between the two there is a gulf impassable to any formula, although as human beings we may pass backwards and forwards like the Gods to Valhalla" (p. 129).

Mr. Needham does not discuss the question of how it comes about that,

if the "mechanical view" has no "real counterpart in external Nature," it is nevertheless so successfully applicable. Moreover, his reality, about which propositions might be "metaphysically true" if both mechanism and non-mechanism were not so completely "subjectivated," seems to be an entirely superfluous entity quite without significance for human beings, and one which can therefore be sliced off by Occam's razor without regrets.

Criticism of natural science from this point of view seems to have done its work, and what is now wanted is more criticism from the standpoint of science itself. Mr. Needham writes in some places as though he regarded the "scientific method" as a kind of divine revelation which (in his own words) must not be "tampered with," and in yet others he is ready to admit that even physical and chemical ideas may not always be quite what they are now. It is high time that a little attention should be devoted to the analysis of the notions commonly employed in these discussions. Mr. Needham follows the usual practice of using the terms "mechanical explanation," "mechanistic view," and "physico-chemical explanation" as though they were more or less synonymous and quite free from ambiguity, or at least so well understood as to need no clarification. And yet this is very far from being the case. The expression "mechanistic explanation" can, for example, be used in so wide a sense as easily to satisfy the demands of every branch of natural science, irrespective of the special concepts which a given one may find it desirable to employ. And it may, on the other hand, be used in a sense so restricted as to be insufficient even for the requirements of physics. Clearly these discussions will always be inconclusive so long as these points are not cleared up. Then again, a perpetual confusion exists between the propositions (1) "Organisms are completely *analysable* into physico-chemical entities," and (2) "Organisms are exhaustively *explicable* in physical and chemical terms". It seems to be widely believed without question that if the first proposition is in some sense true the second *must* also be true. It might be more profitable in future to discontinue these discussions along the old lines and to devote more attention to these preliminary questions. Instead of discussing the relative merits of different kinds of explanation it might be better to consider more carefully what precisely we mean by "explanation," and how, why and what a "scientific explanation" explains, if and when it explains anything. When more clarity has been reached in regard to these questions we shall be in a better position to discover the sort of notions and the kind of procedure required by the actual data of biology (of which we now have so much) for their elaboration into systematised knowledge, instead of being, as seems to be the case at present, little more than a "medley of *ad hoc* hypotheses".

Mr. Needham's book is illuminated and enlivened by a prodigious learning over a very wide field. There is a good deal of "development" of the author's opinions through the various essays, but as the date of original publication is not given it is difficult to discover which represent his latest views. The last essay—"Materialism and Religion"—is better than the earlier ones dealing with the same theme. The essay on "Organicism in Biology" seems to be the least satisfactory because here the depth of the author's learning is not sufficiently in proportion to its width, and he does not enter deeply enough into the theories he discusses, but chiefly uses them as a basis for a further castigation of the vitalistic phoenix. On Mr. Needham's view of knowledge it does not seem to be consistent to appeal to empirical arguments against vitalism, when all possible views are submerged in the mists of subjectivity. Three of the essays

are historical and deal with "S. T. Coleridge as a Philosophic Biologist," "Julien de la Mettrie," and "William Harvey and the Witches".

J. H. WOODGER.

Les Théories de l'Induction et de l'Expérimentation. By A. LALANDE.
Paris, Boivin et Cie., 1929 Pp. vi + 287. 20 fr.

IN this book Prof. Lalande has published a course of lectures which he delivered at the Sorbonne in 1921-22, to which he has added an appendix dealing with recent contributions to the theory of induction. He has certainly succeeded in writing an interesting book. His treatment of his subject is mainly historical. At the outset he distinguishes three problems for discussion, namely, the technique of scientific method, its principles, and its foundation. About two-thirds of the book is concerned with the first problem. The disproportionate amount of space given to this problem is due to the fact that the nature of scientific method cannot be properly understood without taking into account the way in which science has developed from the time of the Renaissance. This contention appears to be well-founded. It is necessary to consider what the great scientists have had to say with regard to their own method of investigation. The logical problem of the principles of induction and the philosophical problem of its foundation were not raised until much later, so that theories with regard to these problems have been less fully developed.

Prof. Lalande discusses various meanings that have been assigned to the word "induction," and points out that the induction that is involved in every form of scientific investigation is what Lachelier called "l'induction amplifiante". He rightly insists that scientific method involves both deduction and induction, and that the opposition between them is often wrongly stated. The opposition is between the *deductive sciences*, and the *inductive*, or rather, the *experimental sciences*, "dans lesquelles prédominent l'expérience, la classification, l'induction amplifiante et l'hypothèse incomplètement vérifiée" (p. 15). After a short chapter dealing with pre-Baconian theories of induction, Prof. Lalande examines at length Bacon's own statement of his theory and its influence upon subsequent writers. In the opinion of the present reviewer, Prof. Lalande's praise of Bacon is excessive, but it is probable that opinions will continue to be divided with regard to his achievements. Prof. Lalande tries to maintain that Bacon did not misunderstand the function of mathematics in scientific method, and that he had a clearer grasp of the essential nature of experimental investigation than had Galileo. It is certainly true that Galileo regarded experimental confirmation of his mathematical deductions as relatively unimportant, since he was convinced of the correctness of those deductions. Nevertheless, Galileo was clearly aware that in the end we must "come to the particular demonstrations, observations and experiments". Bacon's discussion of scientific method was naturally more influential than the theory of Galileo, which has to be gathered from scattered remarks. Newton's "*Regulae philosophandi*" are stated and discussed in an interesting chapter, which is followed by a clear and full discussion of the development of the conception of the hypothetico-deductive method from Newton to Whewell. To the latter Prof. Lalande

pays a well-deserved tribute. It is much to be regretted that Whewell's writings have suffered such neglect that he is seldom remembered save in connexion with Mill's criticism of his views. The chapter on "La Preuve Formelle de la Causalité" contains a brief and excellent discussion of Mill's "Methods"; it is followed by a chapter dealing with the psychological analysis of Claude Bernard.

In the last two chapters Prof. Lalande is concerned to answer the question on what the method of induction depends. He points out that this question is ambiguous since it may mean, (1) what are the principles, or postulates, involved in the use of induction, or (2) what is the logical foundation, or justification, of scientific method. He rejects Mill's attempt to base induction upon the principle of causality, since there are inductions not concerned with causation. He also rejects Lachelier's attempt to base induction upon the principles of mechanism and finality. We must seek principles that are normative in character defining what it is rational for us to expect. There are three such principles, namely, (1) the principle of deducibility, (2) the principle of complementary probabilities, (3) the principle of universalisation. These are stated as follows: (1) "Il y a une nature dont les phénomènes, qui seront l'objet de la science expérimentale, sont susceptibles de déduction à partir de chaque état" (p. 234); (2) "La probabilité d'une hypothèse est le complément (1-p) de la probabilité (p) pour que les faits observés se soient produits si cette hypothèse était fausse" (p. 239); (3) "En l'absence de toute indication contraire, on doit juger que ce qui s'est toujours passé suivant une certaine loi continuera à se passer de même." These principles, however, do not give certainty to inductive conclusions; on the contrary, they receive what confirmation they have from experimental results. There still remains, then, the problem of justification. The chapter on this topic is the least satisfactory in the book. Prof. Lalande does not seem to have felt the force of Hume's problem, and his discussion of the question is perfunctory and not very clear. He contents himself with the remark, "La réponse est dans la question. A-t-elle un sens?" He concludes: "Nous n'avons donc le choix qu'entre l'acceptation du processus inductif, ou un scepticisme absolu supprimant toute pensée" (p. 251). This is a lame conclusion, which it is somewhat surprising to find repeated at this time of day, seeing what careful work has been done on this problem by modern thinkers. In the appendix, Prof. Lalande discusses Nicod's examination of Part III. of J. M. Keynes' *Treatise on Probability*, but he makes no attempt to revise his own treatment of the problem.

L. S. S.

A Study in the Logic of Value. By MARY EVELYN CLARKE, Ph.D.
University of London Press. Pp. x, 330.

No subject of philosophic dispute, probably, is intrinsically more important and stands in more desperate need of elucidation than that of value, and one is naturally disposed to welcome any attempt to clear it up. But it may be doubted whether the most promising procedure to this end is to plunge straight into the muddy depths of current controversies, equipped only with a metaphysical *parti pris* that the truth about value also must be deducible from the realism of Prof. G. E. Moore, and without a preliminary survey of the actual usage of the terms concerned (*cf.* p. 194),

of the *species*, or as Prof. Clarke would say the *cases* (p. 232), of value, and without a consideration of the pivotal relation of means and ends. Without these psychological (and grammatical) preliminaries it seems sanguine to hope for clearness, and still more to expect to overthrow 'psychologism.'

Certainly Prof. Clarke has made her path difficult to follow by her method of exposition. Instead of formulating her position clearly at the outset, so that her readers could understand just why she rejects the views she criticises, she keeps back her fundamental doctrines till near the end of her book. Thus it is not till page 241 that anything is said about the relation of means and ends; and even then it hardly seems enough to declare "I am in complete agreement with the writers who have drawn attention to the artificiality of the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value". It is not till page 293 that one learns that there are not really a number of *kinds* of value, but only "types of object" having value. Hence "what we mean by a moral good is not an object having a certain kind of value, but a certain kind of object having value. An æsthetic good is an object of a different kind, similarly possessing value." This no doubt should relieve the uncertainty a reader must have felt as to what Prof. Clarke means by 'value,' and explain why she should have seemed to refer mostly to the 'good,' sometimes to the 'beautiful,' and only very rarely to the 'true'; but it will hardly repress the query 'Is not "a moral good" "a certain kind of object" having moral value, and an æsthetic good an object having æsthetic value?' Still one can see why Prof. Clarke cannot possibly admit *kinds* of value. 'The doctrine that "good" is "a simple indefinable predicate" (p. 269) or "property" (p. 273) would clearly go by the board, if logical, æsthetic and economic values had to be recognised, and value thus became a genus with many species. Even so, page 294 concedes that the subject in valuing assumes various 'attitudes,' and that these "are believed to afford a clue to differences in the objects that arouse them". So the notion that 'value' is a kind of 'attitude,' and itself a genus with a variety of species cannot be said to be refuted.

However this may be, once the theory of value has been reduced to moral philosophy (p. 180), it remains to account for æsthetic and logical values. About the former we are told (p. 310) that "when we recognise the object's value through the immediate satisfaction it affords us we call it *æsthetic*," and that the æsthetic 'attitude' is "contemplative, resting in the object, devoid of practical or instrumental considerations" (p. 294). As for the latter, "it is a very difficult question whether value can be correctly ascribed to truth at all" (p. 298). "Truth itself . . . may possess some value . . . but . . . so far as it is an intrinsic and not a contributory value object, its character is always æsthetic" (p. 300), even though "our attitude towards truth . . . is seldom free from some tinge of utilitarianism" (*ibid*). This "suggests the question whether all intrinsic value objects may not be æsthetic" (p. 302). In the end Prof. Clarke decides (p. 304) that a number of values (moral and religious and the value of truth) "are seen to be really æsthetic wherever the object is more than instrumental" and that "what we call *moral* value is the value attributed to acts that are useful by reason of the effects they produce" (p. 309). This should lead to a dichotomy of values into 'æsthetic' (intrinsic) and 'moral' (instrumental), but rather deprives Prof. Clarke's views of their vaunted 'simplicity'; and in face of the passage quoted from p. 241 it seems neither plausible nor lucid.

There is a curious slip on page 119 which refers to Prof. Moore's "famous Refutation of Egoism" [*sic*], but there are only a few unimportant misprints and the index is good.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Coleridge on Logic and Learning, with Selections from Unpublished Manuscripts. By ALICE D. SNYDER, Associate Professor of English at Vassar College (Yale and Oxford Press, 1929). Pp. xvi+169. 13s. 6d.

AMERICA has shown a serious interest in Coleridge's philosophical ideas which has been curiously absent among English philosophers. It was in America that there first appeared a complete edition of his works. The Preliminary Essay to the *Aids to Reflection* written by Dr. James Marsh, and the edition of the same work with a Preliminary Essay by J. McVicar (New York, 1839) have held a place with which there is nothing to compare in England. Prof. Alice Snyder quotes the "creed" of the University of Vermont, as containing, as late as 1845, the words "I believe in Coleridge, I believe in Professor Marsh". Present day American scholars are carrying on this tradition by devoting themselves to the too long delayed task of making as yet unpublished manuscripts, which alone can provide the materials for an estimate of Coleridge's real philosophical position, available to students. In this work Miss Snyder has taken a leading part. Her articles on "Coleridge's Cosmogony" (*Studies in Philology*, 1924), "Coleridge on Giordano Bruno" (*Modern Language Notes* XLII.), and "The Critical Principle of the Reconciliation of Opposites" (*Contributions to Rhetorical Theory*, University of Michigan, No. 9) are well known to students of Coleridgean literature in America. The present book is the result of the leisure afforded her by a Fund for Research recently established at her own College of Vassar.

It consists of (1) an account of manuscripts and published prose works bearing on Coleridge's views on Logic and Learning; (2) four essays by the author with the titles "Logician, Metaphysician, Bard," "The Potential Scientist," "The Encyclopædist and Educator," "The Logician"; (3) an analysis with considerable extracts from the hitherto unpublished manuscript in the British Museum upon Logic; (4) "Logoi," consisting of further extracts from this manuscript on such subjects as "The Reasoning Process," "The Criteria of Truth," and the "Art of Perception," followed by others from the more important other manuscript remains; (5) three appendices, the most important of which for the subject of the book is the last, containing Coleridge's *Marginalia* on Wolff's *Logic* (Eng. Tr., 1770), and on the first hundred pages of Hegel's *Logic* (1812-16), which were apparently all that he had the patience to read.

With all the material referred to in number (1) of these divisions, the author must have suffered acutely from an *embarras de richesse*, and she is to be congratulated all the more on the success of her selection. Though there are many other passages in the manuscripts from which the citations are made, that one should have liked to see included, they would not have added materially to the impression the reader is able to form from what he here has of the scope of Coleridge's work on Logic.

In number (2) we have a finely stated estimate of Coleridge's general attitude to science and philosophy, the text of which is contained in the reply (quoted from the author of the *Biographia Epistolaris*) to the often-

repeated complaint that Coleridge had no philosophy: "One of the features of Coleridge is that he was never without a Philosophy, and could not speak without betraying the fact that he judged all things from a point of view which was the centre of a large planetary system of dependent and interdependent ideas". Professor Snyder confines her endorsement of this judgment to the claim for a point of view: "The unifying element in Coleridge's thought," she comments, "which critics are bound to recognise in spite of verbal inconsistencies and contradictions, is a 'standpoint' rather than a system". A good case might perhaps be made out for the recognition in his work of something approaching nearer to Turnbull's "planetary system" than Miss Snyder is apparently willing to admit. But that is another story. The standpoint is at any rate there, and is defined by the author as consisting in the distinction that Coleridge draws between "thinking that was dynamic, imaginative, fertile, and the relatively passive thing that often went by its name" and in his insistence that "the experience of knowing involved 'the total man,' not simply the understanding" and that "the thinking that counted involved the power to perceive afresh the materials of thought, instead of accepting them as ready-made materials for intellectual manipulation". The writer suggests that in this view "one might discover that he had laid several stones in the pavement leading to the instrumentalist reaction against an idealism with which he had been closely associated". I believe that a review of Coleridge's epistemological doctrine as a whole would be found to connect him rather with Royce's Voluntaristic Idealism than with Dewey's Instrumentalism.

The reader of Coleridge's biography is familiar with the names of many of the medical and scientific men whom he numbered among his friends. The Author alludes to this as the subject of a chapter still to be written and modestly confines herself to the story of his friendship with Humphry Davy, and of the controversy between the vitalistic and mechanistic schools of physiologists out of which his own Essay on the *Theory of Life* sprang. The third essay contains some account of Coleridge's idea of a University, which he tried, without much success, to force on the attention of its friends in 1825 when the question of a University "was stirring up the mudpool of the public mind in London with the vivacity of a Bottom wind".

The fourth essay and the analysis which follows it give us for the first time a full account of what remains to us of Coleridge's successive attempts to write a book on Logic that should be adequate to his idea of the scope of that science. So early as 1803 he told Godwin that he was prepared to go to the press with what was to be an "*Organon Veri Organon*, or Instrument of Practical Reasoning in the Business of Real Life". Of this early sketch only fragments remain, the most valuable of which, containing a characteristically imaginative attempt to reconstruct the circumstances under which philosophy in general and logic in particular rose in Greece, is here printed at length. The other fragments of this sketch here given are mainly interesting as indicating the point at which Coleridge had arrived before he had perceived the wider scope which had to be given to his exposition in view of the work of Kant. The main interest of the later manuscript work on the other hand consists just in the opinion it enables us to form on the amount of the debt which he owed to the *Critique of the Pure Reason*.

Though containing in all some 500 pages, the work is obviously incomplete and still more obviously unrevised. It was for this reason that

Coleridge's disciple and literary trustee, Joseph Henry Green, deliberately decided against the publication of it—a judgment in which the author concurs. It is impossible here to give more than the barest indication of its manifold contents. After distinguishing Logic as concerned with the rules of the understanding from Noetic as concerned with the reason that carries us beyond them, and mathematics as “pertaining to the senses”—all included in Metaphysics—Coleridge treats of it under the two heads of the Canon and the Criterion. Under the first we have a restatement (largely influenced, as Miss Snyder shows, by Moses Mendelssohn's *Morgenstunden*) of Aristotelean logic, but showing the same impatience as the earlier sketch shows with the details of the subject. His heart is clearly with the second part which gives him occasion for a detailed exposition on Kantian lines, but by no means in slavish dependence on their letter, of the forms of space and time and the place of synthetic judgment in the structure of experience. This was intended to lead on to a discussion of the Categories, which in the last chapter are only treated very cursorily, as though in preparation for a fuller statement.

It would be useless on the basis of this mere enumeration to attempt any estimate of the originality of Coleridge's work, but there are one or two things to which it may be legitimate to refer, as indicating points at which he went beyond anything that he found in his predecessors. The first is his doctrine of the import of the Syllogism, the second his criticism of Kant's Transcendental Logic as a whole.

Coleridge wrote just before the time at which Logic in England was to receive an immense extension at the hands of Whewell and Mill, and here as in so many other respects Coleridge represents the transition from eighteenth century to nineteenth century modes of thought. He is acutely conscious of the limitations of the older logic, yet he feels also that a problem is raised by it of fundamental importance, that namely of the ground of the generalisation represented by the major premiss and consequently of the conclusion, and he states it in a form that anticipates Mill's well-known discussion. The odd thing (showing how little he was as yet clear as to the implications of his own general principles) is that his solution of the problem (amounting practically to the admission that the syllogism is a *petitio principii*) was the reverse of that which we should have expected from these principles, and connects him with the empiricism which he was elsewhere using the whole power of his genius to undermine.

More in harmony with his own fundamental ideas is his clear recognition of the assumption on which ordinary logic proceeds in taking for granted the common-sense distinction between thought and its object, along with the common-sense view of the criterion as that of correspondence of the one with the other. In making this assumption he saw that logic, like other special sciences, was founded in an abstraction, which had to submit to criticism from the side of metaphysics. What Bradley only discovered in the course of writing his *Principles of Logic*, through the difficulties in which this more or less unconscious assumption involved him, Coleridge had the genius to perceive from the first. With like perspicacity he saw what it involved with regard to Kant's *Transcendental Logic*, his criticism of which is summed up in the characteristic sentences (quoted on page 125): “Considered as Logic, it is irrefragable: as philosophy it will be exempt from opposition and cease to be questionable only when the Soul of Aristotle shall have become one with the Soul of Plato, when

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the Men of Talent shall have all passed into Men of Genius, or the Men of Genius have all sunk into Men of Talent. That is Græcis Kalendis or when two Fridays meet."

Enough has been said to show the importance of Prof. Snyder's work for the proper estimate (which the present reviewer surmises still remains to be made) of Coleridge as Philosopher. It would perhaps be ungrateful, where she has given us so much, to ask for more. Under the circumstances in which her book was written, I do not question the justice of her acceptance of J. H. Green's decision against publication of the *Logic*. But if, as I understand is now likely, the rest of Coleridge's philosophical manuscripts are to see the light with all their imperfections upon their head, I see no reason why an exception should be made in the case of one that is so important for the understanding of his philosophical position. A few misprints chiefly in Greek and Latin words will doubtless be corrected in the second edition of this scholarly and altogether timely work.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

The Son of Apollo: Themes of Plato. By F. J. E. WOODBRIDGE.
Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929. Pp. ix, 272. \$4.00.

THIS handsome book is hardly what the publishers call it on the wrapper, a "reinterpretation of Plato and Platonism," since it excludes from consideration the whole series of dialogues from the *Theætetus* to the *Laws*, and more than insinuates that some or all of them are spurious. Even of the earlier and more dramatic Plato in whom the author is interested there is not very much interpretation, by comparison with the space devoted to description of the background of the dialogues. The author's sub-title describes his book more accurately. What he does is to take four "themes" from the dialogues, the ideal city, education, love, death, and talk to his readers about them, pleasantly enough, though not, I think, with much originality, in a desultory fashion which sometimes reveals his own attitude to his "themes" as other than Plato's. (In the chapter on "Love," the significance of the part played in the *Symposium* by Alcibiades seems to be wholly missed; in that on death, the reader, as the author says, may think the meditation of over thirty pages profound, or may think it silly, but the silliness or profundity belongs much more to Prof. Woodbridge than to the "Son of Apollo.") I doubt if the reader will learn very much about the worth of Plato's political or educational principles from the treatment of the other two themes. For Plato's full and ripe thought on education one has to go to the *Laws*, a work Mr. Woodbridge is ill-instructed enough to treat as spurious, and rash enough to describe—I should hope, for the credit of his judgment, without reading it—as a "poor thing" (p. 131). The *Republic* might be made to yield a good deal of insight into Plato's political ideals, but hardly by an expositor who can be satisfied to make such futile comments as that "there is much in it"—*what* we are not told—"which deserves at least serious attention" (p. 88).

Why Professor Woodbridge could hardly expect to be very successful as an exponent of Plato will be clear to the readers of his introductory chapters on Plato's life and writings. He has not served his apprenticeship to the philological and historical studies without which no one can be competent in the subject. He allows himself to accept from the late *Lives* of Plato any anecdote which strikes him as piquant, while he sum-

marily dismisses facts authenticated by the evidence of Plato's immediate associates. The pretended justification for this arbitrary behaviour is that the *Life* in Diogenes Laertius dates, as it stands, from the third century A.D., and that we know nothing of the personality of Diogenes. That is true, but he constantly specifies his authorities, who are often contemporary with the subjects of his biographies. It is not, *e.g.*, Diogenes, but Aristotle, among others, who is our witness to the giving of "lectures" in the Academy of Plato. The work of discovering and evaluating the "sources" of Diogenes has in the main been done already by the industry of eminent scholars. Mr. Woodbridge may be ignorant of the results, but it is not permissible to ignore them. The same is true of his treatment of the Platonic "canon." A man who denies the authenticity of the *Laws*, a work not only used and criticised by Aristotle, but named by him as Plato's, is merely making himself ridiculous by his rashness and ignorance, no less than he would be if he denied Shakespeare's authorship of *Othello*. Serious study would have shown Mr. Woodbridge that the result of two generations of intensive scrutiny has been to place the genuineness of every considerable Platonic dialogue finally beyond question. Mr. Woodbridge is under no obligation to prosecute these studies if they do not appeal to him, but he is, like all of us, under the obligation not to deceive his readers and to damage his own book by posing as a competent judge where he manifestly has his studies still to begin.

The inevitable result of this neglect of necessary *Vorstudien* is, in fact, that throughout his book Mr. Woodbridge gravely misrepresents the whole character of the age in which Plato lived, by taking the dialogues, from the *Gorgias* to the *Republic* and *Phædrus*, as descriptive of it. Of course it is a consequence of the presence of Socrates as their central figure, that the society these dialogues describe is that of the time of Pericles and Nicias. Athens was then the centre of an empire and the first naval power of the world; the disasters of Syracuse and Aegospotami had not made her what she was when Plato was writing his descriptions, a hopelessly second-rate town at the mercy of the domineering Spartan. No two ages could well differ in spirit more completely than the age of Plato and the age of Socrates; it was the heart-breaking consciousness of the difference, as Plato lets us see in his letters, which turned one whose aspiration was to be a statesman into the head of a philosophical school. To forget the difference between the Athens of Socrates and the Athens of Plato would be like forgetting that the France of 1850 was separated from the France of 1750 by the Revolution, or, to invert the illustration, like taking *Les Chouans* for a "typical" picture of life in a French province under Louis Philippe. The *Laches*, for example, is a very living picture of a certain society, that of which Laches was a distinguished member, but for that reason it is *not* what it is called on page 115, a picture of Athens "in the fourth century." By the side of this gigantic standing misconception, which makes all Mr. Woodbridge's statements about educational conditions in the age of Plato worthless, it is even a minor matter that Thrasymachus of Chalcedon should be called a "Thracian" (p. 90), though one might really, with about as much justice, call Mr. Woodbridge a Huron or a Delaware.

A. E. TAYLOR.

Idealismus und Realismus in der Englischen Philosophie der Gegenwart.
By DR. J. E. SALOMAA. Helsinki, 1929. Pp. 311.

DR. SALOMAA'S study of idealism and realism in modern English philosophy is animated by the laudable purpose of furthering international understanding. He points out that, since the disuse of Latin as the common language, the learned intellectual intercourse between civilised countries has grown harder and has diminished, and philosophic thought has become more and more nationalistic. And he sets himself to show that "there have existed in England a number of independent and noteworthy thinkers who are hardly known on the Continent save by name" (p. 14).

Unfortunately the method Dr. Salomaa has adopted in carrying out his design subjects him to certain crippling disabilities. He has not been able quite to emancipate himself from the traditional assumptions of German histories of philosophy that the national character must prevail over individual idiosyncrasy, and that English thought must be empiricist and practical because the English people are practical. This, of course, overlooks the (really very obvious) considerations that the general tone and tendency of a society may have an intensely irritating effect on certain exceptional mentalities and drive them into violent antagonism, and that the universities have everywhere been turned into havens of refuge for the naturally contemplative minds, where they can meditate at leisure and with impunity on the very matters the bulk of their compatriots most neglect and despise. Even if they are not personally exempt from the foibles of their place and time (and it is clear that they must at least express themselves in the language of their country) it seems probable that their affinities with the national character will by no means be visible on the surface. Even a German pedant might shrink from deducing the characteristics of a Plato from those of the Athenian democracy he detested, and it is really just as desperate an undertaking to trace the features of an English business man (or even of a country cleric) in an F. H. Bradley, or of a Duke of Bedford in a Bertrand Russell. Moreover, Dr. Salomaa has not attempted to write a complete history of modern English philosophy. He says himself he has excluded the evolutionists and the pragmatists. Yet the establishment of Darwinism was incomparably the most important philosophic achievement ever attained in England, and it profoundly influenced the aims and methods even of the thinkers most hostile to it, while the effect of the recent revolution in physics can be very definitely traced, *e.g.*, in the changes of Mr. Russell's philosophy. By artificially restricting his field of vision, Dr. Salomaa has thus obscured many real connexions. Lastly, it was, though convenient, rather uncritical, to take the labels 'idealism' and 'realism' at their face value. They have been used so vaguely and unscrupulously that they now convey practically no information whatever about a philosophy to which they are applied; either can be applied to any philosophy, according as one chooses to emphasise one aspect of it or another. Thus Platonism can just as well be called 'realism' as 'idealism,' and even Berkeley, who is usually taken as a typical 'idealist,' was called by his devoted editor, A. C. Fraser, a 'spiritual realist.' Dr. Salomaa, of course, soon discovers the inadequacy of his nomenclature and comes to the conclusion (*e.g.* pp. 218, 298) that there is much 'realism' in his 'idealists' and much 'idealism' in his 'realists.' This goes a long way to explaining also his final verdict (p. 299) that "as a whole, present English philosophy produces a very variegated and chaotic impression". But could not

that have been said of the state of philosophy anywhere and at any time ? And what does it matter ?

Coming to details, it is interesting, and sometimes amusing, to observe how Dr. Salomaa appraises our leading sages. He has read them, and about them, extensively and conscientiously, and expounds even their wildest paradoxes with an imperturbable calm. F. H. Bradley gets fifty-four pages, Bosanquet thirty-six, McTaggart (with James Ward thrown in) thirty-four, G. E. Moore twenty-seven, Bertrand Russell (who is called "undoubtedly the best known among living English thinkers") forty-nine, and Samuel Alexander twenty-nine. Dr. Salomaa's interspersed criticism is always urbane and sometimes penetrating, and even though he does not always seem to get his perspective right, his work will doubtless give Finnish students a clearer idea of English philosophy.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Der Kampf ums Dasein, und seine Grundlagen in der neuzeitlichen Philosophie.
By VINZENZ RÜFNER. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1929. Pp. viii, 250.
M. 11.

THIS book gives a graphic historical sketch of the development of the tendency towards what would probably be called by its supporters humanism and by its opponents secularism, or, more bluntly, atheism. It is far from being confined to German philosophy but deals with thinkers of all countries; indeed the author might be charged with neglecting his own nation unduly. English thinkers are on the whole most prominent, but for the somewhat unflattering reason that they are regarded as the most consistent *advocati diaboli* because they have laid the greatest stress on the utilitarian principle and emphasised the conception of the struggle for existence.

The fatal defect of modern philosophy since Descartes is held to be that it exalts man at the expense of God. It separates morality and religion, and degrades the former to a pursuit of the useful (or even merely the economically advantageous). It fails to recognise an order of higher values transcending the merely empirical, and seeks to describe the world in merely quantitative terms, an attempt which must, since value is essentially a matter of quality, eliminate all values; while in modern idealism it regards man as the maker of his world and so puts him in the place of God. The origin of these views is traced back to the separation of the divine from the natural which shows itself in the attempt, from Descartes onwards, to make the latter a self-sufficient mechanism which can require a God only "to wind it up in the beginning," if at all, and in the attitude of the puritans who, by condemning the natural man as incurably evil and by refusing to recognise the value of love and the presence of higher motives in man except as he is transformed by a special miracle, pave the way for a philosophy which, while it rejects their religious postulates, embraces their low view of human nature. He effectively illustrates in the Utilitarians, Darwinists, and Manchester school economists, the tendency to explain human life in terms of self-seeking, and regards as the greatest of religious catastrophes the "*Aufklärung*". The tendency in question is traced successively in metaphysics, ethics and religion, and in the concluding section the author ascribes to it the Great War, and discovers in contemporary philosophy indications that the reaction against it has at last begun.

The book must be regarded as solely historical, since there is no attempt to give the author's own arguments and views on the subject, though his general opposition to the outlook described is clear enough. I think the work of giving an account of this tendency in modern thought is worth doing and is here well done; but such an attempt to single out one tendency inevitably gives a very one-sided impression, and the author is not at sufficient pains to counteract this, for he shows no appreciation of the many good points in the thinkers with which he deals. He takes no account of the absolute idealist moment which certainly worked in quite the opposite way to that given by him as the prevailing current of modern thought, and assumes far too readily that the thinkers who try to base ethics on human needs are thereby subordinating the higher values to mere economics. Even in the case of the outspokenly naturalist and utilitarian thinkers it is in most cases quite unfair to suppose, as the author does, that they desired the sacrifice of the higher to the lower pleasures. The assumptions that the separation of religion from ethics naturally means a materialistic kind of hedonism, and that views of God and the universe based on the influence of modern thinkers cannot provide at least as satisfactory a synthesis and one as valuable for life as that of the Middle Ages may be hotly disputed. But this does not prevent the book being a valuable and interesting historical account of a certain tendency.

A. C. EWING.

Das Problem der Wahrheit. By J. E. SALOMAA. Helsinki, 1929. Pp. 177.

THIS monograph comes as a welcome reminder that the discussion of the problem of truth is no monopoly of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, although it might perhaps be contended that the countries which, like Finland, are still dominated by the philosophic tradition of Germany have not yet caught up with the more advanced aspects of the discussion. Dr. Salomaa relies mainly, though not fanatically, on German authorities, but he has heard of pragmatist 'relativism' (against which he brings the list of objections that used to be popular twenty years ago), and he finally comes to conclusions which, if not original or decisive, exhibit at any rate a perception of some of the difficulties and a willingness to acknowledge the claims of experience. He would appear indeed to be a moderate empiricist and a realist in his philosophy, and as he writes simply and lucidly and gives his references, his work may be read with profit.

Nevertheless it is hardly, on his showing, a very complete solution of his problem. He begins by making a sharp distinction between the *meaning* and the *criterion* of truth and by denying that either is relevant to the other. This enables him to hold fast to the belief in absolute truth, but causes him great embarrassments when he comes to consider how such truth is to be known. It then turns out, after sundry vain attempts to extract an applicable means of distinguishing true from false out of the traditional 'laws of thought,' that for a conclusion to be true its premisses must be true, and that it will not do to pursue true premisses into the infinite regress implicit in the principle of ground and consequence. So Dr. Salomaa appeals to inductive method to yield him the truth he requires. On page 143 its procedure appears to be to examine a few select cases, to formulate a 'law' based on them, and then to assume

that all the unexamined cases must conform to the law. One would suppose that even a desperately cornered logician could hardly feel very confident about the 'validity' of this procedure. Fortunately, however, it appears on the very next page (p. 144) that "inductive procedure is always more or less hypothetical," that laws of nature are not absolute, that new experiences can modify old results, and that "with the aid of induction we can only reach more or less probability. The only criterion of probability is that new experience supports it again and again." This no doubt is the true account of the actual procedure of the sciences; but is it not in flat contradiction with the formal theory of induction stated on page 143? And does it not render the latter utterly futile? Especially if it is mentioned, as Dr. Salomaa ought to have done, that the verification of a hypothesis cannot possibly be represented as a formally valid process.

The fact then that Dr. Salomaa has finally to confess (p. 169) that "we have no absolute criterion for separating truth from error," and that so the absolute transcendent truth on which he insists, whether or no anyone knows it or can know it (p. 7), is entirely otiose, suggests that he made a great mistake in "abstracting completely from the questions how truth can be known, or whether it can be known at all" (pp. 6-7) as being irrelevant to the nature of the conception of truth. After all, it may not be the procedure of scientific knowing which is at fault but the traditional conceptions of truth, which are thoroughly psychologistic in that they rest on human prejudices, and utterly verbalistic in that they rest on traditional meanings of words. If (as p. 33 admits) the *cognition* of truth is subject to relativism, there is no real reason why the *notion* of truth also should not be adjusted to the facts of knowing and declared equally relative to human interests in knowing. At any rate the artificial and gratuitous chasm between truth and the ways of ascertaining it, together with the absurdities of an absolute truth which nobody knows and of an unknowable truth which is none the worse for that, may thus be simply and easily avoided.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Systematic Psychology: Prolegomena. By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. With a Preface by H. P. WELD. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1929. Pp. xi + 278. Price 10s. 6d.

In 1917, we are told by Mr. Weld, Titchener began to write "his final word on the establishment of scientific psychology, co-ordinate with biology and physics" (p. v). His death, however, has prevented our having more than this introductory volume, which is itself incomplete, since a proposed chapter on method is missing.

Titchener's sole purpose here is to define psychology. He believes that "there is no science which has suffered to the same extent as psychology from misunderstanding of its problem and method" (p. 82). He also believes that psychology, like every other science, "must have its special point of view over against the existential universe, and must find its special subject-matter in some particular aspect of existence" (p. 87). He therefore first tries to determine the special point of view of psychology. He reviews in detail the opinions of Avenarius, Ebbinghaus, James, Külpe, Mach, Ward, and his old teacher, Wundt; he concludes that "on the side of point of view . . . psychology is the science of existential experience regarded as functionally or logically dependent upon the nervous system

or its biological equivalent" (p. 142). Secondly, he sets out to discover the special subject-matter of psychology. Here, too, he takes it to be his duty to examine the views of other psychologists, as, for example, Dewey, Husserl, Judd, Ladd, Lipps, Meinong, Messer, Münsterberg, Stout, and Stumpf. His own conclusions are extremely tentative. He repeatedly says that "the reader may accept, reject or ignore them, without prejudice to the arguments of the previous paragraphs" (p. 266). They are expressed—or hidden—in the statement that the subject-matter of psychology is "materially sensory and formally systemic" (pp. 265-266).

This is clearly an ambitious, obscure, and difficult book. The first chapter, on Brentano and Wundt, does indeed bring out fairly clearly the differences between "empirical" and "experimental" psychology. But in the second chapter Titchener clumsily seeks for "a working conception" of science, and begins the long, involved argument which we have briefly summarised. It is a pity he tries to define psychology by a special point of view, for every science must be defined only by the distinctive set of facts with which it deals. Nor is it profitable, in trying to define the subject-matter of psychology, to use terms that are left obscure and to describe the merits, faults, and antecedents of a score of other psychologists. His spirited attack on functional psychology—"the parasite of an organism doomed to extinction" (p. 254)—may perhaps afford malicious amusement to some. But his denunciation of the "intentionalism" or "psychologies of act" of Lipps and Stout is obviously less reasoned than rude.

Titchener often fails to distinguish what is extraneous to a theory from what is essential. Thus he implies that functional psychology necessarily makes of psychology "either an introduction to philosophy or an aid to individual and social welfare" (p. 192); but his only evidence is that Ladd happened to believe that psychology is helpful to philosophy, and Judd happened to be interested in its application to practical affairs. He is also often confused. It is true that Stout, "being interested . . . in the inferences that have been drawn from observation, in the systematic setting of the facts, in their interpretation and explanation" (p. 243), pays less attention than some to "the whole vast field of experiment". It is also true that he discusses the theories of other psychologists and constructs theories of his own. But this does not justify Titchener's statement that the *Manual* tells us only "what [others] and Stout himself 'think' about psychology" (p. 243). There is surely a difference between thinking about psychology and thinking about the facts with which it deals.

The present book adds nothing to Titchener's great reputation. It will be forgotten long before his *Experimental Psychology* ceases to be praised. Meanwhile, those who read it should transpose the second and third column-headings in the important table on page 266. As it stands, this table makes confusion worse confounded.

REX KNIGHT.

Essays in Philosophy. By Seventeen Doctors of Philosophy of the University of Chicago. Edited by THOMAS VERNOR SMITH and WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT. The Open Court Co., London. Pp. xvi, 337.

THE Dedication and the Preface of this work explain that it is a memorial of gratitude and admiration for Professors J. H. Tufts, G. H. Mead, A. W. Moore, and E. S. Ames of the University of Chicago by pupils they have trained and taught to make culture hum in the Middle West. They

confess to being all empiricists, evolutionists, and "realists in some wide sense" and to eschewing "all forms of absolutism, dogmatism, and apriorism." They claim (justly) that 'most' of their essays are not technical in style (I have noted only two exceptions), and think that "while all have been influenced by the instrumentalist movement, it would be impossible to decide from these papers alone how many of them are definitely to be classified as instrumentalists or even as pragmatists" (p. xiii). With the exception of putting first the only lady in their team, the authors have arranged themselves in order of seniority, and their list runs 'On Art as Expression,' Kate Gordon; 'Instrumentalism and Ideals,' Arthur Kenyon Rogers; 'Postulates and Preconceptions of Ricardian Economics,' Wesley Clair Mitchell; 'The Relation between Morality and Religion,' William Kelley Wright; 'Meaning and Reality,' John Forsyth Crawford; 'Buddhistic Idealism in Wei Shih Er Shih Lwen,' Clarence Herbert Hamilton; 'Current Trends in Social Psychology,' Ellsworth Faris; 'Prayer, Auto-suggestion, and God,' Josef Roy Geiger; 'The Measurement of Psychological Value,' Louis Leon Thurstone; 'A Critique of Pure Science,' Clarence Edwin Ayres; 'The Philosophical Implications of Organismic Psychology,' Jacob Robert Kantor; 'Monistic Morality,' Thomas Vernor Smith; 'Æsthetic Experience,' Van Meter Ames; 'Relation of Formal to Instrumental Logic,' Charles William Morris; 'Berkeley's Behaviourism,' Donald Ayres Piatt; 'The Grand Strategy of Evolution,' John Wild; 'Reason in Moral Judgments,' Charner Marquis Perry.

It will be seen from this list that an abundant and varied fare is provided and that *il y en a pour tous les goûts*. Personally I have found the book well worth reading, though I have naturally found some of the essays more stimulating than others. Among the latter I would specially mention that of Prof. Wright on 'Morality and Religion,' though in view of his remark on page 64 that "all men and societies" know the terms 'good,' 'right' and 'ought,' I cannot forbear asking him how he would translate the second into French and the second and the third into Greek. Prof. Morris is good on the relation of Formal to Instrumental Logic (*e.g.*, "Meaning" and 'Choice' are the giants which block the roads to the Platonic realm," p. 265), though he does not, perhaps, fully realise the whole depravity of the former. Lastly, Dr. Wild gives a suggestive and ingenious account of Evolution, though he dismisses somewhat too lightly the evidence which indicates that the world-process is really dual and that while its vital component is ascending the physical is running down.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Received also:—

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VII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. xxvi. 21. **E. A. Singer.** 'On the Conscious Mind.' [Denies that we are etymologically justified in taking 'consciousness' as *private* experience, and shows that this sense of the word does not go further back than Locke. It is inferred that *conscious* response to stimulation is objectively observable and that the dictum that "there is nothing to be found in the meaning of experience that is not already contained in the meaning of experiment" may be upheld.] Contains also a long review of McTaggart's *Nature of Existence*, vol. ii., by Prof. Blanshard, which goes into its details very fully and seriously. xxvi. 22. **C. J. Herrick.** 'Mechanism and Organism.' [Questions, apropos of Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World*, whether the concept of mechanism "must go into the discard" with traditional materialism. For "mechanistic science must not be confused with philosophical materialism" and "mechanism and organism are not in conflict and organism is still mechanism," so long as nature is orderly and not capricious. To "grant that human intelligence is mechanistically determined" sacrifices nothing of its creative power.] **C. King.** 'The Vanishing Essence.' [Santayana's, which "is precariously suspended in non-existence between a metaphysical Scylla and an epistemological Charybdis," and cannot be rescued by Drake, Sellars, or any other of the 'critical realists.'] **E. S. Brightman.** 'A Misunderstanding of Idealism.' [A reply to M. C. Otto's review of his *Philosophy of Ideals*.] xxvi. 23. **W. E. Ritter** and **E. W. Bailey.** 'The Problem of Names, as Illustrated by the Word "Light."' [Starts "a brief psychobiological discussion of the use of words" from the question 'should we speak of "ultra-violet light" or of "ultra-violet radiation"?' and points out how important it is to attend to the meaning of words—provided always, one is tempted to add, one does not neglect to inquire also how they get, and change, their meaning.] **H. S. Fries.** 'Some Attitudes and Considerations and a Biological Argument for Epiphenomenalism.' [Asks why "may not the physical organism be a *dynamic* system of which consciousness is an epiphenomenal decoration?" No doubt biologists "distrust pure decorations and this distrust is the only argument against epiphenomenalism." But the objection to thinking that thinking is "a vast irrelevancy" "finds no application to an epiphenomenalism . . . which does not hesitate to admit that the laws of physics and chemistry of the living organism are very different from the laws of physics and chemistry of non-living matter". "And epiphenomenalism need not deny the efficacy of thinking as such." The desire for biological utility may be satisfied by assuming "natural processes which involve decorative concomitants".] **A. T. Poffenberger.** 'Report of the Ninth International Congress of Psychology.' xxvi. 24. **D. W. Gotshalk.** 'Qualities, Relations, and a Paradox of Judgment.' [Qualities and relations may be particulars: the paradox of judgment is that the reality referred to is prior to or posterior

to the descriptive act of judgment.] **J. A. Lynch.** 'Time-Systems as Perspectives.' [Concludes that "this argument from the relativity of relations to the relativity of qualities discredits the conception of activity as an underlying substrate, which Whitehead tends to make it, as well as the event as a kind of an Absolute of which qualities are aspects or *modes*. This latter conception is about what we should expect if we accepted the logic of emergent evolution on a background of Newtonian space and time."] xxvi. 25. **W. T. Bush.** 'Art and Culture.' [An analysis, with running commentary, of *Art and Civilisation*, edited by F. S. Marvin.] **M. S. Harris.** 'The Dilemma of an Experiential Æsthetician.' [Replies to Leo Stein.]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, 1928-1929. N.S., vol xxix. **A. E. Taylor** Presidential Address: 'Knowing and Believing'. [Are we to hold, with Plato, that knowing and believing are radically distinct intellectual attitudes, each with its own class of appropriate objects, or to accept the modern view that there is no such difference of kind between knowing and believing? Is knowing to be defined as believing what is true? But we may have a belief which is true in fact, and is more than a mere opinion, and yet is not truly a knowing. Does it, then, become knowledge when demonstration is added? But demonstration itself depends on undemonstrated principles whose truth is simply seen. It is in such immediate vision that the ideal type of knowledge is illustrated. But for us the ideal is realised, so far as it is realised, only in the highly abstract sciences. Perception gives knowledge which is immediate, but perceptual knowledge lacks the 'self-luminous' or 'transparent' character which is required in an ideally perfect knowing.] **J. H. Harley:** 'The Validity of Values.' [Values are not to be defined as mere objects of desire; they are 'social constructs'.] **A. H. Hannay,** 'Primary and Secondary Qualities.' [Locke's ground for distinguishing primary and secondary qualities, and Berkeley's ground for rejecting the distinction, belong to quite different lines of thought. Without dogmatising like Berkeley we may sympathise with his view that all perceived qualities are in some measure dependent on the percipient; but instead of recognising the independent reality only of other minds like our own, we may suppose some sort of active life and even perception in physical things, and this active being will take the place of Locke's complex of primary qualities as the independent reality which is the cause of our sensations.] **J. Wisdom.** 'Time, Fact and Substance.' [A paper which covers a good deal of ground and which it is impossible to summarise. Along with some other papers in this volume, it suggests the remark that members of the present Cambridge school will soon be in the position of writing only for each other. The following sentence will indicate an additional sort of difficulty which the reader of the paper has occasionally to contend with: "If, if the 'is' of 'my cheerfulness is present' is temporal then 'my cheerfulness is present' means 'my cheerfulness is present at the moment which is present,' then the meaning of the temporal 'is' of 'my cheerfulness is present' contains a temporal 'is'".] **Dorothy Wrinch.** 'Aspects of Scientific Method.' [This paper is in line with previous papers of the same writer, but is concerned specially with the logical significance of Schrödinger's theory of quantum phenomena as contrasted with Bohr's: 'the *ad hoc* postulate of Bohr's theory becomes a deducible consequence in Schrödinger's theory'.] **L. A. Reid.** 'Beauty and Significance.' [A discussion of significance and

expression as the constituent elements of beauty.] **R. G. Collingwood.** 'Political Action.' [Proposes to put the central question of political theory, not in the form 'What are the attributes of the State?' but in the form 'What is political action?' Political action consists in the making and obeying of laws, and the political good is order as such. The making and obeying of laws rest on the freedom and reason of individuals; and 'there is thus, within the personality of the individual, a court of ultimate appeal before which all particular claims must state their case'—the claims of the State as well as those of other associations. This seems to be a fundamentally pluralistic view, but the writer professes to distinguish his position from pluralism.] **W. R. Matthews.** 'Religion as Interpretation.' [Religion, like other forms of man's spiritual life, springs from a sense of continuity with an 'other' which is not alien to the self. It seeks satisfaction for two salient needs of the human self, the need for unity and the need for the substantiation of value.] **E. M. Whetnall.** 'Symbol Situations.' [A long paper on the uses of symbols—demonstrative, descriptive, etc.—and on the nature of the 'referends' to which the symbols refer. The paper is in general clearly written, but makes considerable use of Cambridge technicalities, and has a few sentences such as the following: "In some cases, for instance, in the case of descriptively used symbols, no reference is made to any non-structural part of the whole referend, but this referend has a compound structure while one of its component complex constituents is the referend of the descriptive symbol."] **C. A. Mace.** 'Belief.' [The general character of the paper may be inferred from the fact that the first part of it is concerned with the Ramsey-Moore symposium of 1927. The rest of the paper has for its aim to 'develop hypothetically' the doctrine 'that the occurrence of any cognitive event whatever, be it of the perceptual type or of the type exemplified by belief, involves the existence of objects, some at least of which are independent of my existence'. If the object is the object of the belief and the belief happens to be about myself, the object can hardly be 'independent of my existence'. But otherwise the doctrine seems obvious enough, though its author is content to regard it as merely plausible.] **W. D. Ross.** 'The Nature of Morally Good Action.' ["The notion of the morally good must be sharply distinguished from that of the right. It is only the doing of certain things, irrespective of the motive from which they are done, that is right. It is only the doing of things from certain motives that is morally good." These opening sentences of the paper state a distinction which underlies the whole of the subsequent discussion of such topics as the sense of duty and its relation to other motives, and the question whether morally good actions have a common character and, if so, what that is. We are told that 'the drawing of a rigid distinction between the right and the morally good frees us from much confusion'; but the drawing of rigid distinctions is apt to produce clearness at too great a cost. This one, *e.g.*, leads immediately to the consequence that 'a right act, merely as such, has no value in itself.'] **G. Dawes Hicks.** 'Professor Eddington's Philosophy of Nature.' [The first part of the paper comments upon some of the paradoxes and seeming inconsistencies in Eddington's exposition which put difficulties in the way of the plain man's understanding of his physical theories. The second part shows some of the difficulties involved in the more philosophical doctrines to which the physical theories are thought to point. It is argued that the physical world cannot, even for the physicist, be restricted to a mere 'complex of metrical symbols,' that the background of mind-stuff

will not do the work required of it, and that the inferences regarding causal indetermination are very questionable.] **Hilda D. Oakeley** and **J. Macmurray**. Symposium: 'The Principle of Personality in Experience'. [Miss Oakeley's main contention is that 'it is the nature of personality, as essentially subject of value, which determines the experience of the world as history,' but the greater part of the paper is taken up with a consideration of McTaggart's views about the unreality of time. Macmurray rightly feels that the original subject has been side-tracked by this discussion of McTaggart's views, and returns to the question of personality and value. His argument turns upon a distinction between two kinds of knowing, 'personal' and 'impersonal'. Personal knowledge implies personality and value. Unfortunately the nature of the all-important personal knowledge is never clearly explained. As it is said to be 'at once simple, unanalysable and absolute,' perhaps we ought not to expect more than examples, but many disputable statements are made about or in connexion with it, among which this is one.] **J. H. Woodger**. 'Some Problems of Biological Methodology.' [An attempt to treat the problem of mechanism and vitalism, not in a controversial way, but from the point of view of scientific method. The writer calls attention to the ambiguities of some of the terms used and to the way in which different questions are intermingled in the controversy. He then tries to clear up the relation of the conceptions of 'machine' and 'organism' by starting with each in turn and seeing how far the characteristics of the one are present in the other. The general conclusion is that biology would do well to drop the old controversy and not allow the ideal of physico-chemical explanation to stand in the way of the development of concepts appropriate to the special data of the science.] **H. Wildon Carr**. 'The Fiftieth Session: A Retrospect.' [A very interesting account of the early years of the Society, with notices of some of the leading members.]

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME IX, 1929: *Knowledge, Experience and Realism*. **F. Granger**. Inaugural Address: 'Probability and Paradox.' [The aim of the address seems to be to suggest the limitations of mathematical method as applied to the interpretation of reality.] **G. E. Moore** and **H. W. B. Joseph**. Symposium: 'Indirect Knowledge'. [This discussion can hardly be summarised briefly, for Moore is drawing careful distinctions between different senses in which one piece of knowledge may be said to be "based" on another, *e.g.*, by way of inference or memory or causation, and Joseph is giving a similarly careful criticism of Moore's argument. The main point of the criticism is, that the all-important expression 'based on' is being applied to relations which are fundamentally different in kind and not species of one genus at all.] **J. D. Mabbott**, **G. Ryle**, and **H. H. Price**. Symposium: 'Negation'. [Mabbott distinguishes between two types of negative judgments: (1) those which eliminate a possibility; (2) those which express a failure to realise the true nature of a thing. The former, as contrasted with the latter, involve ignorance and are to some extent subjective. Ryle defends the objectivity of negation, and maintains "that a sentence involving a negative may be the expression of something that I *know*—in other words, that there are real negative facts." He also defends against Mabbott the view that disjunctive propositions may have particular things as subjects. Price, after remarking on this last contention and on the range of eliminative procedure, criticises (perhaps under a

misapprehension) the assumption in the previous papers of a connexion between negation and disjunction, and also comments on Mabbott's second type of (teleological) negations.] **J. Laird, C. E. M. Joad, and L. S. Stebbing.** Symposium: 'Realism and Modern Physics'. [Laird is quite sure that modern physics has not the least tendency to show that *sensa* are mental, and he therefore sets himself to demolish in summary fashion various possible arguments to the contrary. As one of the other contributors remarks, he "apparently sees no difficulties; this is to be regretted". Joad's contribution is interesting for the reason that he is a realist for whom the developments of modern physics have raised difficulties which he does not see how to meet. Modern physics seems to dissolve away our common sense realities, and modern physiology and physics together seem to undermine the realist theory of perception. Miss Stebbing argues that these difficulties do not affect the common-sense realities, but depend on a false opposition between these realities and the physicist's world.] **L. Wittgenstein.** Address: 'Logical Form'. [The task of the theory of knowledge is to find the ultimate 'atomic' propositions, and to devise an appropriate symbolism for expressing them. But the forms of such propositions cannot be foreseen; and the chief point made in the paper is that the consideration of degree shows that number must enter into the structure of some atomic propositions. From this it follows that atomic propositions may exclude each other—a result which is admitted to contradict a previous opinion of Wittgenstein's.] **G. Dawes Hicks, B. Edgell, and G. C. Field.** Symposium: 'Immediate Experience'. [Dawes Hicks's paper is written with previous discussions in view and works out his own position in relation to these. He first notices the views of Ward and Bradley, and then explains the view of immediate experience that is involved in the act-content-object analysis. He argues that feeling cannot be regarded as an act, and is rather to be identified precisely with the aspect of immediate experiencing which accompanies all awareness of objects. Stout's inclusion of presentations within immediate experience, and again Bradley's conception of immediate experience, must therefore be rejected. The main part of Miss Edgell's paper is devoted to showing the difficulty of reconciling some of the statements bearing on the subject of discussion that are contained in the various papers contributed by Dawes Hicks to the Aristotelian volumes. Her own view is that immediate experience is, or involves, a kind of cognition. Field (who had only the first paper before him) also thinks some sort of awareness is implied, but, as he concludes by doubting "whether we immediately experience anything but bodily states and processes," his ultimate position is rendered uncertain. Neither of the two later writers seems to realise the contradiction involved in making immediate experience an awareness of—itself.]

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. 35^e Année, No. 4. Octobre-Décembre, 1928. **V. Jankelevitch.** *Prologomènes au Bergsonisme.* [Why M. Jankelevitch should have called his paper "Prologomena" to Bergsonism is not clear. For, it is, in effect, a vivid and enthusiastic exposition and interpretation of Bergson's point of view, in its application to the five problems of Organic Totalities, Knowledge, Freedom, Teleology, and the concepts of Disorder and Nothingness. As a "metaphysic of intuition," Jankelevitch admits, "Bergsonism is but one system among others". Its originality lies in the "experience of duration" used as the clue to the solution of all the major problems of philosophy. This

experience yields that "central point of view" which enables us to comprehend, not mechanically, *i.e.*, by analysis into parts and their synthetic reconstruction out of parts, but organically, *i.e.*, grasping the whole fact in its living wholeness. Thus only shall we avoid the illusion, or fallacy, which vitiates most philosophy, *viz.*, the fallacy of "confounding the vital order of facts as lived with the logical order of reconstructed concepts". Movement and action are not truly understood except by moving and acting. Liberty which issues from the personality as a whole can be adequately conceived only "with the whole soul"—*σὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ*, as Plato has it. Decision does not really follow on, nor is it caused by, deliberation, but rather precedes deliberation and is *ex post facto* rationalised by it. Through this central point of view, life understands itself as a whole, and philosophy escapes beyond the reach of scepticism. "The philosophy of life is enveloped in certitudes." Throughout, the author draws interesting and provocative parallels between Bergson and Leibniz, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, and even Berkeley.] **A. Spaier.** *Pensée par universaux et pensée par individus.* [An interesting contribution to logical theory in the light of a re-examination of the distinction between universals and individuals. Starting from the Aristotelian distinction between *καθόλου* and *καθ' ἑκάστων*, the author examines critically the traditional classification of judgments by Formal Logic, according to the "quantity" of the subject, into universal, particular, and singular. He discusses also the criticisms of this scheme by Sigwart, Bosanquet, and others, and builds up a classification of his own, based on recognising universal and individual as two distinct and irreducible aspects of every datum of consciousness. Hence universal judgments on the one hand, deal with wholes, classes, genera, variables, types; particular judgments, on the other, with individuals, members of classes, values (for variables), cases or examples (of types). Under each head, subdivisions result from the various kinds of "indetermination". Thus universals are indeterminate in two ways: (a) quantitatively: "all" does not fix a definite number; (b) individually: one member of a class is not individualised as against another, because as members they are all equivalent. It is part of the author's new scheme to reckon the singular proposition the subject of which is a proper name among "particular" propositions, so that a syllogism in *Barbara*, in which such a proposition occurs as a minor premise, must be re-classified as *Darii*. In general, quantitative indefiniteness of the subject ("some") is not the differentia of the particular proposition, but the direction of thought upon individuals as such, or as exhibiting differences from a common class character, or as being exceptions to a rule. The universal proposition deals with essences and their necessary connexion, and only accidentally with the individuals in whom these essences are realised or exemplified.] **V. Delbos.** *Les facteurs Kantiens de la philosophie allemande du commencement du xix^e siècle.* X.—*La réaction contre l'idéalisme spéculatif: Schopenhauer.*—XI.—*Herbart.* [The final instalment of this series of articles in which the author has traced the factors in Kant's philosophy which have influenced each of his immediate successors, and the way in which these factors have been developed in their respective systems.] *Études Critiques: G. Gurvitch.* *La Philosophie phénoménologique en Allemagne: I.—Edmund Husserl.* [A compact, but clear and careful, exposition of what the author regards as the central theses of Husserl's Phenomenology. If it is a defect of this paper that the author, whilst repeatedly praising these theses as "valuable" and "fruitful", does not explain just where

their value and fruitfulness lie, it is, on the other hand, its merit that it concludes with some extremely shrewd and penetrating criticisms of the insufficiencies and lacunae in Husserl's Theory.] *Discussion.* **J. Benda.** *Réponse à l'article de M. Dugas.* [Argues with M. Dugas about the correct interpretation of Renouvier's views on the relation of art and science to morality, this being the wider question involved in the special problem (from which the discussion originally started) whether priests may carry their principles from the pulpit into the political arena.] Indices to Vol. 35. —Reviews of books and periodicals, French and Foreign.

36^e Année, No. 1. January-March, 1929. **Charles Renouvier et William James.** *Correspondence, éditée par R. B. Perry.* [A series of letters, most of them not previously published, which were exchanged between Renouvier and James between the years 1872 and 1882. The later ones especially contain a good deal of discussion on topics, such as pluralism and indeterminism, on which the two thinkers felt in sympathy with each other's views.] **A. Darbon.** *La Méthode synthétique dans l' "Essai" d'O. Hamelin.* [A long and very thorough study of the synthetic method, as employed in Hamelin's *Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation*. That knowledge is always systematic, seeking to construct a whole and thereby to apprehend reality as a whole; and that its method in this synthetic endeavour must inevitably be dialectical—these are the two fundamental convictions of which the *Essai* is the elaboration. In arriving at these convictions, Hamelin was influenced by Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Renouvier, but he differs from all his masters in the particular turn which he gives to the synthetic method as the philosopher's organ for achieving an understanding of the whole. After exhibiting these debts and differences, Darbon gives a careful exposition of Hamelin's "synthetic logic," showing, by way of an interesting discussion of traditional formal logic, whether in its narrower, syllogistic, or in its wider, relational, form, how Hamelin reaches his concept of "synthesis" through contrast with "analysis". For Hamelin, the synthetic movement of thought is carried beyond the given concept with which it starts (instead of staying analytically within its limits) by the insufficiency and inadequacy of that concept, as measured by thought's own implicit demand for, or *nisus* towards, the whole. Thus synthesis transcends its starting-point by seeking to make good the latter's deficiencies: "The dialectic movement goes from the abstract to the concrete". The rhythm of this movement is triadic—thesis, antithesis, synthesis; but thesis and antithesis are not, as in Hegel's version of the dialectic method, contradictories, but differentials which are complementary. [This may be compared to Croce's argument in "What is living and what is dead in Hegel's philosophy".] Darbon ends with some extremely interesting and subtle reflections on the two methods of (a) arguing from the highest category, the Whole, downwards to the lowest—which would seem to be "analysis," and (b) arguing from the lowest category upwards to the Whole, which is Hamelin's "synthesis". He suggests that analysis and synthesis cannot be absolutely opposed, as Hamelin would have it, but must be complementary. For, the lower categories could not be recognised as deficient, except in the light of the whole, however vaguely apprehended, of which they are inadequate characterisations, so that the Whole is, in a way, given and present throughout, and is, in fact, being analysed in the very process of being synthetically constructed.] **E. Rignano.** *La Morale de l'harmonie de la vie.* [A preliminary sketch of the argument of a book the completion of which will occupy the author for several years to come. The Highest Good is

an earthly good, to be achieved by human nature gaining knowledge of, and control over, itself and its environment. The form of this Good is Harmony—the satisfaction, without friction, conflict, or loss, of the largest number of human impulses, alike in the individual and in the society of individuals. It will be a harmony of intense joys, in which the “spiritual” rank above the “material,” though the latter have their legitimate place and are not to be denied on the ground of alleged inherent wickedness. Pain, sorrow, dissatisfaction, ascetic self-denial will be at a minimum. Rignano attempts to show that whatever is sound in traditional systems of morals, including the Christian, conforms to, and is justified by, this principle of harmony, which is also the wise man’s infallible guide in steering his own conduct. He suggests that devotion to this principle may in the future satisfy man’s need of religion, for religion at its best is only another name for “idealist aspiration.”] *Études Critiques*: **E. James**. *Un nouveau Théoricien du socialisme: Henri de Man*. [An appreciative review of the Belgian Socialist de Man’s book *Zur Psychologie des Socialismus*, translated into French as *Au delà du marxisme*. De Man faces the fact that Marx’s materialistic interpretation of history, with the prophecies based upon it, has been belied by the actual course of events; and that his equally materialistic (or economic) interpretation of the motives of conduct of the working classes is a fiction as much out of touch with actual working-class psychology as was the “economic man” of nineteenth century economics. He shows how Marx, though his sympathy and anger were aroused by genuine social evils and injustices, misinterpreted their causes and their remedies under the influence of the false, or at least inadequate, psychological, philosophical, and economic theories of his age, which he uncritically took over. De Man bases his own tentative suggestions towards a reconstruction of socialist theory on the interesting thesis that, like democracy, socialism, in taking seriously the ideal of the equality of all men, is embodying in the modern world, and against its prevailing standards of value, the essential spirit of Christianity.] *Variétés*: **L. Dugas** and **J. Benda**, in three further communications, two by the former, one by the latter, continue their argument, begun in previous issues, concerning Renouvier’s attitude towards the problem whether ministers of religion are entitled to seek to influence politics (and practical affairs in general) in the name of moral and religious ideals. They end by agreeing to differ.—Summary of the proceedings at the meetings of the *Société française de Philosophie*, 1901-1927.—Book reviews, French and Foreign.—Periodicals.—Correspondence.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. xxxi^e Année, Deuxième série, No. 24. Novembre, 1929. **N. Balthasar**. *La réalité de la relation finie d'après S. Thomas*. [Defence of the view of Cajetan that, according to Thomas, there is a real distinction between a “real relation” and its *fundamentum* against the opposite thesis of Javellus and Hervaeus that the relation is identical with its *fundamentum*.] **P. de Munnynck**. *L'idée de l'être (concl.)*. [A lucid exposition of the doctrine of “analogical” knowledge, with special reference to its bearing on the Kantian “agnosticism”. As the author says, though Kant has written at such length of the “analogies of experience,” the precise conception of “analogy of proportion” as its significance is entirely absent from the *Kritik*.] **E. Pialat**. *Une conception nouvelle de la vie psychique, la “Gestalttheorie”*. [The first instalment of this study of the work of Wertheimer, Köhler,

and Koffka is largely historical, dealing chiefly with the reaction against associationism in Psychology.] **P. Nève.** *La philosophie en Belgique* (1918-27). [Extracts from the report recently presented to the Belgian Government, on the strength of which the decennial philosophical prize was awarded to M. P. Decoster. The report calls attention to two very interesting facts, the great output of philosophical work in post-war Belgium, and the complete refutation of the prophecy that the thought of the years immediately after a desolating war would be "realistic" in the bad sense. The most striking event of these years has been Decoster's advocacy of an intuitionist ultra-intellectualism which verges on solipsism.] Account of the activities of the *Société philosophique* of Louvain in 1928-29. Programme of University courses for 1929-30. *Chronique.* Reviews, etc.

xxxii^e Année, Deuxième série, No. 25. Février, 1930. **O. Lottin.** *Les traités sur l'Âme et les vertus de J. de la Rochelle.* [The treatise of *virtutibus* was originally attributed to the Franciscan John of Rochelle on the ground that in the first manuscript of it to be studied it follows immediately on his *Summa de anima*. Two other MSS. are now known which prove the treatise to be the third part of a work *de divisione potentialium animae*, and in one of them it is formally ascribed to John of Rochelle. It can be shown that this treatise was known to and used by the author of the *Summa*, who, however, carefully eliminates its explicit appeals to Aristotle, and also that it must have been composed between 1228 and 1245. Either it is the work of a writer anterior to John of Rochelle, or it is a youthful production written when his interests were more philosophical than theological. The change in the attitude to Aristotle in the *Summa* would then be accounted for by the anti-Aristotelian measures of Gregory IX. in 1231. According to L. this is provisionally the better hypothesis.] **J. Henry.** *Pour le réalisme indirect.* [An "indirect realism" is not shown to be impossible by the arguments commonly used by the direct realist. If we accept the principle that "nothing can pass of itself from potentiality to act," we may start from the "content of consciousness" as a datum, noting that the activity of consciousness is intermittent and that consciousness contains sensible elements. Sense, no less than intelligence, "passes from potentiality to act," and the process requires a "mover". This "mover" cannot be found in intelligence, since the character of sense-cognitions is enough to show that the "mover" must be intrinsically dependent on matter; it must therefore be entirely without the self.] **E. Piatat.** *Une Conception nouvelle de la vie psychique, la "Gestalttheorie" (concl.).* [A sympathetic and lucid account of the main positions of the *Gestalttheorie* and the experimental evidence in support of them. It may be observed that the author is apparently unacquainted with Stout's *Analytic Psychology*. He would have found the main principle of the *Gestaltpsychologen* already clearly enunciated there in advance.] **Á. de Ivanka.** *Sur la composition du de Anima d'Aristote.* [Directed against Jaeger's view that Aristotle's development is away from Platonic metaphysics to positivism. The author argues that there is a real unity of plan and spirit throughout the *de Anima*, and that, if it were otherwise, it is the more "empirical" sections which would more naturally be regarded as the earlier. (Burnet apparently held that they are so.)] **G. Legrand.** *La théorie de l'État.* [Deals with the *Traité général de l'État* of M. de la Bigne de Villeneuve (1929) of the French Law school of Cairo.] **N. Balthasar.** *Le VII^e Congrès National Italien de Philosophie.* **P. Van Steenberghen.** *Bulletin d'histoire de la philosophie médiévale en Occident.* [Notices of a large number of works in this field published since 1926.] Reviews, etc.

VIII.—NOTES.

WILLIAM JAMES LECTURESHIP.

By a gift of the late Edgar Pierce, Ph.D. Harvard, 1895, and author of *The Philosophy of Character*, a Lectureship in honour of William James has been established in Harvard University. Dr. Pierce was at one time Instructor in Psychology at Harvard, and later a member of the Visiting Committee for the Department of Philosophy and Psychology. Appointments will be made to this Lectureship at least biennially, the appointees being in residence at the University and participating in the regular instruction. Prof. John Dewey will be the first lecturer on this foundation. During the spring term beginning February 1931, he will deliver a series of ten public addresses on a topic not yet announced. The subjects covered in the William James Lectures are not limited in any way, beyond the general condition that they must fall within the field of philosophy and psychology. The lectures will appear in book form.

SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Seventh International Congress of Philosophy will meet, 1st to 5th September, 1930, at Oxford, England.

Prospective members of the Congress are requested to send in their applications as soon as possible, together with their membership fees (for active members, £1; for associates—wives and families of members—10s.) to the Secretary, Mr. A. H. Hannay, 74 Grosvenor Street, London, W.1., who will send them registration cards and record their names on the roll of the Congress. Members who pay by postal order or through a bank are requested to notify the Treasurer at the same time so that the payment can be identified. All payments should be in English money. Members will be entitled to a return ticket at a reduced fare from any place in the United Kingdom to Oxford.

Accommodation will be provided at the following Colleges: Corpus Christi College, Hertford College, St. Hilda's College, Magdalen College, Merton College, Oriel College, New College. The general charge will be 12s. 6d. a day. Delegates and members desiring accommodation should state particulars on the application form.

The sessions of the Congress will be held at the Examination Schools, Oxford. The Secretary's office will be in the Examination Schools and will be open from Saturday, 30th August, 1930. Members of the Congress should register at the office as soon as possible after their arrival at Oxford. Letters or telegrams for members may be addressed to the office for the duration of the Congress.

MIND ASSOCIATION: ANNUAL MEETING.

The Annual Meeting of the Mind Association will be held this year at the Examination Schools, Oxford, on Monday, 1st September, at 5 p.m.

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